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Apollo 13 was launched from Cape Kennedy, Florida, on April 11, 1970. 
Approximately 56 hours in to  the  mission,. it was aborted due t o  a massive 
fa i lu re  of the  cryo O2 system of the SEA. An investigation team was es- 
tablished t o  determine the cause of t h i s  fa i lure  and define an appropri- 
a t e  course of action t o  be followed by the Manned Spacecraft Center t o  
allar a timely continuation of ma,nned exploration of the moon and space. 
The Apollo 13 investigation team was made up of several panels. This 
report is the resu l t  of 3 part of the investigation conducted by Panel 6 
and i s  limited t o  consideration of Commnnd and Service Module hardware 
only. Other reports are being prepared for t h a t  par t  of the Panel 6 in- 
vestigation which pertains t o  LM hardware, GFE har-cware and GSE hardware. 
'Ibis report contains the resu l t s  of an evaluation of systems other than 
the cry0 O2 tank portion of the  EPS which might possess the potential  
for the  same general c lass  of fai lures.  
The following general outline was used f a r  t h i s  report: 
1.0 Introduction 
2.0 CSM Pressure Vessel Summary 
3.0 Subsystem Assassment 
3.1 Environmental Control Subsystem 
3.2 Electr ical  Power Subsystem 
3.3 cM Reaction Control Subsystem 
3.4 SM Reaction Control Subsystem 
3.5 Servics Propulsion Subsystem 
3 . 6 Mechanical Subsystem 
4.0 Assessment of Damage Potential 
5.0 Conclusions 
6.0 Recommenaations 
Table 2.0 - APOLLO C O W  AM) SERVICE MODULE PRESSURE VESSELS, i den t i -  
f i e s  t h e  pressure vesse ls  of t h e  CSl4 used fox s torage of consumable 
f lu ids .  I n  addi t ion,  t he  SM f u e l  c e l l  pressure shell is included i n  
t h i s  l i s t  even though it is not a s torage vessel. The CM en t ry  arid pyro 
b h t t e r i e s ,  while not included i n  t h i s  summary table, are considered as 
pressure vesse ls  and were given t h e  same review t h a t  a l l  of t he  l i s t e d  
vesse ls  were given. They a r e  included as par t  of t h e  EPS and are cover- 
ed i n  Section 3.2.4. 
TABLE 2.0.- APOLLO COWAND SERVICE HOWLE PRESSURE VESSELS 
* FACTCS OF SAFETY. ACTUAL = LOWEST ACTUAL TES7 BURST PRESSURE 
THEOP.ETICAL - DESIGN BURST PRESSURE 
- m- 
** SEE SECTION 4. 
I 
W 
TNT ** 
EQUXVALEtJCE MANUFACTURER 
HENASCO 
NORMAL 
OPER. 
PRESS 
4240 
295 
295 
4240 
192 
192 
192 
192 
QUAL. 
BURST 
8600 
885 
1040 
7310 
567 
603 
885 
1040 
I BELL/AIRITE 
BELL/AIRITE 
AIR) FEDEsIGN) ( AC 
6ELL/kIRIrE 
BELL/AIRITE 
BELL/AIRITE 
BELL/AIR!l'E 
L 
* 
QUANTITY 
REQUIRED 
2 
2 
2 
4 
4 
' 
4 
4 
4 
PART NUMBER 
282-0002 
282-0006 
282-0007 
282-0051 
282-0004 
282-0008 
282-0006 
282-0007 
SYSTEM 
CM 
RCS 
SM 
RCS 
, F/SAFETY 
ACTUAL 
1.7 
2.5 
2.9 
1.6 
2.3 
2.4 
2.0 
4.2 
PRESSURE VESSEL 
PRESSURE TANK HE- 
LIUM 
PROPELLANT TANK 
OXIDIZER 
PROPELLANT TANK 
FUEL 
PRESSURE TANK HE- 
LIUY 
PROPELLANT TANK 
PRIMRY OXIDIZER 
PROPELLANT TANK 
PR!M4RY FUEL 
PROPELLANT TANK 
SECONDARY OXIDIZER 
PROPELLANT TANK 
SECONDARY FUEL 
THEO.- 
1.5 
2.0 
2.0 
1.55 
1.5 
1.5 
1.5 
1.5 
VESSEL 
0IMEI'C;IONS 
8.92 DIAMETER 
0.102 
19.907 X 
12.6 
0.022 
17.32 X 
12.6 
0.622 
12.C DIAMETER 
0.132 
27.563 X 
12.6 
0.017 
22.722 X 
12.6 
C.017 
13.907 X 
12.6 
0.022 
17.32 X 
12.6 
0.022 
VESSEL 
MATERIAL 
TITANIUM 
6A1-4V 
TITANIUM 
t6A1-4V 
TITANIUM 
.6A1-4V 
TITANIUM 
6A1-4V 
TITANIUM 
6A1-4V 
TITANIUM 
6A1-4V 
TITANIUM 
6A1-4V 
TITANIUM 
6A1-4V 
BURST 
7500 
710 
110 
7000 
460 
460 
710 
710 
DESIGN 
LIMIT 
5000 
360 
360 
4500 
248 
248 
248 
238 
PRESSURES 
PROOF 
6667 
480 
480 
5985 
331 
331 
480 
480 
TABLE 2 . 0 .  APOLLO COI~IMANC AND SERVICE MODULE PRESSURE VESSELS (CONT) 
* DUE TO S I M I L A T I T Y  TO RLOCK i ' ,  ONLY ONE BLOCK I 1  SPS PROPELLANT TANK WAS QUALIF ICATION TESTED (51 I h .  DIAMETER SUMP TANK). 
TABLE 2.0. APOLLO COMMAND AND SERVICE MODULE PRESSURE VESSELS (COFT) 
SYSTEM F 
MECHAN- 
SYSTEM 
PRESSURE VESSEL 
SURGE TANK O2 
CABIN REPRESS. O2 
RESERVOIR GLYCOL 
WATER TANK POTABLE 
WATER TANK WASTE 
FIRE EXTINGUISHER (CM) 
PRESSURE TANK HATCH 
GN2 (CM) 
PRESSURE TANK DOCKING 
PROBE GN2 (CM) 
PRESSURE TANK PAN 
CAMERA GN2 (SM) 
PART NUMBER 
V-16-613059 
282-0048 
282-0049 
812373 
812260 
ME280-0010- 
0003 
ME282-0052 
-0005 
ME901-0697 
-0005 
ME282-0051 
quANTIry1 VESSEL VESSEL 
MATERIALS 
INCONEL 
718 
INCONEL 
718 
6061-76 
6061-T6 
6061-T6 
STAINLESS 
STEEL 304 
IhCONEL 
718 
INCONEL 
118 
TITANIUM 
6A1-4V 
REQUIRED 
1 
3 
1 
1 
2 
4 
1 
DIMENSIONS 
14.00 X 
13.00 
0.033/0.078 
12.62 X 6.92 
0.028/0.045 
5.0 DIAMETER 
X 7.5 
0.062 
1.0 DIAMETER 
X 8.0 
1.0 DIAMETER 
X 8.0 
12.0 DIAMETEP 
0.135 
DESIGN PRESSURES OPER, 
PRESS 
910 
910 
50WG 
18-2702 
18-22H 
18-270~c 
18H 0 
18-$70~ 
85 
50UO 
5000 
4000 
LIMIT 
1020 
1210 
60% 
2702 
4 M  0 
270; 
40H 0 
270: 
250 
5000 
5000 
4500 
PROOF 
1356 
1600 
90WG 
4002 
64H 0 
400: 
64H 0 
400: 
400 
10500 
10500 
5985 
BURST 
1530 
1800 
lM 
lOOH 0 
1000; 
1OOH 0 
1000: 
1000 
14000 
14000 
7000 
F/SAFITY QUAL 
B:JRSf 
2150 
2767 
420 
1LWH20 
llM2 
1660 
1910fi 
20406 
19 100 
20400 
7800 
ACTUAL 
2.1 
2.3 
2.2H20 
4.002 
1YEO. 
1.5 
1.5 
2'5 
2.5H 0 
3 . 7 0  
TNy 
EQUIV. MANUFACT. 
AIRITE 
AIRITE 
b 
3.1 ENV IRONMENTAL COilTROL SUBSYSTEM (ECS ) 
This section pertains t o  the 02 port ion o f  the ECS a ~ d  i s  res t r i c ted  
t o  those components which inter face with 20 psia o r  greater (normal 7y 
a f t e r  a s ingle fa i l u re ) .  Those components which inter face wi th  less 
than 20 psia 02 were and w i l l  be ve r i f i ed  acceptable by the non-metallic 
material task which i s  the respons ib i l i ty  o f  PD9/J. Craig. 
A schematic i s  provided i n  Figure 3.1-1. For ease o f  reference, 
the fami l i a r  ECS schematic number f o r  each component i s  shown and t h i s  
number i s  then used i n  the text .  
The ECS compor3nts are divided i ~ t o  2 parts, mechanical components 
(9 pressure vessels, and 22 :ine components ) , e lec t r i ca l  components 
(8 conponents). Br ie f ly ,  the find'ngs o f  the CM, ECS, Apollo 13 re la ted 
study indicated the fo l lowing areas requir ing addi t ional  e f f o r t :  
a) Potable and waste quanti ty gaging systems f o r  e f f ec t  of  
e l ec t r i ca l  short. 
b)  Exposed non-metallics ( a f t e r  a s ingle f a i l u re )  which have 
been accepted by s i m i l a r i t y  f o r  acceptance by MSC. 
c)  02 control panel and ECU 100 and 900 psi  aluminum l ines  f o r  
adjacent e l ec t r i ca l  sources. 
d) Cyclic accumulator control valve (1.36), 02 f low transducer 
(9.2) and 100 psi  system pressure transducer (9.8) f o r  
completion o f  review -- Engineering drawings were not 
avai lable a t  time o f  t h i s  wr i t ing.  
For s v m r y  and recomnendations, see beginning of each section and for 
detai 1s see the indiv idual  component. 
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3.1.1 Mechani cal Components 
3.1.1.1 Pressure Vessels 
L is ted  below i n  Table 3.1.1 . l -1  are the pressure vessels and a 
sumnary o f  t h i s  study. The tab le  shows t ha t  the only area o f  concern 
are the two water tanks. The concern i s  the quant i ty  gaging e lect ron ics 
i n  the potable and waste tanks which are exposed t o  25 ps ia  oxygen i n  
f l i g h t  and 35 ps ia  on the ground along w i t h  the anomalies o f  the gaging 
system experienced on CSM 103, 108, and 109. It i s  possible w i t h  a 
shor t  i n  the gaging system t o  cause i g n i t i o n  wi th  probable loss 
o f  the gaging system and possibly, but  less probable, the ' loss o f  the 
tank. Both these tanks are outside the cabin i n  the a f t  compartment 
and loss o f  the tank would probably not  damage any other equipment. 
The power input  t o  the O2 exposed e lect ron ics i s  10 anp, 28 VDC 
supplied through two 5 amp c i r c u i t  breakers. Loss o f  potable tank reauires 
terminat ion o f  mission. The mission my be continued f o r  loss o f  waste 
tank. 
It i s  recomnended t h a t  the water quant i tv  gaging system be 
tested f o r  e f f e c t  o f  e l e c t r i c a l  shor t  and redesigned o r  deleted 
depending on resu l ts  o f  t e s t  and trade-off  studies. 
Table 3.1.1.1-1. ECS Pressure Vessel Sumnary 
I tem 
Surge Tank (70.1) 
Repress tanks (70.3) 
Glysc~l Reservni r (2.29) 
Potable Tank (5.10) 
Waste Tank (5.15) 
Cycl i c  Accumulator (1.29) 
Non ~ e t a m  
-I
Static  ! 
S l iZ lnp impait  
:s 
txposed 
A f t e r  
Single 
Fai 1 ure 
OK 
OK 
- 
OK 
OK 
- 
E lec t r i ca l  
I A f t e r  
Fai I ure* 
Trends 
- 
- 
~ - 
Yes 
Yes** 
I - 
 
- 
Yes 
Yes 
Note: ( - )  indicates not  appl f cable 
*Fai lure trends r e l a t i v e  t o  pressure increases o r  excessive thermal environments 
*Yes, by s i m i l a r i t y  w i th  potable tank. 
- 
- 
- 
The detai  1 informat ion f o r  the ind iv idua l  pressure vessels fol lows. 
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MECHANICAL COMPONENTS 
Subsys tem: Envi ronrnental Control 
Component: O2 surge Tank 70.1 
Quani ty :  1 
Part  No. V16-613034, Figure 3.1.1.1.1-2 &-3 
Location: L e f t  Hand Equipment Bay. Figure 3.1.1 .l. 1-1 
Description and Function 
The Surge Tank stores approximately 3.7 Ibs o f  02 a t  900 psig for use 
during entry, and f o r  augmenting the SM supply when the operational demand 
exceeds. the f low capacity o f  the i n l e t  res t r ic tors ,  and i s  redundant w i th  
the repress tanks f o r  these functions. 
Pressure Control Components 
The surge tank incorporates the fo l lowing components which are located 
i n  l i n e  i n  the high pressure supply l i ne :  
1. Re1 i e f  Provisions: Surge Tank rel ieves through the pressure re1 i e f  
valve ( i tem 4.27) which operates a t  1045 2 25 psig. The pressure 
r e l i e f  f low i s  3.4 l bs l h r  minimum a t  1070 psig. 
2. Surge tank shutof f  valve (item 4.26) which provides a means for 
shut t ing o f f  the 02 flow. 
3. A pressure transducer i tem (70.2) which puts out a signal propor- 
t i ona l  t o  surge tank pressure f o r  telemetry and f o r  display t o  
the crew. 
Internal  Parts and Materials: See Table 3.1.1 .l. 1-1 
E f fec t  o f  Component Loss 
Continue mission, a l l  phases, i so la te  surge tank through surge tank S/O 
valve ( i  tem 4.26). Place repress package valve t o  f i  11 . 
Burst Damage Effect :  See Section 4 
Structural Assembly 
Dimension: 14.0" x 13.0" 
Size: .742 cu.ft. 
Manufacturer: Marquardt 
Tank is. made up o f  two forgings and each forging i s  machined. The 
two machined ha!ves are welded i n  the middle f o r  a width o f  1.0" 
forming the tank. 
Fai lure Mode 
Four (4) C2 Surge tanks S / N O ~  001, 002, 003 and 004 were subjected 
t o  hydrostat ic t es t  by Associated Engineering Test Laboratories. 
The demonstrated burst pressures on the 1st  three (3) tanks were 
2340, 2150 and 2280 psig respectively. No burst  pressure was conducted 
on tank S/N 004. 
Photographs o f  the t e s t  specimnt a f t e r  burst (see f i g .  3.1 .I .1.1-4) 
indicated tha t  the rupture was located near the proximity o f  the 
machined in le ts /out le ts  and not by the weld. 
Although no fragmentation can be detected from t h i s  test ,  since i t i s  a 
hydrostat ic test,  y e t  the tank w i l l  fragment a t  mte r ia l / s t ress  
combination a t  these burst  pressures. 
The design burst  pressure i s  1520 psig and the nominal operating 
pressure i s  900 psig. The safety factors are: 1.5 design and 2.1 
t o  2.29 actual. 
SURGE TANK SHUTOFF /SUIT INLET DISTRIBUTION DUCT 
FIGURE 3.1.1.1,l- 1. INSIDE ECS INSTA%TATTON 
TANK 
,742 
INNER VOL,. 
FIGURE 3.1.1.1.1-2 SURGE TANK INTERFACES- 70.1 
1 2  
FIGURE 3.1.1.1.1-3 SURGE TANK INTERFACES - 70.1 
13 
SURGE TANK 70.1 
iilATERIALS 
METALL I C 
NON-METALL I C
ITEM 
1 
2 
a 
3 
4 
5 
i 
Table3.1 .I. 1.1-1 Surge Tank Mater iz ls  
14 
PART NAME 
Tank Assembly 
Plug 
Seal 
F i t t i n g  
Tubing 
Wire (Safety) 
I 
MATERIAL i 
Inconel 718 
Same 
304 cres - AMS5639 
Cres Per OQ-S-763(300 5er ies) 
304 L Cres. 
MA01 01 -005 ( Inconel per QQ-W-390) 
Appl icat .  
g 2 g  
% -. u 
a a 5 A. 0 
O 7 c t  
(P 
X 
Surface 
Area 
2 I n .  
N 
0.04 
N 
ec 
Maximum 
" F 
PSIA Temp. 
Use- 
age 
Cat. 
Nonmetal 1 i c 
Mater ia l  
Name 
Cat. 
D 
Eval. 
W t .  
Lbs. 
Lubeco 905 
Epon 828/Vers 11 5 
Lam. Shim Stock 
"0" R i  fig Butyl  
C 
I 
N 
N 
N 
- 
1086.5 160 D 
B 
! B 

MECHANICAL COMPOMENTS 
Subsystem: Environmental Control 
Conqonent: O2 Repress ial8is 
Quantity: 3 
Pzrt  No. : HE282-0048 See Figure 3.1 .l. 1.2-1 & 2. 
Location: Below hatch. See Figure 3.1.1.1.2-3. 
Description and F~1:ction: 
Each repress tank (connected t o  comnon manifold) c o ~ t a i n s  1 l b  o f  02 a t  
900 psig f o r  use during entr;c and f o r  augumenting the SH supply when the 
operational demand exceeds the flow capacity o f  the i n l e t  res t r i c to rs  and i s  
redundant wi th the surge tank f o r  these functions. I n  addition, i t  provides 
Direct  02 f o r  the emergency face masks. 
Pressure Control Cyponents : 
1. Rel ief  Provisions: The repress tanks re l ieve through the pressure 
r e l i e f  valve (item 72.3) which can be isolated by a manual valve 
(item 72.1). The r e l i e f  valve operates a t  1045 + 25 psig w i th  a 
pressure r e l i e f  f low o f  3.4 l b s j h r  minimum a t  SO70 psig. 
2. A check valve i s  located downstream f o r  i so la t ion  and a valve f o r  
manual i so la t ion  and f i l l  around the check valve. 
3. A d i r ec t  reaaing pressure gage (item 72.4) i s  avai lable t o  the crew. 
Internal  Parts and Materials: See Table 3.1.1.1.2-1. 
Ef fec t  of Cmponsnt Loss: 
- 
Continue mission a I 1 phases. Iso la te  repress tanks w i th  f i l  l / i so l a t i on  
valve ( i tem 4.34). 
3urst Damage Effect:  See Section 4 
Structurai Assembly- 
Dimension: 12.5" x 7.0" 
Size: .22 cu. ft. 
Manufacturer: A i  r i t e  
Tank i s  made up o f  two forgings and each forging i s  machined. The two 
machined halves are welded i n  the middle f o r  a !.ridth o f  1.0" forming 
the tank. 
Fai lure Mcde 
Two (2) Repress tanks S/NO' 0009 and 0010 were subjected t o  hydrostat ic 
t e s t  by Durkee Environmental Laboratories, Inc. 
The demonstrated burst pressures were 3437 and 3406 psig respectively. 
Ph~tographs o f  the t e s t  specimen a f t e r  burs t  are shown i n  Figure 3.1.1 .l-4. 
Although no fragmentation can be detected from t h i s  test,  since i t  i s  a 
hydrostat ic test, y e t  the tank w i l l  fragment a t  mater ia l ls t ress combination 
a t  these burst  pressures and w i l l  leak wi th  no fragmentation a t  the l i m i t  
pressure. 
The design burst pressure i s  1800 psig, the nominal operating pressure i s  
900 psig and the l i m i t  i s  1210 psig. The safety factors are: 1.5 design 
and 2.8 actual. 
Figure 3.1 .1 .1 .2-1 .  Repress Tank Interfaces-70.3 18 
DETAIL B (SCALE: q )  
FIGURE 3 .1 .1 .1 .2 -2  REPRESS TANK INTERFACES - 70-3 
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REPRESS BOTTLES 70.3 
MATERIALS 
METALL I C 
NON-METALLI C 
"0" Ring - Material - Butyl Per MB0130-028 
- 
ITEM 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
Table 3.1.1.1.2-1 Repress Bottles Materials 
PART NAME 
Bottles (3) 
Seal 
Retainer 
Fi t t ings 
Fit t ings 
Lub. Thd. Fi t t ings 
Tubing 8 Fit t ings 
MATERIAL 
Inconel 718 
MS28773-04 
- 304 Cres. - AMS 5639 
304 Cres. - AMS 5639 
MBOl40-005 
304 L Cres. 
BURST Tl%T 
Burst 
k v e l  
S/N 9 
Figure 3.1 .l. 1.2-4 REPRESS BOTTLES BURST TEST 
2 2 
MFCHANICAL COMPONENTS 
Subsystem: Environmental Control 
Component: Water Glycol Reservoir 
Quant i ty :  1 
Par t  No.: ME282-0049, SeeFi~ure3.1.1.1.3-1 
Location: L e f t  Rand Equipment Bay 
Descript ion and Function: 
The Glycol reservo i r  contains approximately 8.2 Ibs  of water a lvco l  a t  7rI0F, 
i t  contains reserve suoply o f  1J/G and subst i tu tes  f o r  f a i l e d  accumulator. n2 i s  
used t o  oressurize the bladder f o r  W/G e x ~ u l s i o n  a t  zero c .  
Pressure Control Components: 
1. Re l i e f  Provisions: The (2) water and s l vco l  tanks nressure reaulators 
( i tem 5.24) provides r e l i e f  t o  the  reservoi r .  The f u l l  r e l i e f  flow i s  - 
9 Ibs/hr  @ 27 nsia. 
2. Two i s o l a t i o n  valves i n l e t  and o u t l e t  i t e m  2.28 are incornorated i n  
the system t o  i s o l a t e  W/G. There i s  no i s o l a t i o n  nrov is ion  fo r  the 
O2 side. 
3. 02 Pressure x-ducer ( i tem 74.0) t o  measure tk o u t l e t  pressure o f  the 
water and q lyco l  tanks reaulator .  
I n te rna l  Parts and Mater ia ls  : See Table 3.1.1.1.3-1. 
E f f e c t  o f  Component Loss : 
External Leakage 02 and/or Water Glycol 
Mission terminat ion due t o  loss  o f  a l l  tank pressur izat ion canahi1it.y and 
f r e e  f l u i d  hazard which has t o x i c  e f f e ~ t  nn crew. 
LM environment ( i f  avai lab le)  may be used f o r  ear th return.  
St ruc tu ra l  Assembly 
Dimension : 12.07" x 4.72" x 5.82" 
Size: 210 cu. in .  
Manufacturer: AiResearch 
The tank is made up of two (2) s h e l l s  having a thickness of .08 t o  .10 
with an expulsion bladder i n  t he  middle. The two halves a r e  bol ted  
together. 
Fa i lure  Mode 
One tank SIN0 46-102 was subjected t o  hydros ta t ic  t e s t  by AiResearch 
Manufacturing Division. The demonstrated b u r s t  pressure w a s  420 psig. The 
r e s u l t s  of the  CTR Data indicated t h a t  one b o l t  a t  end of tank broke and 
caused t h e  tank halves t o  separate .  The separa t ion  caused the  bladder t o  
blow out. I n  addi t ion,  a l l  b o l t s  and tank f lange  were bent.  
Two more t e s t s  on another specimentwere conducted, the  t e s t s  were f o r  
package l e v e l  dynamic t e s t  and mission l i f e  test. 
However, a s ide  from a premature tank f a i l u r e  the  system exhibi ted f a i l u r e  mode 
f o r  overpressurizat ion is  not  t he  water glycol  reservoi r .  With the  reservoi r  
i so l a t ed  overpressurizat ion causes e i t h e r  of t he  water tanks t o  f a i l  ( =  110 psig)  
p r i o r  t o  t he  r e se rvo i r  (420 psig) .  With the  r e se rvo i r  not  i s o l a t e d  i t  is  a l s o  
possible  t h a t  the  glycol  accumulator may f a i l .  (250 ps ig  from f a i l u r e  on CSM 
104 due t o  procedural e r r o r )  
The design bu r s t  pressures  is 150 ps ig  and the  nominal operat ing pressure is  
18-27 psig. The s a f e t y  f ac to r s  are 2.5 design and 7.0 ac tua l .  

Water Glycol Reservoi r Materi a1 
Metal 1 i c 
- 
- 
Item Par t  Name I Materi a1 
WIG Reservoir Assy 
Tank Halves 
Bracket 
Doubler 
H.T. t o  T.6 per MIL-H-6088 
& Anodi ze per MIL-A-8625, 
Type 1 
AL. Aly 6061 -T6 ,QQA-327 
AL. Aly 6061-0,QQ-A-327 
7 1 B a f f l e  1 U . A l y  6061-0,QQ-A-367 
She1 1 
6 / Flange 
1 F i t t i n g  I AL.Aly 6061-T6 ,QQ-A-325 AL. Aly  6061 -T6 ,QQ-A-327 
AL.Aly 6061-0,QQ-A-327 
AL.Aly 6061-T6 ,QQ-A-367 
Non M e t a l l i c  
Table-3.1.1.1.3-1 Water Glycol Reservoir Mater ia l  
25 
W t .  
Lbs . 
.001 
Neg . 
Neg. 
- 3  
.003 
.3 
Maxi mum 
OF 
PSIA TEMP. 
Use- 
age 
Cat. 
B 
El 
6 
D 
D 
F 
43.5 
J 
Surface 
Area 
In.  
.06 
.03 
13 
110 
.06 
110 
89 
Cat. 
D 
Eval. 
I 
C 
B 
Nonmetall ic 
Mater ia l  
Name 
EC 583 
Scotchcal 3650 
Dry F i lm  Lube 
Po ly i  sopreme Rubber 
L-9 
Poly i  sopreme Rubber 
9 
Applicat.  
" ' + I  V) - 
$ g u 3
2 9 . 3  C) 
0 cP rt 
X 
X 
. 
Mechanical Componente 
Subsystem: Environsental Control 
Componerit : Potable and waste water t a d  (5.10 & 5.15) 
Quantity: One (1) each 
P a r t  No. : ME192-0036-Potable; ME192-0008-Waste Figure 3.1.1.1.4-2 
Location: A f t  Compartment. See Figure 3.1.1,l. 4-1 
Description and Function: 
The potable and waate water tanks a r e  c y l i n d r i c a l  i n  ahare with pressurized bladder. 
The potable contains 39 l b s  of H20 and i s  used primarily f o r  metabolic purposes. 
The waste contains 59 pounds of water and is  used primarily f o r  s torage of 
water f o r  coolisg. The bladders a r e  pressurized wi th  25 ps ig  O2 thru  8 comu.an 
manifold which pressur izes  the  potable,  the  w a s t e  and t h e  glycol  reservoir .  The 
common manifold has no provisions t o  i s o l a t e  a tank. 
Pressure Control Components: 
1. Relief Provisions: The (2) water and glycol tanks pressure  regula tors  
(item 5.24) provides r e l i e f  t o  the  tanks. The f u l l  r e l i e f  flow is 9 lbs /h r  
@ 27 psig. 
2. O2 Bleed o r i f i c  down stream each tank f i l t e r  provides overboard r e l i e f .  
3. O2 pressure X-ducer (item 74.0) t o  measure the  o u t l e t  pressure of t h e  
water and glycol tanks regulator.  
I n t e r n a l  P a r t s  and Material: See Figures 3.1.1.1.4-2 & 3.1.1.1.4-3 
Note: A ro ta ry  potentiometer quant i ty  transducer is  located on each tank on 
t h e  O2 s i d e  of the  bladder. 
The water quant i ty  i s  measured by the amount the bladder i s  
displaced from the center. This i s  done as shown i n  Figure 3.1.1.1.4-3. 
Cal lout  23 i n  t h i s  f i gu re  contains the s ignal  condi t ioner  and the 
var iable res is to r .  The signal  condi t ioner i s  supplier! 28 VDC ( ~ i g .  3.1.1.1.4-5) 
through two 5 amp c i r c u i t  breakers. Both c i r c u i t  breakers are 
closed f o r  a l l  phases o f  countdown and f l i g h t .  Normal power con- 
sumption i s  40 ma f o r  each transducer. Thew i s  no fus ing f o r  the 
Apoi lo vehicles, however, the Skylab CM i s  incorporat ins  a 114 amp 
fuse. The transducer i s  open t o  the 02 pressure through a 0.095 
inch diameter hole less  the t e f l o n  coated wi re  running through i t  
of 0.021 inch diameter. This leaves an area o f  0.0067 sq. i n .  
Three i g n i t i o n  tes ts  were performed, 11/6/67 due t o  the ex- 
posure o f  the e lect ron ics  t o  the 02 pressure. The t e s t  was per- 
formed a t  20 psia 02 and the i s n i t i o n  source was t issue paper 
wrapped around n i  chrome wire. Sec! Figure 3 .l. 1.? .4-4. The t h w e  
tes ts  were s i m i l a r  except the i g n i  t i ~ n  1ocai;ion was varied. See below. 
rnCATI0N OF 
IGN SOURCE 
MATERIAL 
AND USE 
Contract vith RTV 9 FU'V 90 sealant for wire Surfcce burn 
lead thfu 
EPON 828 Encapsultation 25% of surface t ~ r n  
far  signal cond. 
Contact .ith Kl!V 
Helipot a t  wire 
Irad thru E m H  828 
No damage 
No damage 
Ro damage 
Sleeve a t  feed thru Cons& 
Teflon insu l .  wire 
contact with  EWE 828 
mri 628 
Fartially burned i n  
immediate vicinity 
50$ surface burn 
No other apparent 
w e  
l%e results of the above tests  indicate that the f i r e  is r z l f  extinguishing 
and muld not terninate the mission wr compmmlse crew safety. However, 
the test  vas performed ci t  a pressure of 20 psia, whereas the actual con- 
figuration pressure would be 35 to r( psta during the countdown a d  25 
psis during flight. In addition, a nichrome wire wraqed with tissue 
papper was the ignition source whereas the actual situation a s b r t  i n  
wiring would be the ignition source. If detailed analysis of the quantity 
gaging system ignitian tes t  and the theoretical failure aoalysis indicates 
a marginal factor of safety, then consideration should be given to repeating 
the ignition tes t  to  a better fidelity. 
Effect of Coqnent Bss: 
Mission termination due to drinking water, f ~ d  preperation and f i r e  
extinguish*-ng capa'Lilities are lost. Ibwever IM water ( i f  available) 
may be used to s9pplement CSM. 
Waste 
-
Continue mission. IM system ( i f  available) may be used to supplement 
CSM. Althugh no water-will be abailable for cooling, some power down 
m y  be required for Iunar Orbit. The& studies indicated that reeatry 
can be accomplished vitbout coaling. 
Burst Damage Effect: 
There would be no outside damage if the tank were to  burst pre- 
maturely at l i m i t  pressure. For pressure increase above limit 
pressure the failur. mde i s  deformation of the end plate allowing 
0, and water t o  escape. See Failure Mode Section follnving. 
L 
Structura l  Assembly 
Dimension : Potable - 12.25 x 9.9 
Waste - 12.25 x 16.0 
Size: Potable - 0.640 f t 3 
Waste - 0.962 f t  3 
Manufacture: AiResearch 
Tank is made up of seven major pa r t s  
1. Cylindrical portion 
2. TWO end caps welded t o  (1) 
3. Bladder assembly 
4. Two end pla tes  which holds and s e a l s  the  bladder. 
5. Quantity gaging system 
Failure Mcde 
The CTR burs t  tests and over pressurization accident on S/C 020 indicated the  
f a i l u r e  mode t o  be s t r ipping of the  center  b o l t  on the  end plates.  See Figure 
3.1.1.1.4-2. This allows both the  0 and the water t o  escape. Thus a f a i l u r e  of 2 t h i s  type would a lso  cause the  loss  of O2 pressure from the  other two tanks which 
a r e  t i ed  t o  the  common O2 manifold. 
H 0 Side 02 Side 
CTR Burst Test Data* %sig Psig 
Limit Prsssure 
Design Burst 
Actual Burst 
Safety Factor 
Desiga 2.1 
Demonstrated 2.7 
*Above data  based on t e s t  with waste tank. No burst  test w a s  performed on 
potable tank. It was approved by s i d l a r i t y .  
TABLE 3.1 .I .I .4-1 POTABLE & WASTE WATER TANKS 
METALLIC MATERIALS 
- --- 
PART NAME -- - --- PATERIAL .-- --- 
CRES TYPE 304 MIL-T-8506 
FRAME ASSY AL ALLOY: 606 1-T6; QQ-A-327 
WLI-T-789 
4 ; SUB ASSY , 
5 
6 
7 
8 
(SEE NON-METALLIC TABLE: 
(SEE NON-METALLIC TABLE; 
TOeE 4L ALLOY : 0061 -T6, W-T-789 
BLOCK AL ALLOY: 6061 -T6, QQ-A-327 
ROD AL ALLOY: 6061 -T6, QQ-A-270 
TUBE ASSY AL ALLOY: 6061 -T6, WW-T-789 
QQ-A-270 
11 COVER ! AL ALLOY: 6061 -16, QQ-A-327 
j 
12 $UB ASSYS 
13 
(SEE NON-METALLIC TABLE: 
(SEE NON-METALLIC TABLE: 
24 
25 
I 
(SEE NON-METALLIC TABLE; 
CAP t AL ALLOY: 6061-0, QQ-A-327 
END AL ALLOY: 6061 -T6, QQ-A-327 
BOSS Al. AL1.OY : 6061 -T6, 00-A-325 
GUSSET AL ALLOY: 6061 - i6 ,  QQ-A-32 7 
DOUBLER AL ALLOY: 6061-0, QQ-A-327 
SHELL AL ALLOY: 6061 -T6, Q3-A-327 
RING I AL ALLOY: 6061 -T6, QQ-A-327 
DRAIN TUBE ! AL ALLOY: 6061-0, W-T-789 PIN AL ALLOY: 6061-T6, Per QQ-A-325 
INSERTS NAS 1394C-4 
GUARD 1 AL ALLOY: 6061-T6 COVER ASSY AL ALLOY: 6061 -T6, QQ-A-327 
o INSERT ! MS35914-145 
FITTING ASSY ! (0 BLEED ORIFICE) 
FITTING C R ~  S 304, QQ-S-763 
RESTRICTOR \ CRES 347, QQ-S-763 
TUBE CRES 304 PER MIL-T-85C4 
CRES 30G SERIES (1  5 MESH) 
MS16629-4025 
27 J(SEE W-METALLIC TABLE, 
27(a, 
27(bJ 
FILTER 
REV.9INING RING 
i 
! 
28 /(SEE NCN-f4ETALLIC TABLE: 
LABEL (OXYGEN) ---- 
LABEL (GSE) I ---- LABEL (WATER) ---- 
1/2 tiARD AL. 
29  SEE NON-METALLIC TABLE j 
30 (SEE NOIJ-METALLSC TARLE, 
31 SEAL 
32 
33 
NUT i CRES; 300 SERIES 
LABEL, IDENT I ---- 
NUT i AL ALLOY: QQ-A-225/4; 225/6; 
t QQ-A-367 
29 I i 
TABLE 3.1 .l. 1.4-1 POTABLE & WASTE WATER TANKS 
METALLIC MATERIALS (Con ti nued) 
ITEM 
33(CONTINUED) 
PART NAME 
UNION 
WASHER 
WASHER 
SCREW 
SCREW 
LOCKW I RE 
SCREW 
NUT 
IDENT PLATE 
DECAL 
MATERIAL 
AL ALLOY: 17-ST, QQ-A-351 CONDT 
24-ST, QQ-A-267 CONDT 
CRES MIL-S-5059/6721 
AL ALLOY : QQ-A-20515 (T3/T4) 
CliES - Am 5735/7 o r  5525 
---- 
TABLE 3.1.1.1.4-2 POTABLE & WASTE WATER TANKS 
NON-METALLIC MATERIALS 
Cat. 
D 
Eval 
Nonmetallic 
Material 
Name 
RTV 1 0 2  
Loctite GRH 
Locquie Primer 
XCQ-H 125/H9-3469 
Dry Film Lube 
DC-510 
fvli uoseal Bearing Lube 
Polyisoprene Rubber 
Polyiseprene Rubber 
Silicone Rubber EMS323 
S418-6 
EPR Rubber 
EPR Rubber 
Zytel 1 0 1  
Teflon 
Fiberglass Tape 
Turcon, Fi l led TFE 
Epon 8 2 8  Deta 
RTV 90flherrn 12 
Scotch Cast XR5068 
Textal i t e  
EPR Elastamer 
-- 
Wt. 
Lbs. 
~ 
Neg . 
Neg. 
N~CI  
Neg . 
' Neg. 
. 0 0 1  
Neg - 
.45 
-45 
.003 
Nes. 
. 0 0 1  
.001 
Neg 
.005 
Ne9. 
. 0 2 1  
.027 
.007 
. 0 0 1  
.002 
Neg . 
Surface 
Area 
2 
..i. 
LEGEND 
o Usage catagory f o r  non-metallic5 
A - 01 component but not exposed t o  high pressure 02 (major used mat.) 
i3 - 0.7 component but not exposed t o  high pressure 02 (minor used mat.) 
C - < 20 PS IA  - Suit  Loop 
D - 2 20 PS IA  
E - Hermetically Sealed Box 
F - Vented Box - t o  cabin 
Remarks 
I n  Scre~: Threads 
Adiies i v? 
Screl:r Lock 
o Cat. D Evaluation 
A - NASA Test 
B - AiResearch Test 
C - Accepted by s im i l a r i t y  





3.1.1.1.5 MECHANICAL COMPONENTS 
Subsystem: Envi ronmental Control  
Component : Cycl i c Water Accumulators ( 1  .29) 
Quant i t y :  2 
Pa r t  No: ME901-0737 F ig .  3.1.1.1.5-1 
Location: L e f t  Hand Equipment Bay i n  the ECU. See F ig .  3.1.1.1 .I-1 
Descr ip t ion  and Function 
The c y c l i c  water accumulators a re  p a r t  o f  t he  s u i t  heat exchanger. They are 
redundant system and p is ton- type pumps, which a re  actuated by a common man i fo ld  
w i t h  02 pressure o f  100  psi^ on the discharge s t roke,  and by a r e t u r n  spr.ing 
f o r  t he  suc t ion  s t roke.  The 02 f l ow  i s  c o n t r o l l e d  by the  two water accumulator 
se lec to r  valves. Each va lve contains a se lec to r  f o r  auto, manual o r  o f f  con t ro l .  
The auto p o s i t i o n  al lows the  so lenoid va lve t o  actuate the c y c l i c  accumulator. 
The so lenoid va lve can be con t ro l  l e d  au tomat ica l l y  by s igna ls  from the  t im ing  
equipment which w i l l  cause one o f  the  accumulators t o  complete a cyc le  every 
10 minutes. The purpose o f  the  accumulators i s  t o  remove excess water t o  con t ro l  
humidi ty . During mission, one accumulator i s  operable. 
Pressure Control  Components : 
1 . Re1 i e f  prov is ion:  Bleed o r i f i c e  t o  the  s u i t  heat  exchanger i n  each 
accumulator. 
2. Two so lenoid con t ro l  valves w i t h  a manual over r i de ,  I tem 1.36, t o  
shut  o f f  O2 f l ow  t o  the accumulators. 
3. Water accumulator c o n t r o l l e r  I tee1 1.38 t o  con t ro l  so lenoid valves 1.36. 
I n t e r n a l  Par ts  and Mater ia l  
EPR Elastomer RS-142 T!lese pa r t s  are diaphragm pa r t s  and passed 
Dacron D400 c l o t h  A i  Research S t a t i c  t e s t .  
E f f e c t  o f  Component Loss: 
A1 1 phases. Continue mission w i t h  cne accurnul a t o r  loss.  
loss Propable mission terminatioi i .  
Burs t  Damage E f f ec t :  
Analysis ind ica tes  bu rs t  tank a t  l i m i t  pressure w i l l  n o t  cause damage o the r  
than loss  of c y c l i c  accumulation which can be i so la ted .  The f a i l u r e  mode of 
excessive p r e s s x e  i s  through the  diaphragm. 
Struc tura l  Assembly 
Dimension: Leng~t; = 4.74 i n ,  I .D .  = 2.536 i n ,  Thickness = 0.03 i n  
Size: 8 cu i n  
Manufacturer: A i  Research 
The c y c l i c  accumulators are made o f  two (2 )  halves bol ted together w i t h  
a pistonldiaphragm t o  i s o l a t e  the O2 from the water. The water i n l e t  and out- 
l e t  check valves and the C2 bleed o r i f i c e  are incorporated i n  the tank. 
Fa i l u re  Mode 
Only one c y c l i c  accumulator bu rs t  t e s t  was accomplished f o r  the f l i g h t  
conf igurat ion version. There were four  previous tes ts  using a blcrL I 1  con- 
f i g u r a t i o n  except fo r  the diaphragm material %hfch was changed from ?iton A t o  
EPR. The f a i l u r e  mode, assuming the O2 s ide i s  overpressurized, is ruptl lre 
o f  the diaphragm. 
Below i s  the design and t e s t  pressures: 
L i m i t  (ps ig)  
Bur'st (psig) 
CTR Test (ps ig)  
Safety Factor 
Desi yn 
Demonstrated 
NA* 
100 
210/Zi' ' 'k 
W n  i s  ind icated i n  spec i f i ca t i c .  t o  determine safety fac tor .  
Burst d iv ided by 150% i s  assjmed (67 p i i g ) .  
** 
The CTR burs t  t e s t  f o r  the H20 s ide was no t  accomplished since i t  was 
approved by simi 1 a r i  ty . 
100 psi 
Bleed O2 
t o  Eeif ::=a: E::sha;ir'r 
- . - 
Diaphragm 
Water 
Out 
Fig. 3.1.1.1.5-: CYCLIC ACCUK:iATOR 
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3.1 .1.2 Line Components 
L is ted below i n  Table 3.1.1.2-1 are the l i n e  components reviewed and 
a sumnary o f  the findings. The primary area o f  concern a: shown by a "yes" 
i n  the l a s t  column i s  re lated t o  the acceptance o f  non meta l l i c  materials 
exposed t o  greater than 20 ps i  oxyge:,. NR has reviewed the non metal l ics on 
these components and many were accepted by s im i la r i t y .  MSC has not  y e t  con- 
curred on the NR acceptzncc. The non metal l ics referred t o  here are those 
non metal l ics not i n  the high pressure o>.ygen stream but  are on the com- 
ponent. It i s  recomnended tha t  these non metal l ics which NR has accepted 
by s im i l a r i t y  be reviewed by S C .  I f  any nor? metal ic niaterials are unacceptable 
by MSC, a de ta i l  review o f  those components tha t  contain the non rnstai l ic  be 
accomplished t o  determine i f  a s ingle f a i l u r e  can expose t ha t  par t i cu la r  
non meta l l i c  t o  the high pressure oxygen. 
The concern on the aluminum 1 ines i s  the possi b i  1 i t y  o f  ac extercal 
thermal source which could weaken the 1 ines , spec i f i ca l l y  a shorted e l ec t r i ca l  
source. It i s  recomnended tha t  a visaal inspection be made t o  ensure t ha t  
there are no e l ec t r i ca l  sources imnediately adjacent t o  the aluminum l ines. 
The non metal l i c s  were reviewed f o r  each component t o  determine i f  they 
were acceptable for  high pressure oxygen (plus impact i f  applicable) use. 
Since a l l  non metal l ics were acceptable o r  o f  i ns ign i f i can t  amount, no s ingle 
f a i l u r e  analysis was accomplished f o r  the mechanical components -- pending 
the aforementioned review. 
A l l  impact appl icat ion non meta l l i c  materials are prssently acceptable. 
Because o f  the uncertainty o f  the adequacy o f  the impact test,  a re-revieu o f  
these materials may be required as indicated by any new t e s t  standard. The 
material type and i t s  appl icat ion and acceptance i s  shown i n  Table 3.1.1.2-2. 
Table 3.1.1 -2-1 ECS Line ConpOnents S u m r y  
NON - HETALLICS 
COHPONEkT 
SLlnING 
I -  - 900 PSI 
Repress Regulator (72.3) -- I t - - YE< 
Note: (--) indicates no t  applicable. 
IHPACT 
OK 
rJK 
-- 
Check Valve (4.25) 
Shutof f  Valve (4.26) 
F i l t e r  (4.31) 
Surge Tank Relf. Vlv. 
Repress Press. Gage (72.4) -- I OK O2 Main Reg. (72.5) 
100 PSI 1 OK Emfrgency Cabin (4.22) 
Pressure Reg. 
Cabin Pressure (3.28) I OK Regulator i 
* Nm-metal l i c s  accepted by s i m i l a r i t y  
** Aluminum l i nes  with PiVSCUre qreater than 100 psig  
OK 
OK 
OK 
Repress Pkg. Ylv. (4.34) OK 1 OK - - 
! j 
-- I OK i I - - YES* 
I 
OK GK 1 -- ! 
I i t --
-- 1 OK -- 
i i 1
OK i OK ! -- I I Y 6% I i I I 
Y ESx 
YES* 
-- 
Y-Es** 
- 
Dem~id Pressare (4.16) 
/ O X  l o x  OK -- Regulator 
Tank Pressure Reg. (5.24) 1 OK OK OK I -- 
i 
OK OK 1 -- YES+ i 
EXPOSED 
AFTER 
S m  FAILURE 
(4.27) f OK 
- - 
D i r ec t  02 Valve (4.17) i OK -- j OK* - - Oxygen F i l t e r  (4.35) I -- -- I IES* , YE;* 
- . - 
FAILURE OTHER 
TRENaS CONCERIIS C - -- 
Valve (72.1) 1 OK -- I YES* 1 I 
and Re l i e f  Valve I 
25 PSI 
-- 
Potable and Waste 
F i  1 t e r s  
A1 umincn Lines 
OK -- 
OK 
-- 
- - 
-- 
- - 
-- I -- 
YES* 
-- 
i -- YES* 
-- -- 1 YES* 
- - 
TABLE ?. 1.1.2-2 ECS Llne Components 
. . .  
LEGEND 
o Usage catagory f o r  non-metal l l c s  o Cat. D Evaluatlon 
A - On component but not exposed t o  hlgh pressure 02 (major used mat. ) A - NASA Test 
B - On component but not exposed t o  high pressure 02 (mlnor used mat.) B - AiResearch Test C - 20 P S I A  - Su i t  Loop C - Accepted by simi 1 arf  ty  D -  20PSIA 
E - Hermetf c a l l y  Sealed Box 
F - Vented Box - t o  cabin 
Cat. 
Eval. D 
B 
B 
B 
B 
B 
A 
A 
A 
. .. 
- 
Nonmetallic 
Material Name 
-- 
EC 5 8 3  
L-9 Lube 
EPR Elastomer 
EMS 3 4 2  SII. Rub. 
EC 5 8 3  
L-9 Lube 
E PR E lastomer 
Kel -F 
Zytel 1 0 1  
Tef lori TFE 
Teflon TFE 
Teflon FEP 
L-9 Lube 
Use- 
Cat. age 
B 
D 
D 
D 
B 
D 
D 
8 
B 
B 
D 
B 
B 
Item No. Maximum 
Part Name 7 Temp. OF 
. 
4.25 
628280 -2  
Check Valves 
4.26 
M E  2 8 4 - 0 1 9 1  
-0041 
- 0 0 2 1  
Valve, S h ~ t  Off 
- -". 
4.31 
Applicat. 
k g {  i;' U! 5'
Wt. 
Lbs. 
- 
N 
N 
N 
lu 
Neq . 
, 0 0 1  
.006 
Neg . 
Neg . 
. 0 0 1  
.O 1 
Neg . 
. 0 0 1  
ME 286-0034 
-0002  
Oxygen Fi l ter  
- .--- 
Surface 
Area In. 2 
.04  
, 4 0  
.28 
.35 
.02 
3.2 
2.52 
.02 
Neg . 
.38 
.02 
.15 
1 .75  
1026 1 5 0  D 
D 
--.--.-I. -.-I.. . 
1086.5 
1 0 8 6  
- 
V 
9 
! 
* I 
I 
1 
X 
X 
X 
I 
Teflon TFE 
Teflon TFE 
. . ..-- 
-I 
1 5 0  
1 5 0  
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- 
.
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TABLE 3.1 . I  .2-2 ECS L ine Components (Cor, t inued)  
+ See f i r s t  page o f  t h i s  t ab l e  f o r  LEGEND 
Nonmetal I i c  
Material 
Name 
EC 583 
Loct i te Gr H 
Invelco 33F 
TI11076 Sil icone 
EMS 342 Sil icone 
Teflon F E P  
Kei -F 
Zyte l  101 
Loct i te Grade C 
Locquic Primer 
Dry F i lm Lube 
EMS 342 Stlicone 
lrivelco 33 
EC 583 
App I i cat. 
- z 3  -. 
-. ~z 
O S  SL 
X 
X 
X 
Wt. 
Lbs . 
Neg . 
Ney . 
Neg . 
Neg . 
. 0 0 1  
.001 
Neg . 
.02 
Neg . 
Neg . 
Neg . 
Ney . 
Neg . 
N 
Item No. 
Part Name 
4.17 
828560 
D i r e c t  O2 Valve 
P 
4.35 
&4&%if ER 
Surface 
Area 
2 in. 
. - 
.01 
.77 
.80 
.04 
.63 
1 .97  
Neg . 
1.11 
.02 
.02 
2 .97  
.26 
.80 
.032 
* 
Use- 
age 
Cat. 
B 
B 
D 
D 
D 
8 
B 
B 
B 
B 
B 
B 
B 
B 
* 
Cat. 
D 
Eval .  
A 
B 
B 
Maximum 
O F  
PSlA Temp. 
156 
NA 
200 
N A 
.
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sliding' 
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* See f i r s t  p q e  o f  t h i s  table f o r  LEGEND 
TABLE 3.1.1.2-2 ECS Line Components (Contjqacdj 
App l i cat. 
- FC3 
r: p- -E 
0 3 
CP G 
Wt. 
Lbs. 
Neg . 
.001 
Neg . 
* Ney. 
Neg . 
Neg . 
002 
.041 
Neg . 
.001 
.001 
.002 
.017 
Neg. 
.GO2 
Surface 
Area 
2 In.  
.04 
1.57 
.25 
.35 
.01 
.34 
5.6 . 
2.08 
.07 
.34 
.97 
2.6 
4.2 
1.17 
20.8 
* 
Cat. 
D 
Eval. 
A 
C 
A 
B 
B 
B 
C 
B 
B 
A 
C 
B 
* 
Use- 
age 
Cat. 
R 
D 
D 
D 
D 
B '  
D 
D 
D 
D 
D 
D 
D 
D 
D 
7
X '  
X 
X 
X -' 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
Nonmetallic 
Material 
Name 
EC 583 
Epibond 123 ?931 
Epi Re2  510 
Locti te 
DC-510 
L-9 Lube 
EMS 308 si/Dacron 
Th 1076 Silicone 
8164 Silastic 
EMS 342 Silicone 
E PR E lastometer 
Teflon TFE 
Red Fiber Sheet 
15004/1 Dacron Fab. 
Item No. 
Part Name 
5.24 
ME 284-0368 
-0001 
OXYGEN REGULATOR 
X 
X 
Maximum 
OF 
PSlA Temp. 
156 I 160 
3.1.2 Electric.11 Components 
Lis ted  below i n  Table 3.1.2-1 a r e  the e l e c t r i c a l  components reviewed 
and a sununary of the  f indings.  Note t h a t  t he  review f o r  items 1.36, 9 .2 ,  
and 9.8 have not  been completed, and the  potable  and waste tank quant i ty  
gaging systems a r e  covered i n  Section 3.1.1.1.4 Pressure Vessels,  s ince  they 
a r e  i n t e g r a l  with the  tanks. A s  can be seen by Table 3.1.2-1, t h e  only area 
of concsrn is the  exposure of e lec t ronics  t o  high pressure oxygen a f t e r  a 
s ing le  f a i l u r e  f o r  items 70.2 and 74.0. Because of the  design, however, the  
transducers a r e  accepted a s  is. The transducers a r e  s imi la r  i n  design, s ee  
Figure 3.1.2-1 and have a safe ty  f ac to r  of grea te r  thau 10. Note, t h a t  the  
threaded f i t i n g  and the  sense diaphragm is machined from a s ing le  stock. I n  
addi t ion,  the  s igna l  conditioner is cur ren t  l imited by a 1/4 amp fuse ,  s ee  
Figure 3.1.2-2. Also, the e lec t ronics  t h a t  would be e x ~ ~ o s e d  a f t e r  a s ing le  
f a i l u r e  is f u r t h e r  cur ren t  l imited by the  s igna l  c o ~ d i t i o n t r .  
Table 3.1 2-2 l is ts  each e l e c t r i c a l  component a l c n ~  with i t s  f ~ m c t i o n , i n t e r -  
face  prb, r t ies a i d  e l e c t r i c a l  cha rac t e r i s t i c s .  Table 3.1.2-3 L i s t s  the  
non-metallic mater ials .  
Table 3.1.2-1 ELEGTRICAL COMPONENTS SUMMARY 
CCMPONENT 
O2 Surge Tank 
Pressure X-Ducer (70.2) 
02 WIG & E20 Tank 
Press ,  X-Ducer (74.0) 
Cyclic Accum. 
Control Vlv (1.36) 
02 Flow X-Ducer 
(9.2) 
02 Main Keg. 
Press X-Ducer (9.8) 
Potable & Waste 
Quantity Gaging 
(--) None 
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TABLE 3.1.2-2 ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS (CONT 'D . ) 
COMPONENT 
SCHEMATIC NO. 
PART NUMBER 
NAME 
I FUNCTION PROPERTIES AT I ELECT. COMPONENT 
COMPONENT, TO FLUID I PRESS. PWP. I INTERFACE ELECTRICAL CHARACTERISTICS 
PSI OF I 1 
t he  sense  diaphragm 
must f a i l .  Safe ty  ' 
f a c t o r  >10.0. See 
Fig. 3.1.2-1. 
70.2 
ME 449-0055 
'2 
To measure pressure  
surge tank up t o  
1050 psig.  Used 
f o r  PCM and on- 
board display.  
74.0 
vl 
ME 449-0052 
F 
O2 Pressure X-Ducer 
5.10 
ME 192-0036 
Potable Hz0 Tank 
Quantity 
The d e t a i l s  f o r  t he se  x-ducers a r e  covered under 
Sec t ion  3.1.1.1.4 s ince  x-ducer is i n t e g r a l  wi th  
tank. 
1086.5 
To measure t h e  
water and g lycol  
tanks regula t ion  
o u t l e t  preasure. 
5.15 
ME 192-0008 
Waste H20 Tank 
Quantity 
* Steady s t a t e  conditions: 
Downstream cry0 tanks ( i n  CM,) 900 p s i a  and 7 0 ' ~  
Downstream main r egu la to r s  ( i tem 72.5) 100 p s i a  and 7 0 ' ~  
Downstream H20 glycol  tank regula tors  ( i tem 5.24) 25 p s i a  and 70°F 
To measure t he  
quant i ty  of H20 
i n  potable tank. 
Used f o r  PCM and 
onboard d isp lay .  
150 
43.5 
I 
To measure t he  
quant i tv  of H20 
i n  t he  wazt t  
tank. Used f o r  
PCM and onboard 
43.5 
There is  no i n t e r -  
f ace  of e l e c t r o n i c s  
t o  t he  high pressure  
02. A f a i l u r e  of a 
one p iece  x-ducer 
threaded f i t t i n g  and 
89 
130 
43.5 
S ignal  condi t ioner  cu r r en t  
l imi ted  by 1 /4  amp fuse .  
See Figure 3.1.2-2. 
X-ducer f u r t h e r  c u r r e n t  
l imi ted  by s i g n a l  condi t ioner  
130 
Same as Item 70.2 Same as Item 70.2 
Table 3.1.2-3 ECS Electrical Components 
8 
Applicat. 
- 
3 r  5 - d  
-. 
= ! 
-. g ; 
O t Z  
Wt. 
Lbs . 
.009  
. 0 0 1  
.012  
,329 
Neg . 
Neg . 
Nonmetallic 
Material 
Name 
Penntube II 
DC 651 
Strycast 1090/Cat 9 
FEP Teflon 
DC 651 
S418-6  
Surface 
Area 
In. 2 
4.20 
.10 
.52 
4 1 0  
.O 2 
.O 2 
Cat. 
D 
Eval. 
Use- 
age 
Cat. 
A 
B 
B 
A 
B 
I3 
Item No. 
Part Name 
74. o 
ME 4 4 9 - 0 0 5 2  
- 1 1 0 2  
- 1 1 0 4  
Pressi~re 
Transducer 
70.2 
ME 449-0055 
- 1 0 0 1  and 
-1043 
Pressure and 
Tell~perature 
Transducer 
Maximum 
OF 
PSlA Temp. 
43.5 
1086.5 
89 
150 
Ihe portion of e lec t r ica l  parer subsystem included i n  thi:: evaluation 
consists of the cryo 5 storage tanks, the oxygen distribution y o v i -  
siw, the fue l  ce l l s  provision, entry and pyro batteries. 
Installation of the tank i n  the SM is shown i n  Figure 3.2.1.1. 
The hydrcgen tank 
Internal Components External Components (mounted) 
a. Temperature sensor 
b. Density sensar probe 
c. Two heaters 
d. Two fans 
e. F i l t e r  
f. Support tube 
a. Signal conditioner (temperature 
and density) 
b. Electrical connector 
c. F i l l  and vent disconnect 
d. Vac-ion puup 
D r a w i n g s  of the above items are sham i n  Figure 3.2 -1.2 through 3.2 J .6.  
Table 3.2.1.1 is a list of materials contained i n  the I$ tank assembly. 
The starage tank consists of two concentric spherical shells. m e  annular 
space between them is evacuated and contains the thermal i n s u l ~ t i o n  ma- 
terial, pressure vessel suppart, f lu id  l ines  and the e lec t r ica l  conduit. 
!be inner shell, or pressure vessel is made f r a u  forged and machined hemi- 
spheres. The pressure vessel support is bu i l t  up on the pressure vessel 
f'ran slibassenhlies and transmits pressure vessel loads t o  the support 
assembly. 
Each stwage tank contains a forced convection pressurization and de- 
s t ra t i f ica t ion  uni t .  %ch u n i t  consists of the following: 
a. A 2.0 inch diameter suppart tube approxL?ately 3/4 the tank 
i n  diameter i n  length. 
b. Rro heaters. 
c. Two fan motors. 
d. Two thermostats. Eliminated for  H2 on CSM 113 and subse- 
quent CSMs . 
The lnotors are three phase, four wire, 200 volts A.C. l ine  t o  line, k00 
cycles miniature induction type with a centrifugal flow impeller. 
The heaters are a nichrome resistance type, each contained i n  a thin 
stainless s t e e l  tube insula*d with pavered magnesium oxide. The beaters 
a r e  designed f o r  operat ion a t  28 v o l t s  DC during f l i g h t  o r  65 v o l t s  M: 
f o r  GSE operation. The hea ters  a r e  s p i r a l l e d  and brazed along t h e  ou te r  
surface o f  t h e  tube. 
The thermostats are a bimetal type u n i t  developed f o r  cryogenic service.  
They a r e  i n  s e r i e s  : .~ith the heaters  and mounted ins ide  the  hea ter  tube 
with a high conducting mounting bracket  arranged so  t h a t  the  terminals  
protrude through t h e  tube wall. 
Each s torage tank contains a dens i ty  sensor  cons is t ing  o f  two concentr ic  
tubes which serve a s  capaci tor  p la tes ,  with ttlc operat ing media ac t ing  
a s  t h e  d i e l ecx r i c  between t h e  two. The dens it.^ of t h e  f l u i d  i s  d i r e c t l y  
p r o p r t i o n a l  t o  t he  d i e l e c t r i c  constant  and therefore  probe capacitance. 
A four-wire ?latinurn r e s i s t ance  temperature sensing l e m e n t  i s  mounted 
on the  dens i ty  senmr .  It is  a s i n g l e  poin t  sensor encased i n  an  Inconel 
sheath which d i s s ipa t e s  only 1.5 m i l l i v o l t s  of  power per  square inch t o  
minimize s e l f  -he:ttinl;. e r rors .  
Materials use2 i n  t h e  Hz tank assembly have been invest igated and no 
known incompatibt l i ty  has been found with the  me ta l l i c  materials.  How- 
ever, t he re  a r e  two al loys,  so lde r  and brass ,  which i n  themselves a r e  
not known t o  be incompatible with H2, but  which contain l e a d  and zinc, 
respect ively,  which a r e  known to be ind iv idua l ly  incompatible wi th  hy- 
drogen. Test ing is  required t o  resol-.te t.kis i s sue .  The nonmetallic 
mater ials  i n  the  hydmgen tank has been evaluated and no known incom- 
p a t i b i l i t y  with hydmgen has been found unless heat is  present  such a s  
would be the  case i n  t he  event of  an  e l e c t r i c a l  short .  I n  t h i s  case, 
it i s  suspected t h a t  a p t e n ' i a l  r eac t ion  of  te f lon ,  aluminum and H2 
ex i s t s .  Testing i s  required to  resolve t h i s  i s sue  and has been i n i t i a t e d .  
The po ten t i a l  f o r  hydrogen embrittlement of t he  metals i n  t h e  H2 tank  
has been reviewed. The metals used i n  H;! tanks a r e  not  embri t t led by 
hydrogen. 
Evaluation o f  t he  de t a i l ed  design of t he  H2 tank e l e c t z i c a l  element ind ica te  
t h a t  t h e  ssme type of design has been used i n  H2 tank a s  is  w e d  In  the  02 
t ank  which failec? ( these components a r e  not su'ujected to  AVT during accep- 
tance).  Thsrefore, t he  H2 tank must be assumed t o  have the  p o t e n t i a l  of 
producing e l e c t r i c a l  shor t  czrcu i t s .  Short c i r c u i t s  i n  t h e  bydmgen tank  
w i l l  r e s u l t  i n  mission abor t s  i f :  
c .  The shor t s  produce a r eac t ion  t h a t  s u b s e q e n t l y  ruptures  
the  pressure vesse l  o r  
b. The shor t s  cause a f a i l u r e  of  both hea ters  and a s ing le  
fan thereby g rea t ly  reducing the  flow r a t e  ava i l ab l e  f r o m  
the  tank. 
It w i l l  be  necessary t o  conduct spec i a l  t e s t s  t o  determine whether t h e  
above abort  s i t u a t i o n s  can r e s u l t  from e l e c t r i c a l  sho r t  c i r c u i t s  i n  t h e  
hydrogen tank. Two t e s t  requests have been submitted t o  i n i t i a t e  the  
required tes t ing .  
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TABLE 3.2.1.1 H2 TANK ASSY MRTERIfiS LIST (~~282-och7) 
Material 
AL ALY 7 0 7 5 ~ 6  QQ-A-250/12 
AL ALY 7075-~6 QQ-A-250/12 
AL ALY 2024-0 ~ ~ - ~ - 2 5 0 / 5  
ALSH QQ-A-250/12 7075-~6 
ALPL QQ-A-250/12 7075-~6 
5P.1-2.5Sn Titanium (~~13869 ) 
5x1-2.5Sn Eli Titanium (~~13769) 
AST21 8-5 Copper T. Loc. 
3 0 4 ~  ~res ~~0160-020 ( 3 ~ )  
201,~ C~*es Tube MB0160-007 
3 0 4 ~  ~res ~~0160-020 (BAR) 
5~1-2.5~n Eli Titanium (~~13769) 
5~1-2.5~n ~itenium (~~137691 
3 0 4 ~  ~res ~~0160-020 (BAR) 
3 0 4 ~  ~res ~~0160-020 (BAR) 
Part Name 
Skirt Assy, H2 Tank 
Ani;! e 
Tee-Attachment 
Skirt Beaded 
plate Reinf. 
Plate-Ident 
Tank Assy-H2 
Ring Assy 
Ring Assy 
Ring Mount 
Girth 
Tube Assy 
Valve Assy 
Adapter Assy 
Vent Disconnect 
Coupling-Weld 
Tube Feed Inlet 
Fitting-Feedline 
Adapter Assy 
Bi-Met . Vent Disc. 
Adpt. Flange 
J t . -Transition 
Adpt. Vent & Fill 
Part Number 
.-- 
13532-1503 
13532-3543 
13532-3542 
13532-3545 
13532-3544 
13532-3557 
13532-1502 
13532-2806-3 
13532-2807-9 
13532-3515-7 
13532-3519-3 
-5 
13532-2510-1 
13532-2809-3 
13532-3506-5 
-7 
13532-3517-3 
13532-3808-1 
13532-2814-1 
13532-3813-1 
13532-3811-3 
-5 
3 3532-3812-1 
TABLE 3.2.1.1 H2 TANK ASSY MATERIALS ~1~~(~282-0047)- Continued 
Material 
ASTM-R-338-611 Titanium GR-2 
Cres 3 0 4 ~  Annealed MBOl60-023 
5A1-2.5Sn Eli Titanium (BS3769) 
302 Cres ~&-~-423 Forn I Cond B 
Cres 3 0 4 ~  Annealed ~~0160-020 
Cres Tube ~il-T-8504 
Cres 3 0 4 ~  ~01.60-007 
5A1-2.5Sn Eli Titani um (~~13769) 
AL 1100-0 QQ-A-561 
6061-~6 A1 ALY QQ-A-250111 
QQ-A-20018 
Cres 3 0 4 ~  MB0160-020 
' 5 ~ 1  2.5sn Eli Titanium (~~13769) 
Cres 3 0 4 ~  ~~0160-020 
Shell Matl: Cres 3 0 4 ~  
Glass Bead Insulators 
Cres QQ-s-T~~ CL 302 Cond A 
,0005 Cold Coated Kapton 
Type H Film 
MB0170-010 5Al-2.5Sn Eli Ti 
MB0170-010 5Al-2.5Sn Eli Ti 
Cres 302 Cond B 
2.5Sn Eli Titanium (~~13769) 
Cres 302 MIL-S-50157 
5A1-2.5Sn Eli Ti ( ~ 1 ~ 1 6 8 )  
Part Name 
Tube-Vent 
Body Fill Disc. 
Poppet-Disc . 
Spring-Poppet 
Cap-Disc. 
Ferrule-Cable 
Seal-Disc. 
Valve Assy. 
Fill Disc. 
Adpt Assy-Fill 
Tube-Fill 
~dpt-~ssy  ill 
Flanee-Adpt 
Diaph-Press-Relief 
Brkt Assy (sig. con) 
Transition Jt . 
Sleeve-Elect. 
Conn.-Elect. 
To Ring 
Insl. -Hz Tank 
Press Vess. Assy 
Tank Hemis. Upper 
Tank Hemis. Inner 
Bolt Hook 
Spt Sen. & Heater 
Washer-Flat 
Plate-Disc. 
Part Nmber 
13532-3531-3 
13532-3533-3 
13532-3534-3 
13532-3535-1 
13532-3536-3 
13532-3540-1 
13532-4070-1 
13532-2811-1 
13532-2808 
13532-3530-3 
13532-2815-i 
13532-3814-1 
13532-4036 
13532-2513 
13532-3805-1 
13532-3806-1 
13532-4702-1 
13532-3548-1 
13532-3523 
13532-2501-1 
13532-3500-1 
13532-3120-3 
13532-3133-1 
13532-3132-1 
13532-3086-3 
13532-2514 
TABLE 3.2.1.1 H2 TANK ASSY MATERIAIS LIST (ME282-0047 )- Continued 
Part Name 
Nut-Self Lock 
Clamp-Heater 
Insert-Screw 
Screw-Cap 
Wire-Safety 
Ins l .  I n s t l .  
Beam Assy No. 1 
Strap Assy . -Tens 
St rap  Tens 
Fast.  Tens-Strap 
Strap Inner-Tank 
Strap  Intmed. 
1nsul.-Strap 
Ret. Pre-Load 
Fast-Ann. Threaded 
Shield Assy No. 1 
l'ube-Vapor No. 1 
Clip-Tube 
Shield Girth 
Clip-Shield 
Part Number 
13532-4052-3 
13532-3134-1 Assy 
-5 
-9 
13532-3141-1 
13532-3139-1 
13532-3110-1 
13532-2800-1 
13532-2505-1 
13532-2512-1 
13532-3509-1 
-3509-2 
13532-3521-3 
13532-3510-1 
13532-3511- 
13532-3512-1 
-3-5 
13532-3523 
118707 
13532-2803-3 
13532-3508-3 
13532-3550-1-3 
-5-7 
13532-3563 
13532-3561-1 
Material 
E l a s t i c  Stcp Nut P/N 1803-02 
5Al-2.5Sn E l i  Ti  Alloy ( ~ ~ 1 3 7 6 9 )  ) 
Cres 302 o r  304 (same as  ~2321209) 
302 or  304 Cond A QQ-S-763 o r  as  speci f ied  
i n  NAS 1351 
Cres 304 Form I Cond A &&-~-423 
6 ~ 1  4~ E l i  Ti Type I11 
Cocd. C Annealed MIL-T-9046 
7075-T651 A 1  ALY QQ-A-225/9 
Unalloyed Ti Ams 4900 
6A1 4~ E l i  Ti Type I11 Cond D 
Annealed ~il-T-9046 
Type E Glass Fiber & Type 700 
Binder ( ~ ~ 1 4 4 6 3 )  
Cres 304 Cond A QQ-S-763 
QQ-S-766 
Cres 304, 304L, 316, 321 o r  347 
QQ-S-763 
Cres 3 0 4 ~  Annealed MB0160-007 
See Sht 10 
Ams 4900 Coml Pure Titanium 
,0005 Gold Coated Kapton 
TABLE 3.2 .l. 1 H2 TANK ASSY MATERIALS LIST(ME~~~-0047) - Continued 
Par t  Name 
I n s l S p i d e r  
Shim-Pump 
Shield Vapor Cool. 
Shield Assy No .  2 
- 
P a r t  Number 
13532-3567 
13532-3572 
13532-3507-1-3 
-5-7 
13532-2804-1 
-3 
Material 
Type H Film 
A 1  Aly 6061-~6 QQ-A-250/11 
A 1  Aly 3003-0 QQ-A 250-2 
TABLe 3.2.1.1 H2 TANK ASSY MATERIALS LIST ( ~ ~ 2 8 2 - 0 0 4 7 )  - Continued 
Par t  Name 
Wash. Rad. Shield 
Shield Assy No 3 
Tube Vapor Cooled 
Spider Assy Beam 
Ins l .  Shield 
Spacer Tens :Strap 
Probe & Heater 
Probe Assy 
Tube Vent 
Conduit-Wire 
Adpt Assy press-Ves 
Adpt P l a t e  
Adpt Flange 
Jt-Trans Cres-Tit . 
Pla te  Mount Elect  
Tube F i l l  Line 
F i l t e r  Element 
Wash .-Teflon 
Adpt . -Teflon 
Tube-Fill t o  QTY Sensor 
Probe Qty & Sensor 
See Sheets No. 5, 
6,  & 7 
Par t  Number 
118708-1 
13432-280 5-1 
-3 
13532-3514-3 
13532-3524-1 
-3 
-1-3 
13532-3539-1-3 
-1- 5 
13532-3547-1 
13532-2801-1 
13532-2802-1 
-3 
13532-3502-3 
13532-3503-3 
135321-2813-1 
13532-3809-1. 
13532-3810-1 
13532-3205-5 
-y 
13532-3802-1 
13532-3522-3 
13532-4504-11 
13532-3520-1 
13532-3525-1 
-3 
13532-3526-3 
13532-4502-3 
Materi a 1  
Dupont "Vespel" SP-1 Polymide Resin 
Cres 3 0 4 ~  Annealed MB0160-007 
Alaly 2014 '(351 ~ 4 0 1 4  
Type E G l a s s  Fiber & Type 700 Binder (Owens- 
corning ) 
Alaly 7075-T6 QQ-A-250/12 
Cres 3 0 4 ~  Annealed ~ ~ 0 1 6 0 - 0 0 7  
Cres 3045 Annealed MB0160-007 
Cres 3 0 4 ~  Annealed ~B0160-020 
5AL-2.5 SN ELI-Titanium ( ~ ~ 1 3 7 6 8 )  
Cres 3 0 4 ~  Annealed SST MI30160-020 
SAG2.5 Sli ELI TI ALY (B~13769) 
Cres 3 0 4 ~  Annealed ~ ~ 0 1 6 0 - 0 2 0  
Cres 3 0 4 ~  Annealed ME0160-007 
See Page 11 
Teflon Rod MIGP-19468 
Teflon Rod MIL-P-19468 GPS 
Cres 3 0 4 ~  Annealed ~30160-007 
TABLE 3.2.1.1 H2 TANK ASSY MATERIAIS ~ 1 ~ ~ ( ~ ~ 2 8 2 - 0 0 4 7 )  - Continued 
Part Name 
Heater Assy Fan 
Heater Assy Fan 
cn 
-1 
Part  Number 
13532-2515-1 
13532-2052-5 
-7 
-9 
-11 
-45 
Mat e r i  a 1  
Same Mat1 as 0 Except as i n  TLD on Pan Assy- 2 
Motor 13532-4505 
Cres S H  MILS-6721 Comp. T1. 
Cres SH MILS-6721 Comp. TI. 
Copper Tinned SH &&-~-576 Sof t  Annealed Cold 
Rolled 
Teflon Rod MIGP-19468 
Teflon TFE 
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TABLE 3.2.1.1 H2 T A i i  ASSY MATERIALS LIST(ME~~~-0047) -  Continued 
Part  name 
Tube assy fan 
- 
Eleillent heater  
Nozzle assy heater  
Nozzle 
Sleeve 
Tube motor case 
Support motor l w r  
Sviiport motor upr 
Tube heater  
Tube fan h t r  
Support 
Tube assy 
Blind r i v e t  
Screw machine 
Bolt 
Wire safety 
Rivet 100° csk 
Screw cap 
Doubler t h e m .  
Nut s e l f  lock 
Fan assy-motor 
Part  number 
13532-2516-1 
13532-4510-1 
13532-2054-1 
-2054-3 
-2054-5 
13532-3136-1 
-3136-3 
13532-3137-1 
13532-3138-3 
13532-3529-1 
13532-2C53-15 
-2053-21 
-2053-29 
13532-3091-1 
-3091-3 
13532-3099-1 
-3699-3 
13532-3104-9 
13532-3110-1 
13532-3119-1 
13532-3139-3 
135 32-3162-2 
13532-4052-1 
-4052-3 
13532-4505-1 
Material 
Same mat'l  as element i n  t he  O2 tank 
Assembly 
Cres SH MIL-S-6721 comp ~1 
Cres tube 321 MIL-T-8808 tyye I 
Cres 321 AM35645 
Cres 321 ~ ~ ~ 5 6 4 5  
Cres 302 MIL-S-7720 cond A ( c )  
Cres 302 MIL-S-7720 cond A (c)  
Cres 321 MIL-T-8808 type I 
Cres 321 MILT-8808 type I 
~ r e s  SH M I L - s - ~ ~ ~ I .  comp ~1 
( ~ o n s l s t s  of -15 & -21 above) 
Al aly comp 2117 QQ-A-430 
Al aly comp 2117 QQ-A-430 
Cres 302 cond A QQ-S-763 
Cres 302 cond A QQ-S-763 
Cres 302 cond A Q~-S-763 or  as specified i n  
NAS501 
Cres 304 form I cond A QQ-W-423 
Al aly comp 2117-~4 QW-430 
302 o r  304 cond A QQ-S-763 o r  as specified 
i n  NA51351 
Al aly fed QQ-A-327 ~6 
Elast ic  stop nut P / N  1803-40 
Elas t ic  stop nut P/N 1803-02 
H2 motor same as O2 except s t a to r  assy has 
Thermostat H2 and O2 135 32-4506-1 IRML wire Same mat ' 1 as o2 
TABLe 3.2.1.1 H2 TANK ASSY MATERIALS LISTf,M~282-0&7)- Continued 
Part name 
Cap pinchoff tube 
Body 
cap 
Disconnect fill & purge 
Plate ident . 
Placard 
Pump assy vac-ion 
Detail parfs 
-I 
IU Brkt assy vac-ion 
Vac-ion pulip append 
Converter-volt 
Case assy-potting 
Part number I Material 
Cameron Forging P/F 61598-1 
~ i t m i ~ m  (SAL 2.5 SN?) (~~13863) 
Assy. 
6061~6 Alum 
606116 Alum 
~ S Y  
8015 Minnesota Mine Mfg. 
304 cres . ASTM-A-269 
Cres. 3 0 4 ~  annealed SST ~80160-020 
5 ~ ~ 2 . 5  SN Eli Ti alloy ~ ~ 1 3 7 6 9  
Assembly 
6061-T6 A1 QQ-A-250 I l l  
6 0 6 1 4  AJ. QQ-A-250/11 
1 Purchased from I Mat'l same Varian Associates 02 Paio Alto. Calif. 
Purchased from Transformer Slectronics i Co. , Boulder, Colo. (Mat '1 same as 02) 
i Cres. 3 0 4 ~  QQ-S-766 cond A 
Cres. 3 0 4 ~  QQ-S-766 cond A 
Cres. 3 0 4 ~  QQ-S-766 cond A 
I Cres. 304L &~,-~-766 cond A 
Shield assy-heat 
TABLE 3.2.1.1 H2 TANK ASSY MATERIALS LIST (m282-0047) - Continued 
-- 
Material 
- 
AI. 6061-~6 QQ-A-250111 
AI. 606I.-T6 QQ-A-250 /11 
Al llO0-0 QQ-A-25011 
ASTM-B-338 6 1 ~  GR2 s o f t  
annealed titanium 
Titanium annealed A ~ ~ 4 9 0 1  
Titanium annealed AMS4901 
Titanium ASTM B-338 6 1 ~  G R I I  
Titanium ASTM B-338 6 1 ~  G R I I  
Titanium annealed AMS4901 
C o d  pure ti tanium AMS 4900 
Coml pure titanium AMS 4900 
Titanium annealed AMS 4901 
Mat'l same a s  O2 
Purchased  fro^ Physical Science Corp. 
Arcadia, Calif .  PIN 5573 o r  61 
Part  name 
-- 
Clip tube 
Ring. 
Haxness assy 
Plilg-elect 
Part  number 
13532-3550-1 
-3 
-5 
-7 
13532-2523-7 
-9 
-?-I 
-.i3 
-1 5 
-17 
-18 
-19 
13532-2707-3 
13532-2704-5 
13532-4509 
TABLE 3.2.1.1 H2 TANK ASSY MATERIALS LIST(ME~~~-0047)- Continued 
Maxer ial 
- 
300 aeries cres 
304 cres 
304 cree 
Tef Ion 
3014 cres 
304 cres 
Part name 
VACCO filter 
BAC PIN 13532-4504 
I Loading Mandrel-filter 
Disc & sleeve assy 
Disq-compressor 
Seal 
Compressor washer 
Element tube 
4 
C 
Part Number 
BAC P/N VACCO 
PIN 
13532-45011-1 81436 
61140 
13532-4504-3 61141 
13532-4504-5 61140 
13532-4504-7 61142 
13532-4504-1 62080 
TABLE 3.2.1.1 H2 TANK ASSY MATERIALS L1ST(~~282-0&7) - Continued 
-- - 
Mater ia l  
Teflon TFE Type E AWG # 14 
H t .  Shrink,  Tubing, 
Wire AWG # 22 Teflon Coated MIL-W-16878 
Type E, E Modified 
Plug - Make From PTS06A-14 
915 ( ~ e n d i x  Corp. Sidney, N. Y. ) 
Terminal - Make From 328472 
Post insu la ted  AWG # 20 
Stud S ize  No. 1 0  (American Pancor Inc ,  , 
Havert own , Penn . ) 
Plecard CP 1000 (Transformer E lec t ron ics  
Bouider , Colo . ) 
Weld Wire MIL-R-5031 Class 16 ER308ELC 
Pot t ing  Boot f o r  S h e l l  S ize  8 Recept. Nylon 
Threaded (Bendix Corp, , Sidney, N. Y. ) 
Shielding 118 in .  Braided Tinned Copper 
(P/N1390 Consolidated Wire & Associate Co. 
Chicago, Ill. ) 
AN735-4 Clemp 
AN735-12 Clamp 
AN3C-3A Screw 
79NTM-02 Nut 
Volseal (Johns-Manville Chicago, Ill. ) 
Apiezon m (Johns-aManville Chicago, Ill. ) 
P a r t  Name 
Wiring Harness 
Part; Number 
13532-2709 (A) 
(B) 
(C) 
(D) 
(E) 
(F)  
(G) 
(H) 
( I )  
(J) 
( K )  
( L )  
(M) 
TABLE 3.2.1.1 H2 TANK ASSY MATERIALS LIST f ~~282-0047)  - Continued 
I (0) A ~ 9 6 0 ~ 6 7  Washer I 
Material 
~ ~ 2 1 0 4 4 ~ 0 6  Nut 
Par t  Name 
Wiring Harness 
I (R) RTV 108 Potting (G.E. Waterford, N. J . )  I 
Par t  Number 
13532-2709 cont . ( N )  
(P) 
(Q) 
Lockwire 
NAS 1593-114 0-Ring 
PLk'960C10~ Washer 
1 General Notes: 
Solder per ~514244 
Solder per MIL-S-6872 Use Mat1 per  FED QQ-S-571 
Comp. ~ ~ 6 0 ,  type S 
CL-2-(2-120 1 Cable I 
Terminal 
Rivet 
MS27039-21 Screw I 
NAS1022 I Nut I 
Weld Wire 
Weld Wire 
~ ~ S 1 3 5 1 ~ 3 ~ 8  Screw 
- ---. 

TABLE 3.2.1.1 H2 TANK ASSY MATERIALS LIST (~~282-0047)-  Continued 
Material  Pa r t  Name 
TA7 31TH 
MS21288-1 6 
NAS1351 
~ ~ 1 2 9 1  
NAS.1633 
~11214-111 
FED-&-~-499 
FEDQQ-S-561 CL. I1 
MIL-R-503~- Type 2 
-I 
m MIL-E-19933A 
~~~560-CK3-2  
TF552TSS-3T 
~1~-~-16878M - 
Pure n i  Type E 
Type E #12 Clem 
Type E #14 White 
FEDQQ-S-571 Type AR 
MMS-N306A Type 822 
MS17 821-4-9 
QQ- 5 ~ ~ - S N ~ O - W A R P Z  
MI~-~-14256 
MS27039-(21-0 8 
~ ~ 7 1 6 ~ - D -  4~ 
~1L-~-7178 #509 
MS51045-19 
P a r t  Number 
Clamp ' Tubing 
Bolt 
Screw Cap 
Nut, Self-Locking 
Screw 
0-Ring 
F l u  
Braze Matl. Si?.ver 
Braze 
Weld Wire 
Weld Wire 
Screw 
Clamp 
Wire Teflon 
Tubing Heat Shrink 
Tubing Heat Shrink 
Solder 
Drilube 
Tie ,  Sel f  Locking 
Solder 
Flux 
Screw 
Clamp 
Lacquer, Red 
Set  Screw 
TABLE 3.2.1.1 H2 TANK ASSY MATERIALS LIST(ME~~~-0047) -  Continued 
Miscellaneous Material & 
Applicable Specs other 
than the  d e t a i l  pa r t s  
description 
H2 Tank Assy 
Shield Assy 
Tube Assy 
Valve Assy Disc. 
Adpt Assy Vent. Disc. 
Material P w t  Name 
Adpt Assy F i l l  Disc . 
Ins1 I n s t l  H2 Tank 
Part  Number 
Shield Assy No. 2 
Shield Assy No. 3 
Probe & Heater I n s t l .  
Heater Assy Fan M t r  
Tube Assy Fan M t r  
Clean Per Bac Spec B513879 
Clean Per Bac Spec BS13779 
Clean Per Bac Spec B~13879 
Bac ~ ~ 1 3 8 7 9  
Clean Per BS13779 
Clean Per BS13779 
Clean Per BS13879 
Bac 13879 
~ a c  13879 
Bac 13779 
Bac 13879 
Bac 13779 
Drilube as Reqd See Page 14 
' Bac 13779 & 13879 
Bac 13779, Drilube See Page 1 4  
S i lve r  Braze See Page 14 
Bac 13779 
Si lver  Braze See Page 1 4  
TABLE 3.2.1.1 H2 TANK ASSY MATERIALS LTST(ME282-0047)- Concluded 
Mat e r  i a1 
Clean Surfaces i n  contact  with H2 Per 
BS13779. 
Vacuum Clem BS13879 
Vacuum Clean 3813879 H2 Surfaces clean 
BS13779 
H2 Surfaces Clean BS13779 Vacuum Clean 
~ ~ 1 3 8 7 9  
H2 Surfaces Clean BS13775 
Vacuum Clean BS13879 
Vacuum Clean BS13879 
Solder Wire t o  Terminals Per NPC200-4 Suppl l td  
by MSC-ASPO-56~ & NAA Attachment O2 & H2 
Surfaces Clean Per BS13779 
Solder Per MI~-5-6872 
O2 & H2 Surfaces Clean Per BS13779 Braze per  
MIL-B-7883 
Vacuum Clean BS13879 
Vacuum Clean BS13879 
Coating Per ~ 1 ~ - ~ - 5 5 4 1  Type 11, Grade C ,  
C l a s s  I 
H2 Surfaces Clean BS13779 
Par t  Name 
Ring Assy 
Adapter Assy 
Valve h s y  
Press Vessel Assy 
Beam Assy f l  
S t rap  Assy 
Heater Assy Fan 
Tube Assy Fan 
Pump Assy Vac-Ion 
Shield Assy Heat 
Converter Volt 
Tank Hemis Inner 
Pa r t  Number 
13532-2807 
13532-2809 
13532-2811 
13532-2501 
13532-2505 
13532-2512 
13532-2515 
13532-2516 
13532-2527 
13532-2523 
13532-4074 
13532-3120 
The fuel  cel ls  contain three pressure vessels: the gaseous nitrogen 
( G N ~ )  supply bottle, the fuel  c e l l  pressure shel l  which contains the 
reactant element and individual cells,snd the glycol accumulation. 
Figure 3.2.2.1 is  a sbrplified schematic of the fuel c e l l  and G% sup- 
ply* 
The GI$ supply tank contains nitrogen a t  1500 psi. It is used t o  sup- 
ply nitrogen t o  the fuel  c e l l  pressure she l l  where a 53 p s i  atmosphere 
is maintained. This is accmpl ishe~ through a regulatm i n  the feed 
line,  The regulator controls the pressure i n  the fuel  c e l l  pressure 
she l l  by either providing more nitrogen from the supply - or by vent- 
iag the fuel  c e l l  pressure she l l  as required. 
The G% tank is a spherical tank 6.1 inches i n  diameter made of 0.075 
inch Titanium AMS4910. The tank is mounted on the fuel  c e l l  f'rame above 
the fuel  c e l l  pressure shell. This tank has no internal or external 
components. The characteristics of th i s  tank are given in Table 2.0. 
The fue l  c e l l  pressure she l l  is a cylindrical vessel with dished and 
flanged ends. It is 14.6 inches i n  diameter and 24 inches long. It 
is made of A1-10 Titanium w i t h  walls of 0.022 j.nches and ends of 0.015 
inches. This pressure shel l  is designed t o  a burst pressure of 265 psi. 
An @ regulator fai lure  would dump the entire G% tank and resul t  i n  a 
pressure of la ps i  which is not high enough t o  burst the fuel  c e l l  
pressure shell. !&is pressure she l l  is covered with gold myla insula- 
t ion and has no exterllal mrqonents.. It contains the 31 electricity- 
producing reactant ce l l s  and a hydrogen by-pass valve and regenerator. 
Figure 3.2.2.2 is a drawing of the fue l  c e l l  module showing the pressure 
shell. 
The fue l  c e l l  glycol accumulator is a cylindrical tank with a n~minal 
operating pressure of 53 psia. It contains a butyl rubber bladder t o  
separate the water glycol mixture from the nitrogen which is used as 
a reference pressure. Figure 3.2.2.3 is a drawing of the glycol accum- 
ulatar. There are no electr ical  components i n  or on the glycol accumu- 
la tor  tank. 
A l l  of these pressure xessels are acceptable for their  present applica- 
tions as they have an adequate factor of safety and there are no signifi-  
cant sources of pressure iacrease except t o  the fuel  c e l l  shell. A 
failed open 02 regulator (discussed i n  3.2.3.2.4) w i l l  resul t  i n  an 
overpressure condition which causes the gasket i n  che she l l  joint t o  
f a i l  resulting i n  loss of the fuel  c e l l  due t o  leakage. This is  con- 
sidered acceptable as discussed i n  3.2.3.2. k. 
Evaluations of the EPS 02 l ine components considerrd the following items: 
N2 
VENT 
FIGURE 3.2.2.1. FUEL CELL SCHEblATIC. 


a. O2 System Valve Module (ME 284-0290-001) which contains 2 
ral ief  valves, 1 check valve, 2 pressure transdu<?ers and 2 
pressure switches. 
b. Inline Fi l te r  (ME 286-0036-0002) . 
c. . Fuel Cell Valve Mule (ME 284-0289-001) which contains 3 
solenoid valves and 2 check valves. 
d. 02 Florz Sensor (ME 449-0015) . 
e. Fuel Cell Reactant Pressure '1Fransfucer. 
f .  02 Reactant Pressure Regulator. 
g. 02 Purge Valve. 
'The, f luid schematic f a r  these canponents is sham i n  Figure 3.2.3.1. 
The invidivual camponents are described i n  the follakzilrg sections. 
3.2.3.1 Materials 
The materials used for  the EPS O2 l ine  components are l i s t ed  by canponent 
i n  %ble 3.2.3.1. The following canponents were f ~ u n d  t o  he.ve nonmetallic 
mter. 1s i n  the indicated application i n  contact with the 02: 
a. Fuel Cell Valve Module - Solenoid Valves - Teflon and KEL-3' 
are used i n  direct contact with the high pressure 02. Teflon 
is  used as wire insulation, heat shrink tubing, and tape t o  
form insulation for the amnature coil. KEL-E' is used as a 
bslL and adapter for actuation of a micro svitch. (Micro- 
switch is a purchased piwt and i t s  composition was not avail- 
able.) Ihe check valves in t h i s  module do not use any non- 
metallic parts. 
b. 02 Purge Valve - "Vitronl' is used as "0" rings and red s i l i -  
cone rubber is used as a seat. 
c. 02 Reactant Pressure Regulator - Fluoro casbon and silicone 
rubber are used as "0" rings and fl.uoro cwbon rubber is 
used as a poppet. 
Impact e;,plications of nonmetallic~ were found as follows: 
a. Fuel Cell Valve Module - Impact of KEL-F bal l  on KEL-F 
adapter and impact of stainless s tee l  armature pl-unger on 
KEL-F ball. Bo'hh of these occur in  high pessure 02. 
b. 0 Reactant Pressure Regulator, - Impact, of' fluoro carbon 
r%ber poppet m stainless s tee l  seat on both the in le t  and 
vent ports. Both of these occur in  high pressure 02, 
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FIGURE 3.2.3.1.  EPS O2 LINE COMPONENTS FLUID SCHEMATIC. 
TABLE 3.2.3.1 - EPS 02 LINE C O M P O I ~  M A W I A L S  LIST 
PART ' VEMlm PART NUMBER MATWiAL 
% Sys Valve Mod 
02 Sys V a l v e  & Module Assy 
Mounting Lug, Relief Valve 
Mounting Lug S.O.V. 
M o ~ t i n g  Lug POT. 
Mounting Lug P.S. 
Strap 
Spring, 'Pubular 
Spring, 'Pubular 
Tension Device 
Pin . 
awing Supt Ring 
Spring, -r 
wing,  Outer 
Saddle. Luuer 
Saddle,  up^-* 
Nut, Lock 
Imulatcz- 
Saddle Screw 
Locking, Dsice  
--, sad- 
sh*, Manifold. 
Name Plate  
Saddle, Upper 
Rivet 
clamp 
Lock Wire 
%pe 
Saddle, Lmr 
Wire 
Potting 
Primer sS-4101 
Spring, Positioner 5663-205 
02 Relief Valve Assy 5661032-1 
Spring; PQmet 5631319 
Shim Poppet Seat 5631338-1 thru 3 
Spring 5631 561 
Washer 5631342 
2024-T351 
202LT351 
2024-T351 
2024-T351 
~o~CL-CRES 
~286-CRES 
~286-CRES 
17-4-PH 
3 0 2 - m  
17-4-PH 
RS-l20-Ti 
RS-120-Ti 
321-CREs 
321-CRES 
Vendor Item 
Eblar-'ww A 
17-4-PH 
303-= 
17-4-PH 
301/302-(XEXE 
2024-T3 
2024-~351 
321-- 
471 Teflon 
321-CFES 
16GA MIL-W-16878 Nsckel 
Plated Conductor Teflon 
Coated Skylastic, Dav 
Corning 
KTV-601 
G. E. SS- 4101 
Q P ~  A
TABU 3.2.3.1 (continued) 
Washer 
Screw 
Support Main 
Support, Diaphram 
cool~pensatar 
Canpensator 
Support 
Shim 
=ap 
Guide 
m i n d  
Support 
Shim 
cap 
spring 
Ring . 
Shim 
SKPpart 
spring 
Shim 
Support 
Support 
support 
Insulatm 
Lock Wire 
Guide 
Spacer 
Spacer 
R i n g ,  Retainer 
Screw 
Washer 
Guide 
Spacer 
Screw 
Shim 
spring 
spring 
Seat & Pappet Assy 
Tube Assy Outlet 
Tube 
Sleeve 
Nut 
~ t e ,  Inlet 
Seat 
Body & Check Valve Assy 
!hbe 
!l!ube, Inlet  
17d4-PH 
302/30k-~~~~ 
2024-'I4 
lNvAR 
17-4-PH 
300-CRES 
2024-Q51 
17-4-PH 
17-4-PH 
17-&-pH 
301 302-CRES I 202 -T351 
17-LPH 
Vendor Part 
301/302-~~~~ 
17-4-PH 
17-4-PH Dry Film Lube 
30IJ302-CRES 
17-4-PH 
17-4-PH 
17-4-PH 
17-4-PH 
301/302-~~~~ 
17-7-PH Dry Film Lube 
17-7-PH Dry Film Lube 
Seat 
Pappet 
spring 
Body Manif old Assy 
Tube 
Sleeve 
Nut 
%ifold, Inlet  Assy 
Manif old 
Insert 
Nut 
Sleeve 
Plug 
Guide 
*Pressure Switch Assy 56Lc1715 
Baay - 
We, Inlet  
D i a m  
Vendor 
3 0 4 ~ - m  
3 0 4 ~ - W  
17-7-PH 
*I-%essure %ansducer Assy 5630034-3 
Boay 
Vendor 
NISPAN "C" 
Tube, Inlet 304~-CRES 
Op Relief Valve Assy 5 661032-2 
Seat Assy 5661033-w 
Tube 5661013-1 
Nut 
W e ,  Inlet 5661035 
* ALL RBNDilX PARTS SAME AS 5661032-1 ASSY 
Body Assy 
Boay 
B e l l m  Assy 
BeUars ASSY 
Bellows 5641310 
Seat, Poppet Link 5641311 
Shim 5631341 
W e ,  Outlet 
Tube, Inlet  
Nut 
Sleeve 
Plug 
4 
TABLE 3.2.3.1 (continued) 
FILTER (VACCO VALVE cO) 
(ME 286-0036-000 2) 
Boay 
Fi l t e r  Disc. 
02 FUEL CEKG VALVE MODIILE (PARKER) 
(ME 281; -0289-001) 
Fuel Cell Module Assy Inst1 
Fuiel Cell Module Assy 
shim 
Shim 
Spacer 
Nut 
G r  amnet 
Shim . 
spring 
Poppet 
Adhesive Tape 
Potting 
Solder 
Wire 
Wire 
Bcdy Assy 
-- 
Weldment 
B ~ Y  
Clip L. H. 
Clip R. H. 
Sleeve 
Forging 
Solenoid Assy 
Sleeve 
Shell 
302-CRES 
301/302-CRES 
3Kl Series CREs 
321-CRES 
'Peflon 
3 0 1 / 3 0 2 - ~ ~ ~ ~  
301-CRES 
~286-CRES 
3.M Co. 
EPIBOND 99384 
Sn 30 
~1~-~-16878/4  Nickel 
Plate 
~ 1 ~ - ~ - 1 6 8 7 8 / 4  Nickel 
Plate 
2024-T351 
Armco Ingot Magnetic 
5 
TABLE 3.2.3.1 (continued) 
Spacer 
Connector 
Clip 
spring 
ming HT Shrinkable 
M i n g  HT Shrinkable 
Solder 
Coil Assy 
Bdbbin Assy 
Bobbin 
!Pef lon 
Washer 
Solder 
Magnet Wire 
Magnet Wire 
spe 
Tubing, HT Shrink 
Armature & *Itch Assy 
Ball 
Shell 
Adapter 
Switch 
Shim 
Screw 
Screw 
Washer 
Washer 
Lcck Wire 
Soluer 
Lead Wire 
Tubing HT Shrink 
Pin, Terminal 
Solder 
G a s k e t  
Armature Ass? 
h t u r e ,  Close 
Armature, Open 
Spacer 
S p r N  
Spring 
Rivet 
Tube Lcsy 
Seat 
Seat 
W e  
Tube 
Sleeve 
Nut 
5 631492 
5631558 
5661073 
5631237 
FE? 18 
FEP 20 
30 AWG 
26 AWG 
P-4ll 
FEP 2000 Type A 
FEP 22 
5 661059 
5 631440 
5f541398 
5631438 
6w 
s661080 
~.@oo AD2-6 
Ah500 AD2-7 
~ ~ g ~ c 1 2 - 1  
A N ~ @ Q  
I4520995 $20 
Easy Flar 45 
26 AWG Type E 
FEP 20 
Ro~-040-05 65 
2024-T351 
321-CRES 
301-CRES 
301-CRES 
Teflon 
Teflon 
Sn 30 
316-CRES 
FEP Teflon 
Sintered Teflon 
Silver 
Capper 
Copper 
Teflon 
Teflon 
Teflon 
KEL-F 
Armco Ingot Magnetic 
KEL-F 
Vendar 
301-CRES 
Silver 
Copper 
Teflon 
NlRON 
Sn 30 
Teflon 
416-CRES 
416-CRES 
A286-CRES 
302-CRES 
Berylco 25 
6 
TAELii 3.2.3.1 (continued) 
Cap Assx 
cap 
Tube 
Sleeve 
Nut 
Diaphram 
Washer 
Seat Assy 
Poppet 
Seat 
o2 now m s m  (IIOS~ONT) (.m 449-0015) 
Case Assy 
Nut, Hex 
Case 
Plate 
Bracket 
Base 
End Cap & Tube Assy 
Tube 
End cap 
Diffuser Assy 
F i l t e r  
Ring 
Diffuser 
Shunt Tube Assy 
Tube 
Convection Shield Assy 
Convection Shield 
B e l l  and 
Wire 
Wire 
Elbow, b a d  
Lead Tube 
Steel 
Ltoctite 
KYlar 
Hysol . 
Hysol 
304-CRES 
3003-H.14 
304-CRES 
304-CRES 
CRES Screen 
304-CRES 
304-CRES 
Silver solder 45 
304-ms 
304-ms 
Si1-a~ 355 
Cement PBX 
Ceramic 
446-(IRES 
303/304-CREs 
.0004 Platinum 
.002 FT 
446-CRES 
304-CEaS 
304-CRES 
Heat LLnk Assy 
Outlet 
I n l e t  
Lead Assy 
Wire 
Wire 
Insert 
Tube Assy 
Ring 
Bushing, Elbar 
!tube (BY- ass) 
Regulator kssy 
Screw. 
spring 
Screw 
Seat . 
Lock 
Washer 
spring 
Tube 
B e u r n  
Bel low Flange 
Packing 
Packing 
Melding 
Rod 
Pin 
spring 
Rod 
Seat 
spring 
Packing 
Packing 
Washer 
Nut 
Stud 
Pin 
Seat 
F i l t e r  
Collax 
Housing 
Seat 
Adapter 
Housing 
B e l l o m  Flange 
02 REA- PFESSURE REGULATOR (F&w) 
2 4 ~  Gold 
Ceramic 
.0125 FT 
Ceramic 
304-ms 
304-ms 
304-cR~S 
304-CREs 
303-CRES 
302-CRES 
303-= 
3 4 7 - m s  
3 2 1 - m s  
302-CRES 
302-CBS 
321-CRES 
321-CRES 
321-CRFS 
Fluoro Carbon Rubber 
Silicone Rubber 
Fluoro Carbon Rubber 
303-CRES 
302-CRES 
17-7-PH 
303-CRES 
17-4-PH 
302-CRES 
Fluoro Carbon Rubber 
Fluoro Carbon Rubber 
AMs 5735 
AMs 5625 
lw.3 5445 
Stainless Steel  
321-CRES 
6061-~4 
17-7-PH 
C120AV T: 
6061-T4 
fms 5747 
8 
?IABLF: 3.2.3.1 (continued) 
FUEL CE13; REACTANT PRESSURF TRANSDEER (P&w) 
(complete materials l ist  not avaclable) 
Case 
Diaphragm 
Wire 
Curing Agent 
s t ee l  
347-- 
Teflon Coated X30-738 
Slygard 182 
PURGE VALVE (P&w) 
The purge valve contains the following types of materials: 
302, 303, 304, 304~,  321, 347, 430 and 440 CRES Steels 
2024-T4 Aluminum Alloy 
Red Silicone Rubber (Seat) 
Viton ( 0-rings) 
Teflon Coated Wac (MIL-W-16878/48) 
Solenoid Coil Contains the follatiag: 
Tape-Permacil P-2ll 
Varnish GE 220 
Fiberglas Yarn - Huse Liberty EPC 450$ 
Sleeving - Bently Harris #20 extra f lex  
Wire SML #35 Anaconda 
0-Ring MIC-R-25897 
Diode Potting Compound Dicast 2762 
c. O2 Purge Valve - Impact of stainless s tee l  b a l l  011 red sili- 
cone rubber seat occurs i n  the O2 downstream of the fuel  
ce l l s  (60 psi). 
No sliding application occurs in  these components. All other usages of 
nonmetallics i n  contact with the 02 are s ta t ic .  
Table 3.2.3.2 provides a summary of the nonmeta!.lic materials used i n  the 
02 l ine components and the rationale for  acceptance of thede tipplications. 
MSF'C LOX impact data have been considered and MSC is i n  process of de- 
veloping the capability t o  perform impact testing. Whsn MSC data became 
available, it wi l l  be used t o  support these conclusions. I f  tciscrepancies 
exist, the issue w i l l  be reaperied at the time the data become available. 
All of the  nonmetal3.i~ materials applications l i s t ed  above are considered 
conditionally acceptable except for  the fuel  c e l l  valve module solenoid 
valves. 
3.2.3.2 Mechanical Components 
. The f ollaring ccenponents are s t r i c t ly  mchanical: 
a. 02 system valve module rel ief  valves and check valves. 
b. Inline f i l t e r .  
c. Fuel ceU valve module check valve. 
d. 02 reactant pressure regulator. 
3.2.3.2.1 C)2 System Valve Module 
Relief Valves - Parker part number 5661032-1 
Figure 3.2.3.2 shows an overall vie?? of the 02 valve module with re l ie f  
valves installed. Figure 3.2.3.3 is a cutaway drawing of the rel ief  
valve. The re l ie f  valve is a differential  type designed t o  be unaffected 
by back pressure i n  the damstream plumbing. The n l v e  has temperature 
compensation and a self-aligning valve seat. The valve consists of an 
ambient pressure sensing bellows preloaded with a belleville spring, 
which operates a poppet valve. Ful l  flow pressure is  1010 psig maximum 
and rescat pressure is 965 psig minimum. The b e l l m  is  a potential 
single point fa i lure  which, i f  failed, would U r n  the venting of the 
contents of one of the O2 tanks. This failure i s  judged t o  have a lar 
probability of occurrence since the bellows was development tested for  
10,000 cycles a t  1000 psi, stroking f r a n  1.129" t o  1 . ~ 4 "  and back as a 
,component. The rel ief  valve was qualification tested by applying 199 
cycles of pressure fran ?O t o  982 ps i  and one cycle t o  crack pressure 
(7 983 psig), fa flow ( 4  1010 psig) and reseat pressure (> 965 p i g ) .  
'Phis sequence was repeated unt i l  2400 cycles were applied. Each valve 
is proofed as a component a t  2030 ps i  and after installation into the 
SPACECRAFT COMPONENT 
Oxygen System Valve Module 
Pressure Relief Valve 
Pressure Transducer 
Pressure Switch 
Check Valve 
Oxygen Fuel Celi  Module 
Check Valve 
Solenoid Valve 
Fuel Cell  
Pressure Regulator 
TABLE 3.2.3.2 EPS O2 LINE COMPONEX'ITS - MATERIALS NORMALLY EXPOSED 
EXPOSED MATERIAL 
No Nonmetallics exposed 
No Nonmetallics exposed 
No Nonmetallics exposed 
No Nometall ics exposed 
No Nonmetallics exposed 
Tef lon Insulation 
Teflon 
Teflon FED 2000 Tape 
Teflon Coating 
P-471 Teflon Tape 
Kel-F Seat 
Viton A 
Viton A 
Viton A 
Viton A 
Silicone Rubber 
OXYGEN 
PSpLICAT1ON I comATI~ILITy 
Wire Insulation 
Heat Shrink Tube 
Covers Coils 
Coil Coating 
Covers Coils 
Seat 
Seat 
Seal  
Seal  
0-Yng 
Packing 
RATIONALE 
MSC/WSTF Test 
MSCNSTF Test 
MSC data  on teflorz 
MSC/WSTF Test 
MSC Teflon Data 
MSC/EP 
MSC /WSTF 
MSC/WSTF 
MSC/WSTF 
MSC /WSTF 
MSC /wsm 
One f d l u r e  w i l l  
expose Mylax 
One f a i l u r e  w i l l  
expose addi t ional  
nonmetallf cs 
One i a i l u r e  w i l l  
expose a d d i t i ~ n a l  
n~)nmetall ics 
These materials  
associated with 
e l e c t r i c a l  
current. 
*G - ~ o o d ,  P - Poor, U - Unknown Data 
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FIGURE 3.2.3.3. O2 RELIEF VALVE. 
system at I263 t o  1310 psi. Because of the test history of this val-re 
and lack of problems associated with its usage, th i s  is collsidered t o  
be an acceptable single point failure. 
3.2.3.2.1.2 Check Valves - ,Parker part number 5661027-1 
F i g i i  3.2.3.4 is a cutaway drawing s.t, the ci;eck valve. The check vs3ve 
is clesigned t o  open a-c a differential  pressure of a~proximately 1 psia. 
It has an a l l  stainless s tee l  welded body ad a single, sp r ing  lcsded, 
poppe* with mew t o  meC& seats. It uses no nonmetallic naterials. 
3.2.3.2.2 Inline f i l t e r  - (ME 286-0036-002; 
The f i l t e r  consists of a stack of chemically etched discs mounted on a 
mmdrel-like cartridge. The boQ is welded 3045 CRES and the element is 
3 0 4 ~  CRES. It uses no n o m t a l l i c  materials and has no moving &s. 
3.2..3.2.3 Fwi Cell Nodule Cneck V a l v e  (Parker part number 5661076) 
Figure 3.2.3.5 is a cutaway drawing of the check valve. The check valve 
is designed t o  cpen a t  a dSferential pressure of approximately 1 psia. 
The valve contzins a &n and an awciliary seat -&jch are spring loaded 
such tfiat a t  Iw flws the zwriliary seat is barely open and catches con- 
t a m b m t  particles. During ~~ flav both seats o_Den fu3& and the high 
flow velocities carry partinzes through the valve. The valve contains 
no n m t a l l i c s  anduses  EM to m e t a l  seats. 
3.2.3.2.4 03 Reactant Pressure Regulator (F&W part number 6071~7) 
Figure 3.2.3.6 is a cutaway drawing 03 the regulatar. !b 0;1 reactant 
regulator is a bellows o m t e d ,  lever actuated unit which naintains 32 
pressure at a constant prescribed level &ove the fue l  c e l l  nitrcgen 
refereace pressure a-er  the full range of gas coA%mption f r o m  zero f lcu  
t o  full power aperation plus purge flw.~. m e  bellows assembly is can- 
posed of two bel lms for increased uni t  reliabili ty.  The lever arm is 
fr ict ion damped and actuates a supply and vent vaive. The regulator 
regulates pressure by pressure sensed a t  the bellws, balanced against 
sprilig and regulated lb pressure. &rcr i n  regulated pressure causes 
be1lcx.f~ t o  compress or extend, opening  en+ or supplgr valves, respective- 
ly, czusing regulated pressure t o  decrease or increase, restoring balance. 
Ihe regulator characteristics are as follavs: 
Set Pressure 6.7 t o  12.2 (6.2 t o  ll.7)* ps i  above reference 
Dead Band 0.2 - 0.7 psid 
Capacity 2.6 ~bs/hr 
Upstream &assure 150 psia (min. ) 
1020 psia (m.) 
*Applies t o  parer plants P650769 and up 
\ BODY 
FIGURE 3.2.3.4. O2 CHECK VALVE. 
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FIGURE 3.2.3.6. O2 REACTANT PRSSW2E REGULATOR. 

This regulator is single stage and is a pctential  single point fa i lure  
which, if it occurred, would overpressurize the fuel c e l l  causing it t o  
f a i l .  Ihe possi5le fai lure  modes of the regulatar are a stuck open in- 
l e t  puppet due t o  freezing or a binding i n  the lever pivot member. I f  
t h i s  fa i lure  occurs, it w i l l  cause an overpressurization of a fuel  c e l l  
causing its pressure she l l  t o  f a i l  (failure histary of the F/C shel l  
indicates its fai lure  mode t o  be a fai led gasket which produces a leak) 
causing the loss of one fue l  c e l l  and pa r t i a l  contents of the storage 
system. This regulator has experienced 60,000 hours of operation during 
f ie ld  operatiors, 120,000 hours of operation during development anu in- 
house t e s t s  and ll,5OO hours of c q o n e n t  type tests. The postulated 
mode of fai lure  has never occurred. !This is considered t o  be very un- 
l ikely fai lure  and therefore is an acceptable single point failure. 
3.2.3.3 Electrical Components 
The follciuing cclnponents have both e lec t r ica l  and mechanical functions: 
a. 02 system valve module pressure switch and pressure trans- 
ducer 
b. Fuel c e l l  valve mdule solenoid valves 
c. 02 flow sensor 
d. Fuel c e l l  reactznt pressure transducer 
e. 02 purge valve 
The electr ical  ~ h ~ a c t e r i s t i c s  and c i rcu i t  protection p-L-ovision Par these 
conrponents are given i n  Table 3.2.3.3. 
3.2.3.3.1 O2 System Valve Module 
Fressure Snitch - Parker part number 5641715 
Figure 3.2.3.7 is a cutaway drawing of the pressure switch. 'Phis part 
is  purchased by Parker frm Southwest, Ind. Its in te rna l  materials and 
detailed arrangement were not available. I'he pressure switch is a 
double pole, single throw absolute device. A positive reference pres- 
sure, typically between 4 t o  10 psia, is  used t o  trim e h ~  lnechanical 
t r i p  mechanism t o  obtain the required absolute switch cctuation settings. 
A circular convoluted diaphragm senses tank pressw? and actuates a 
toggle mechanism which provides switching t o  drive a motor switch. The 
motor driven switch cuntrc,ls power t o  both the tank heaters and de- 
s t rat i f icat ion fans. Review of the infamation available on th i s  switch 
indicctes that  a d i a p h r w  f +.lure w i l l  expose nonmetallic materials and 
the electr ical  e lemats  of the switch t o  the high pressure ad. Quali- 
f ication testing of thii, component required exposure t o  5000 on-off 
cycles, mis switch has never e ~ p ~ r i e n c e d  a disphragm failure. This 
r T A d K  PRESSURE 
1 d 
HORSESHOE SPRING 
FIGURE 3.2.3.7. O2 VALVE MODULE PRESSURE SWITCH. 
s t ruc tura l  fa i lu re  mode is considered t o  have a l o ~  prababil i ty of oc- 
currence and thereiore is acceptable. If the additional data t o  be 
provided 5y NR prove t h i s  conclusion t o  be invalid, the issue w i l l  be 
reopened at  t ha t  time. 
3.2.3.3.1.2 Pressure Transducer - Parisr  part number 5630034-2 
Figure 3.2.3.8 is a drawing of the pressure transducer. This par t  is 
purchased by Parlner from Dyna-Sciences, Inc. a d  i t s  interilal materials 
arid detai led =rangemen% were not available. The pressure transducer 
is an absolute (vacuum reference) device. The transducer consists of a 
si l icone pickup c q r i s e d  of four sensors mounted on a damped edge 
diaphragm and an in tegral  signal  conditioner. The unit senses tank pres- 
sure through the discharge l i ne  f'rm the tank. The sign&L conditioner 
output i s  a 0-5 VDC analog output which is l inear ly  proportioned t o  tank 
pressure. Review of the  information available on t h i s  transducer indi- 
c a b s  t ha t  a diaphragm fa i l u r e  will expose nonmetallic materials anil the  
e l ec t r i c a l  elements (sensors as a miximum) t o  the  high pressure Q2. Since 
t h i s  fa i lu re  is s t ructural  i n  nature and since the  transducer is exposed 
t o  proof pressure during system proof test ing,  it is considered t o  have 
a lm  likelihood of occurrence and is  an acceptable single point fa i lure .  
If addit ional  data t o  be provided by NR prove t h i s  conclusion t o  be ir,- 
valid, the  issue w i l l  be reopened a t  t ha t  time. 
Fuel Cell V d v e  Module Solenoid Valves 
Figure 3.2.3.9 is a cutaway drawing of the solenoid valve. 'Phe solelloid 
valve employs a poppet-seat arrangement. The poppet is actuated by a 
magnetic armature which is suspended.on a be l lev i l l e  spring. One sole- 
noid is used t o  open the valve; another t o  close it. A snap-over-center 
be l lev i i l e  spring guides the  armatures and latches the  valve open or 
closed. A switch t o  indicate valve closed position is incorporated. The 
valve opans against pressure and y e s s u r e  helps s e a l  the  valve against 
leakage i n  the normal flow direction. The e l ec t r i c a l  elements of t h i s  
valve and nonrnetaLlic materials are i n  d i rec t  contact w i t h  the high pres- 
sure 02. The solenoid co i l s  are &-e on a 316 CRES bobbin wkich i s  
ccated on its inside with .OO25 FEP teflon. Multi-teflon coated 30 gage 
cupron resistance wire and multi-teflon coatea 30 gage copper magnet 
wire a re  wound on the bobbin t o  form the coil .  'Phe outside of the c o i l  
windings is covered :t*th a layer of P-4ll t e f lon  tape and c layer of FEP 
2000 type "A" tef1.011 tape. Type E teflor! coated 26 gage copper wire is  
spliced t o  the  30 gage wires t o  form the power leads fo r  $Qe c o i l  The 
high pressure % i s  i n  contact with these solenoid co i l s  and t h e i r  power 
leads. The position indicating pasts of t h i s  valve consists of a KEL-F 
ba l l ,  a KEL-F adapter and a micro switch, a l l  three of which are  i n  di -  
r e c t  contact with t he  high pressure 9. The power leads fo r  the sole- 
naids and the leads fo r  the position indication passes through the valve 
body via  glass header type pass through. The joint  of the lead t o  the  
pass-through st112 is covered wi5h heat shrinkable tef lon tubing. This 
Is also  i n  conkc t  with the  02. 


icigirre 3.2.3.10 is a circui t  dizgran for t h i s  valve. Parer t o  maintain 
lztchii-4 is applied t o  the soler.ofd during boost and other assigwd 
times and is current limited t o  approximately - 5  amps. Normal solenoid 
G-perations use a s teaa-  curre!~t of 2 ws with maximum in-rush current 
cf 10 amps. fssumiw a direct short, the energy available for  200dp 
o-~erload i s  (26 volts) (20 a p s )  (40 seconds) = Z80G joules and for a 
606 overload is (28 volts) (60 amps) (1.75 seconds) = 294.0 Joules. 
U of the e l e ~ i e ~ t s  are zvailable within th i s  valve t o  make it a potential 
fim hazard t o  the subsgstem am spacecraft and therefore should 5e re- 
iiesig-md. 
5.2.3.3.3 @ Flw Sensor (ME 449-0015) 
Figure 3.2.3.U is a drawing  of the f l m  sensar. m e  flw sensor Is a 
c a y j i l a r ~  tube hot wire anemometer. 'Be only nometallics used on th i s  
cmgomr~t are on %he cutside of the case elements or i n  the signal con- 
5it;oning. To expose any or then ';> the 03_ would require tvc structural 
failures. 
3.2.3.3.4 Fuel Cell Reactant r'ressure Wansducer 
Figure 3.2.3.E is a drawing cf +?he traudccer.  Canplete identification 
of the internal materizls a d  its dstailed arrangamellCu were not available. 
'The tmnsducer is  an &solute device util izing bon6ed strain gages on a 
bean as&ly which is strained vZa l ink  and piston attached t o  a i'ia- 
p'n_mga which interfaces with the pressurized fluid. Review of available 
infannation indicates that a diaphragm fai lure w5ll expose nonmetal.lic 
nsterials and the electr ical  elements (s t rain gages as a minimum) t o  the 
32. During fuel c e l l  operation, t h i s  transducer has eqerienced similar 
exposure as the regulator discussed i n  3.2.3.2.1;. !!his postulated fai lure 
mcde is struc+,ural i n  nature a d  has never bee2 experiezced in  usage. 
!Phis is considered a very unl ikeu fai lure and therefore is an acce2bble 
single point failure. 
3.2.3.3.5 % Purge Valve 
FQwe 3.2.3.13 is a cutaway drawing of +his valve. This valve employs 
"0" rings of viton and red silicone rubber as  the valve seat i n  direct 
contact with the 02. Detailed engineering dra-vings ~f t h i s  valve were 
not available t o  a l l o w  assessment of postulated f s i l ~ r e s ;  however, Prat t  
& IJhitney Aircraft -as asked t o  make t h i s  determinaticr,. Their response 
indicates that  tiro failures are required t o  introduce additional non- 
metallic materials or electr ical  elements t o  the 02. This valve is con- 
sidered acceptable. 

FIGURE 3.2.3.11. O2 FLOW SENSOR. 
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The (24 contains f ivt c:.lver oxidc -zinc l?ut;tc I- ills. Three a r e  rechar(:, - 
able en t ry  b a t t e r i e s  ::nd two are  pyro Lot,tt.r*;c.::. They use an elect.iqc:- 
l y t e  of KOH i n  iiG$ so!.1lt.2on. 
The CM critrjr b a t t e r i e s  are  constructed of i-xi-rliy iadividual  c e l l s  
withtheirown p l a s t i c  case. These c e l l s  arc t l l i : a~ed  i n  a p lex ig lass  
type case and wrappcd with l aye r s  of r e s i n  '11i1.i L gr~ated f ibe rg l a s s  
clo-th. 
The en t ry  b a t t e r y  c e l l s  a r e  each vented % . i t l l i r i  tlie ba t t e ry  assembly 
which i e  i n  turn  conrleztcd t o  a rnan5fold. '!Cllt~ 1i13liifold has i n s t r ~ ~ ~ e n -  
t a t i on  which can sense from 0 t o  20 PSIA. Thi;: ~nanifold can be 
manually vented t o  l o c a l  a b i e n t  througti the water overboard dump nozzle. 
Each c e l l  incorporates e l e c t r o l y t e  entrapment provisions and gas ( H  ) 
p r e s s w e  r e l i e f  ~ a l v e s  which r e l i eve  a t  30 + 10 PSIG. 2 
- 
EXTRY BATTERY PEFG'OWNCE CHARACTEKISTICS 
Rated Open 
Capac iQi Ci rcu i t  Ambie:: t 
~ e r  Volta se Nominal Minimum Bst te ry  
Bat tery Voltagi: Voltage Temperature 
-- 
40 amp-hrs 37.2 ViX nom 29 VXK! 27 vdc 0 50 .to (25 ampere (37.1 VDC i n  (25 amps lu sd )  (25 amgs. load)  110 F 
r a t e  f o r  1 hr f l i g h t )  
& 2A t o  40 AH 
The CRI pyro ba t te r i -es  u t i l i z e  a G-IL) laminated g l a s s  e p c w  case a ~ d  
cover. 
The ba t t e ry  case has a r e l i e f  valve xhich operates a t  30 + 5 PSI d i f -  
- f e r e n t i a l p r e s s u r e .  Tne ba t t e ry  c e l l s  cach have r e l i e f  valves which 
operate a t  about 0 t o  2 p s i  d i f f e r e n t i a l  pressure.  
Each c e l l  incorporates e l ec t ro ly t e  ~ t i t r a p ~ ~ i t ,  and the ba t te ry  asr-cmbly 
vents d i r e c t l y  i l l to the lower equi~:nt:nt bay. 
PYRO B A m Y  PERFOREIANCE CHARACTERISTICS 
Rated open 
Capacity Circui t  Ambient 
Per Voltage Nominal Minimum Battery 
Battery . Voltage Voltage Temperatme 
20 vdc 0 0.75 amp- 37.2 vdc nom. 23 vdc 30 t,0 
hrs ('75 (37.1 vdc i n  (75 amps load)  (75 amps load) 110 F 
amps f o r  f l i g h t )  (32 vdc open 
36 seconds) c i r c u i t )  
Qual i f ica t ion  t e s t s  of the  entry ba t t e r i e s  did not include a pressuri-  
zation burst  t e s t  of the ba t tery  ca.se. Because the upper l i m i t  of the  
shecif ied operation of the pressure r e l i e f  valve is 40 psid, the case 
should be capable of withstanding t h a t  pressure with sonre add i t io ra l  
margin of safety.  Two individual c e l l s  were t e s t ed  by the vendors. 
Fai lure pressures were i n  excess of 50 psid. 
The procurement spec i f  i c a t  ion (MC 461-0012) requires the vendor t o  
verify the function of each c e l l  a s  t o  containment of pressure up t o  
30 + 10 psid and r e l i e f  of over pressure. The acceptance t e s t  pro- 
cedGes i n  ATP-202A, :./12/69, a re  not completely responsive t o  t h i s .  
They c a l l  out separate t e s t s  of the c e l l  case a t  one atmosphere, 
and function& t e s t  of the  r e l i e f  valve. Each delivered ce l l  case is not 
ver i f ied  t o  be capable of containing 40 p s i  which is  the highest 
pressure t o  be expected. 
Qual i f ica t ion  t e s t s  of the  pyro ba t t e r i e s  did not include a pressuri-  
zat ion burst  t e s t  of the ba t tery  case. The l i m i t  of $he speci- 
f i e d  o ~ e r a t i o n  of tine pressure r e l i e f  valve i s  35 psid, therefore 
the pyro bat tery  case must be capable of withstanding t h a t  pressure 
w ~ t h  some margin cf safety.  T ~ Z  speci f ica t ion  (MC 461-0007) requires 
the  vendor t o  perform pressurizat ion t e s t s  of each c e l l  t o  operational 
specif ied pressures. 
The vendor i s  a l so  required t o  t e s t  the in teg r i ty  of the s e a l  t o  
specif ied pressures pr ior  t o  delivery t o  NR. This implies a t e s t  of 
the case t o  withstand pressures of 35 psid. The t e s t  procedures are  
s imilar  t o  those of ATP-202A f o r  the ent ry  ba t t e r i e s ,  ard do not require 
ver i f ica t ion  of pressure re tent ion  up t o  30 2 5 psid with subsequent 
reli-ef.  
The l imited t e s t  history of these ba t t e r i e s  indicates t h a t  there i s  
l i t t l e  danger of explosive burs t  of the case, but t h a t  the case w i l l  
s p l i t  a t  a jo in t .  The r e s u l t  of a CM bat tery  f a i l u r e  would be t o  
release H2 gas in to  the CM cabin and provide a means of escape f o r  
f r e e  KOH. Each c e l l  of the entry ba t tery  contains about 2cc and 
each c e l l  of the pyro ba t t e ry  contain about 1/2 cc of KDH. The hazard of 
the  H2 released i s  sml l  because the  volume of the  CM is  l a rge  with 
respect to  the  amount of H2 generated under normal conditions. 
I f  KOH solut ion escapes i n t o  the cabin area, the e f f e c t  would be equiva- 
l e n t  t o  the  presence of any caust ic  solut ion (as  w e )  f r e e  t o  move 
about i n  a z e r o 4  environment; i .e  ., physio.l.ogica1 skin damdge accom- 
panied by st inging sensation and eye damage. However, t h i s  is  very 
unlikely since the  b a t t e r i e s  a re  located behind a close out  panel of 
the  lower equipment bay which would impeed the  movement of the  KOH. 
Any leakage from a ba t t e ry  case could corrode the  aluminum structl=e i n  
t h i s  area. 
E&D has been requested t o  perform burst t e s t  of ent ry  and pyro 
ba t t e r i e s  t o  determine the capabi l i ty  of the design t o  perform i ts  
intended function and determine capabi l i ty  t o  subject  each individual 
ba t tery  t o  a proof pressure t e s t  t o  insure required manufacturing 
pf r f  ect ion is being obtained. 
Proof pressure t e s t ing  t o  1.33 times maximum r e l i e f  valve s e t t i n g  of 
a l l  ba t t e r i e s  i s  desirable, but i f  the burst  t e s t  show the b a t t e r i e s  
do not have t h i s  capability, then the r e l i e f  valves should be 
adjusted within the necessary operational l i m i t s  t o  allow a minimum proof 
of 1.1 times maximum r e l i e f  valve se t t ing .  
SYSTEM IEScRrnION 
The CM/RCS provides the  impulse fo r  a t t i tude  control t o  maintain the  
required CM entry  a t t i tude  a f t e r  separation from the SM. During en t ry  
the M/RCS provides impulse t o  control r o l l  a t t i tude  and t o  cWqr ro l l ,  
pitch, and yaw rates. During aborts, the CM/RCS provides the impulse 
fo r  three-axis rota t ion and/or r a t e  damping as  required t o  control CM 
att i tude.  Propellant depletion i s  accomplished prior t o  CM touchdown 
for  a l l  mission modes. The CM/RCS consists of two independent pulse- 
modulated, helim-pressure-fed, positive-propellant-expulsion, rocket 
propulsion systems as shown schematically i n  Figure 3.3.1. Earth 
storable hypergolic fue l  and oxidizer are used a s  the propellants. Each 
subsystem (designated Assembly 1 and Assembly 2)  consists of the f ol- 
lowing: 
a. Helium pressurization subassembly 
b. Propellant supply and distr ibution subassembly 
c. Six reaction control rocket engines 
d. Monitor and control provisions 
e. Propellant burn/dump provisions 
f .  Serv ichg  provisions 
The engines are  mounted internally, with the engine nozzle extensions 
scarfed t o  match the CM heat shield mold line. Figure 3.3.2 shows the 
arrangement of the system i n  the CM. 
The materials of construction of the  components in the CM RCS are  l i s t ed ,  
by ccmponent, below. Table 3.3.1 defines the compatibility of materials 
used i n  the  ozidizer system and the rat ionale fo r  t he i r  acceptance. Table 
3.3.2 defines the compat;ibility of materials which may be contacted 'by 
the oxidizer i n  the event of a single fa i lure ,  sp i l l ,  or leakage. Table 
3.3.3 defines the ccmpatibility of materials used i n  the fue l  system and 
the rat ionale f 3r t h e i r  acceptance. Table 3.3.4 defines the canpat ibi l i tg  
of materials which may be contacted by the fue l  i n  the event of a single 
fai lure,  spiU,  or leakage. 
3.3.2.1 Oxidizer System 
a. Oxidizer tank: titanium, aluminum (6061 , s ta inless  s t e e l  
(304, 304L9 347, m N  (m, 


TABLE 3.3.1 COMPATIBILITY OF CM RCS OXIDIZER SYSTEM MATERIALS NORMALL:! EXPOSED TO NITROGEN TETROXIDE 
SPACECRAFT COMPONENT 
COMPONENT MATERIAL 
Tank 
Tank Probe 
I 
Propellant 
Explosive 
Valve 
Propellant 
... ' . ,ling 
Golenoid 
O Valve 
I NONMCFALS 
CONTAINED MATERIALS APPLICATIONS 
Titanium + 
Cress S tee l  
Titanium 
Altminum 
Teflon TFE/F'EP 
Teflon TFE 
Teflon TFE 
Teflon TFE 
Teflon TFE/FEP 
Blotter  
Qaaket 
Vent Cord 
Pad 
Pad 
Cress S tee l  
Viton 
Cress Steel  
Stainless  S tee l  
Alinco V 
Iron 
Teflon i Valve Scats Silicone Rubber Potting 
--- 
COMPATI.. 
BILITY 
RATINO* 
REFERENCE/ 
PAGE NO. *# 
Acceptable for  t h i a  application 
r ince t h i a  i r  a recondary rea l .  
Acceptable f ~ r  thiu applicatiotr 
r ince f a i l u r e  i a  required for  
exposurc . 
Exposed only a f t e r  1 fa i lu re ,  
therefore acceptable in thin 
appli cat. i on. 
- - 
* G - Good 
P - Poor 
U - Unknawn 
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TABLE 3.3.1 COMPATIBILITY CP CM RCS OXIDIZER SYSTEM MATERIP.LS N O R V a L Y  EXPOSED TO I,IITXOGEN TETROXIDZ - Concluded 
SPACECRAFT I COMW- I 
COMPONENT I MATBRIII I CONTAINED MATERIAIS M P L I  CATIONS RATING* PAGE NO. ** ReMARKS I 
I I I I I I 
** References : 
Propellant 
Filter 
- 
1. Compatibility of P lae t ics  with Liquid Propellante. Fuel?, and. Oxibizere, 
January 1969; P las t ics  Technical Evaluation Center, Picatinny Arsenal. 
Cree Stee l  
 over , New Jersey 
2 .  Compatibility of Materials with Rocket Propellants and Oxidizers, January 
1965; Bat te l le  Memorial In s t i t u t e .  
3. Pennsalt Chemical Bullet in VF 2~-62 
4. NR Report SD69-459-1 & 2 dated 3uly 1960 
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TABLE 3.3.2 COMPATIBILITY OF MATERIALS NOT NORMALLY EXPOSED TO MITROGEIJ TETROXIDE - Conciudclu 
t-' 
'U 
wl 
**REFERENCES 
1. Compatibility of Plastics with Liquid Pro~ellanta . Fuels. and OxidiZerb, January 1969 ; Plastics Technical 
Evaluation Center, Picatinny Arsenal, Dover, New Jersey 
MATERIAL ( s ) 
Teflon Tr'E/FEP 
TG-15000 Fiberglas 
Paint 
7 3-X 
Avcoat I1 
2. Compatibility of Materials with Rocket Pro~ellants and Oxidizers, January 1965; Battelle Memorial Institute 
REFERENCE/** 
PAGE NO. 
1/68 
1+/13-1 
14/13-1 
4/4-3 
3. NASA Contributions to Advanced Valve Technolo&, NASA SP-5019, 1967; National Aeronautics and Space 
ACIministration, Office of Technology Utilization, Washington, D.C. 
REMARKS 
"l data 
Paint will first bleach 
and then dissolve. 
Bleaches 
Bubbles and reacts with 
oxidizer fumes. Destroyed. 
4. IIypergolic Propellant Materiala Compatibilit~, No. CR 64-88; Martin Company 
COMPATIBILITY 
RATING" 
C 
P 
P 
P 
USAGE 
Heat-Shrink Tubing 
Thermal lnsulation 
Torque Stripe Paint 
Marking Ink 
Hentahield Material 
TTME TO 
MILURE 
Indefinite 
Several Hours 
A few minutes 
A few minutes 

TABLE 3.3.3 COMPATIBfLIT!t OF CMRCS FUEL SYSTEM MATERIALS 
NORMALLY EXPOSED TO MONOMETHYLHYDRAZINE - Concluded 
TRnb Probe 
SPACECRPET 
COMPOmnT 
Tank 
Propellant 
Explosive 
r Valve 
rU 
4 
Propellant 
Latching 
Solenoid 
Valve 
~MWNEhT 
MATERIAL 
Cress Steel  
Ti t  an'ium 
Aluminum 
Teflon TFE/FEP 
Teflon TFE 
Teflon TFE 
Teflon TFE 
Teflon TFE 
CONTAINED MAmIALS 
' ~itsnium 
Cress Steel  
V i t  on 
Cres Steel 
Stainless Steel  
Alinco V 
Iron 
Teflon 
Silicone Rubber 
'G - Good 
P - Poor 
U - Unknown Data 
NONMETALS 
APPLICATIONS 
Blatter  
Gasket 
Vent Cord 
Pad 
Pad 
Seal 
Valve Seats 
Potting 
COMPATI- 
BILITY 
RATING* 
REFERENCE/** 
PAGE 110. 
Acceptable for  t h i s  ap- 
plication since t h i s  i s  
a secondary seal. 
Exposed only a f t e r  one 
fai lure.  Therefore, 
acceptable fo r  t h i s  
application. 
Exposed only a?%er one 
fai lure.  Therefore, 
acceptable for  t h i s  
application. 
TABLE 3.3.4 COMPATIBILITY OF MATERIALS XOT NORMALLY EXPOSED TG MONO1.IETHYLHYDRAZINE 
~ k n i n u m  
Aluminum 
Aluminum/Sili cone 
Aluminum/Epoxy 
Aluminized Mylar/H-Film 
Anodized Aluminum 
Cork 
IU 
OD 
Epoxy/Fiberglas 
Fiberglas 
H-Film (F?lyimide ) 
Kynm (polyvinylidene 
chloride ) 
leoprene/Fiberglas 
lomex (Aromatic Nylon) 
Nylon 
Nylon 
* G - Good U - Unk 
P - Poor 
USAGE TIME TO 
FAILURE 
Structure and/or Tubing 
Nme Plates  
~ ~ ~ ~ y c o m b  
Thermal Insulation 
Structures (gold, blue 
and brown ) 
Door Sealant 
Circuit Boards 
Spot Ties 
Wire Insulation 
I D  Sleeves and Heat- 
Shrihk Tubing 
Bmdaids 
Spot Ties 
Velcro Fas5epers 
Parachutr! System 
Paints  (red,  yellow, 
and black) 
Indefini te  
COMPATIBILITY 
RATING* 
- 
REFERENCE**/ 
PAGE NO. 
Simtlar t o  R-7001. 
Siliraar t o  R-7001. 
Epoxies a s  c lass  - poor 
H-Film - poor 
Auodized aluminum probably 
a l l  good 
Similar t o  Spun V I  , 828. 
Similar t o  h a l o n  
Bleaches 

TABLE 3.3.4 COMPATIBILITY OF MATERIALS NOT NORMALLY EXPOSED TO MONOMETHYLHYDRAZINE - Concluded 
TG15000 Fiberglas  I Thermal Insulat ion I 
MATERIAL ( s ) 
Paint  I Torque S t r i p e  Paint  I 
Vinyl (polyvinylchloride) Wire Insulat ion I I 
USAGE 
73-X I Marking Ink 1 
APPROXIMATE 
TIME TO 
FAILURE 
Unidentified Sleeve (black and 
yellow) 
Unidentified 1 Lanyard Cover (green) I 
COMPATIBILITY REFERENCE**/ 
RATING* I PAGE NO. I 
Unidentified 
0 
REMARKS 
Pot t ing Compounds 
(blue and brown) 
1. Compatibiiity of P l a s t i c s  with Liquid Propel lants ,  Fuels,  and Oxidizers,  
January 1369 ; P l a s t i c s  Technical Evalue-tion Center, P ica t  inny Arsenal, 
Dover, New Jersey.  
**REFERENCES 
2. Compatibility o f  Mater ia ls  with Rocket Propel lants  and Oxidizers,  January 
1965; B a t t e l l e  Memorial I n s t i t u t e  
3. NASA C o n t r i b u t i c : ~ ~  t o  Advanced Valve Technology, NASA SP-5019, 1967; National 
Aeronautics and Space Administration, Office of Technology U t i l i z a t i o n ,  Washington, D.C. 
4. Hypergolic Propel lant  Materials Compatibili ty,  No. CR 64-88; Martin Company 
'b. w ' u a ~ v e :  stainleas e k e 1  (304~,  ~ T - P ) ,  V3n,~ 
: \flwrmubber) 
c, Dmp Pale: See (b)' above. 
dd Interconnect vdve: See (b) above. 
e. ' Tsolation valve: StaQleas s tee l  (3044,. 347, 321, ~ ~ 3 5 0 ) ~ .  
8wico  V, Armco ingo t  iron, aluminum (2024), 'PEFEX)N, sili- 
. cone rubber, epoxy 814. 
f. injector valve: stainlese s tee l  (304~, 321, 3b7, ., 
k3~l7, .fi-TPH), s- tel l i te  , -ON (FEP) , silicone rubber. 
. . 
g. &11 qnd vent cou 'ing: stainless s tee l  (3~2, 303, 304, 
. . 304.L~ ,316, l~-i'& wluhR. 
. . .  
. . ,  
h. - B m t -  @sc as~embly: ' . s-kainless s tee l  (303, - 304, 304~,  
17-4), d u m i n ~ ~  (6061) m N ,  Resistazlne 88,. 
i. %at pobt di~conqect.cmpXi;Ig: stainless s tee l  (303, 304,. 
: . ' 310,: 321, 1 7 q P ~ ) ,  . KYN9R. . 
The components u 8 e d . h  the fuel system are the same those used in the 
oxiqzer :systerq, via the sane materials used, except i n  the check mlve. 
The fuel-aide check vave materiqI.8 .are: ,stainleas s tee l  (304, 3&L, 321, 
17-4PH, 1 ~ - 7 )  and Em (ethylene propylene rubber). . . 
a .  tank: - t i t a n i w n ,  stainless steel, !TE3U)ll, butyl rubber. 
. . 
- 2  - .. . . 
. . I .  
b. ~ e g u h t o r :  staihless steel(3CZ, 3043, 347, AM 350, UOC, 
17-4m3, s t e e l  (SBE 9524), aluminum (2&, al,.. 70753, bi- 
metal; TeFLoW ('PI%), KYNiU, rus3ber (~~634-TO) .  
c. Isolation valve: stainless &%eel (304~, 17-4FX), aluminm 
(6061), WON. 
d, Chzck valve: stainless s t ee l  (3&, 304~,  321, 17-~PH, 17-7), 
KYNAR and Resistazine 88 i n  oxidizer system and EPR (ethylene 
propylene rubber) i n  the fuel system, 
. - 
e.. Interco~e.ct,  valve: stainless s teel  (304, 17-~PH), WCON. 
. .  . 
f. .Reiief .valve.: stainless s tee l  (301, 303,. 304, 304~ ,  17-4PH), 
a l e m i  (1145), TEFLON. 
g.  ill coupling: stainless s tee l  (303, 304, 304L, ~286, 
L';-~ZH, 17-~PH), aluminum (2024, 7075 ), KMIAR, KEL-li81. 
h. Test point coupling: stainless s tee l  (303, 304, 310, 321, 
1'7-7W)j KWiR. 
3.3.3.1 Oxidizer System 
a. Oxidiz2r tank: Fi.gu?e 3.3-3. 
The oxidizer tanks are in the C)ji a f t  c a n e  between 
1 and 2 and 3 and 4. % (24 RCS oxidleer is inhibited 
N20 Each tank f s  loaded w i t s h  78.3 +1.6 1B. aridier under 
a p!&ssui-e of 100 9 psia  ~ 5 t h  e l i c  !lh ~16- is not 
pressurized f m  operation (&$ $ ~ i a )  uDfil me hour before 
re-entry. %ere are no electrical souroes m or in the tank. 
Should the tank bladder leak, a dod le  c b c k  wle f a l u r e  
Inus+. occur before oxidizer could get in to  the f-1 system 
8nd c a s e  a reaction. !I?h m d i e e r  t -aka  considered ac- 
ceptable in their  present application. Ppesare regulation 
'is redudant as discussed in peragraph 3.3.3.3 rrnd there are 
no electr ical  interfaces to prrovide an lgaition source fm 
the tank bladders (~e f lon) .  Risk associated w i t h  these tanks 
is m'.nimize~ by the limited pressurized -ticxu (entry only). 
b. Ell and vent coupling: 3.3-4. 
The coupling mechanism is tacked up by a closure cap after 
loading. !be coupling is  acceptable in its present ap- 
plication es a single B i lure  does not --use leak8ge. 
c. Burst disc assenibly: Figure 3.3-5. 
Canponent failure MUM result i n  premature expoeure of the 
gallery l ines t o  the oxidizer and dces not imnn-fr crew safety. 
The disk assembly is acceptable. 
d. 'Pest point disconnect coupling: Figure 3.3-6. 
Same as (b) above. 
3.3.3.2 ,wl System 
a. -1 tank: Figure 3.3-3. 
Tbe -1 tanks are i n  the (3M aft camparbmnt et W s  9 and 10. 
The RCS fue?. is Mi. Ekch tar;k I s  loadEPd with 14.2 + 0.9 lb. 
fuel under a pressure of 100 +5 peia with helim. The b t e m  
is not pressurizeti fp. operatim (291. 914 psi.) until one hour 
OUTLET TUBE 
BOLT 
WASHER 
LSV TUBE 
Of FFUSER TUBE 
FLANGE 
REf AlNER 
(347 CRES) 
(TITANIUM) 
(347 CRESf 
(347 CRES} 
(6061 A1 ) 
(6061 A1 ) 
(6061-f 6 Af 1 
Rf NG 
GASKET 
BOLT 
FITTING 
NUT 
GASKET 
GASKET 
(6061 A t )  
(TEFLON TFE) 
(347 CRES) 
(304L CRES) 
(347 CRES) 
(TEFLON TFE) 
(TEFLON TFE) 
8. BLADDER (TEFLON TFEIFEP) 16. NUT (347 CRES) 
FIGURE 3.3.3,  PROPELLANT TANK 
WASHER 
SHELL 
NUT PLATE 
VENT CORD 
F L A ~ E D  EYELET 
PAD 
PAD 
(6061-TS A l )  
f TIT AtJIUM) 
(A236 CRES) 
(TEFLON TFE) 
1304 CRES) 
(f EFLON ?'FE/F-EP 1 
(TEFLON TFE) 
1. 302 CRES 
2. 303 CRES 
3. 304 CREb 
4. 304L CRES 
5. 316 CRES 
6. 17-4PH CRES 
7. KYNAR 
FIGURE 3.3.4. AIRBORNE HALF OF THE PROPELLANT DISCONNECT COUPLING. 
VIEW A-A 
(END VIEW OF THE 
BURS1 DIAPHRAGM 
' v '  GROOVE) 
1 
.4 
RESISTAZINE 88, OXYGEN 
VALVE; PARKER 8496-7,  
FUEL VALVE 
17-4 CRES 
304  CRES 
6061-T651 A1 ALLOY 
304L CRES 
303 CRES 
TEFLON 
FIGURE 3.3.5. BURST DIAPHRAGM ISOLATION VALVE 
135 
1. 310 CRES 
5. 304 CRES SCRI 
6. 3 2 1  CRES 
FIGURE 3.3.6. AIRBORNE HALF OF THE TEST POINT DISCONNECT COUPLING 
136 
before re-entry. !&ere are no electr ical  sources on or  i n  
the tanks. Should the tank bladder leak, a double check, 
valve fai lure  must occur before fuel  could get into the 
axidizer system an3 cause- a reaction. The ml tanks are 
considered accegtable in the i r  present application. Pres - 
sure r e g u l a t i o ~  is  redundant as discussed in paragraph 
3.3.3.3 and there are no internal sources of tank-pressure 
increase. The limited pressurized operation (entry) by 
these t anks  further reduces any r i sks .  
b. M11 and vent coupling: Figure 3.3-4. 
S~TE rem~rks as for  midizer. 
c. B-t disc assenibly: Figure 3.3-5. 
%me remarks as for axidizer. 
d. Test point disconnect coupling: Figure 3.3-6 
Sane remarks as fo r  =midizero 
3.3.3.3 Heliun System 
a. H e l i u n  tank: Figure 3-30?. 
The two h e l i m  tanks sre located appruximately diametrically 
on the +Y and -Y sides of the aft canparlanent between Frames 
2 and 3 and between &ames ll and 12. Each tank is loaded 
w i t h  0.57 lb. heliun a t  4150 5 0  psia at 70 +5%. There 
are no e lec t r ica l  sources on or in the tank.- There are no 
significant external sources of tank pressure or temperature 
increases. The tanks are acceptable in their present ap- 
plication as they have an adequate factor of safety and no 
mechanisms f a r  tsnk pressure or temperature increase. 
The regulators are series-parallel redmdsnt for  each propel- 
lant system. Loss of a single regulator would have no effect 
on hl or oxidizer tank pressure. If both regulators of 
a unit in series failed open af te r  system activation, then 
the propellant tcmks of that system would rupture as the 
fai led open regulatar f lat  exceedes the re l ie f  valve capa- 
bi l i ty .  
c. Relief valve : Mgure 3.3-9 . 
The heliun relief valve contains a diaphragm which ruptures 
at 340 5 psig. The valve relieves a t  346 +14 psig and re- 
seats at 327 psig minimum. There is a reliGf valve for  each 
FIGURE 3.3.7. HELIUM PRESSURE VESSEL (356 CU. IN.) 
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ALLOY 
FIGURE 3.3.9 . CM RCS HELIUM PRESSURE RELIEF VALVE. 
propellant tank. These valves are sized t o  accolmnodate 
temperature or pressure increases such as entry heating 
but do not accomodate dual regulator fai lures.  
d. F i l l  and drain coupling: Figure 3.3-10. 
The coupling mechanism i s  backed up by closure cap a f t e r  
loading. They are acceptable as  a single fa i lu re  does not 
cause excessive leakage. 
e . Check valve : Figure 3.3-110 
The check valves are series-paralled redundant and any 
single fa i lu re  does not result i n  fue l  and oxidizer mixing 
or  loss  of pressurization. They are considered acceptable. 
f. Test point disconnect coupling: Figure 3.3-6. 
See '(dl above. 
3.3.4.1 Oxidizer System 
. 
The sa l i en t  characterist ics of the e l ec t r i c a l  ccmponents i n  the oxidizer 
system are given i n  Table 3.3-5. A discussion of the hazard potential  
and ef fec t  of canponent fa i lu re  are  discussed beluw. 
a. Purge tralve: Figure 3.3-12. 
A s  sham in  Mgure 3.3-12, machineu f i t t i n g s  are  brazed t o  
the tubing forming a complete mstall ic end closure. bakage 
of an untzctuated valve is  remote. A metal-to-metal s ea l  i s  
formed af ter  actuation with a redundant VTTON esal. These 
valves are actuated only a f t e r  completion cf RCS contro: fo r  
system dmp csnd purge. They arc acceptable fo r  t he i r  present 
applications. 
b. lXrmp valve: Figure 3.3-12. 
Same as (a )  above. 
c. Interconnect valve: Figure 3.3-12. 
Same a s  (a)  above. 
d. Isola t ion valve: Figure 3.3-rj. 
Propellant i sola t ion valves are normally in &he open condition 
and are  no5 normally cycled during f l igh t .  Theref ore, f a i lu res  
due t o  cycle l i f e  are insignificant. A single fa i lu re  of the 
a
&
 
m
tn
 

TABLE 3.3.5. CM RCS OXIDIZER SYSTEM ELECTC!ICAL CmPOIlENTS 
PURGE VALVE 
PROPELLANT ISOLATION 
VALVE 
OXIDIZER 
VALVE 
.-- 
OXIDIZER DK4P VALVE 
ENGIIUF. INJECT02 VALVE 
DIRECT 
AUTOMATIC 
TEMPIIRATURE SENSOR 
SQUIB VALVE TO PURGE 
OXIDIZER LINES AFTER I 28 
WWP. 
SOLENOID VALVE TO 
I X L A T E  OXIDIZER 
FROM ENGll4E I k l E C -  
TOR VALVE. 
SQUIB VALVE TO CON- 
NECT SYSTEM 1 AND 1 
SYSTEll 2. 
SqUIB VALVE TO DUMP 
OX1DIZER OVERROARD, 
SbLENOSD FOR WNUAL 
ENGINEER CONTROL; 28 
HEATER. 
SOLENOID FOR AUTO- 2 8  
MATIC EH i INE  CVNTROL. ( 
RESISTANCE ELEMENT 
TO MFASURF INJECTOR 
TEMPERATURE. 1 O 5  
MAL OPERATING I NORMAL Fl.UIfl ! 
LECTRIC*.L. - .- 
. - . . - . . - .
PROPERTIES 
RACTERISTICS I AT COMPONENT SUMNARY DESCRIPTION I OF ELECTRICAL COnWNENl  TO FLUID  . - 
AMPERES I PRESSCRE 1 TEMPFRATUPE I INTERFACE 
3.5/5.0 70 F/N ME2R4-0019-0006. OXIbIZER F ILLED L I N E  
ON OUTLET S IDE  OF VALVE. HELIUM ON INLET 
1 5  MILLISFCONOS SIDE OF VALVE. ONE VALVE I N  EACH SYSTEM. 
-- 
I I I 
1.71 1 2 9 1  1 7 0  I P/fd EE284-0276-00u l .  OXIDIZER ON INLET SIDE 
(ACCEPTANCE) I I I ONLY AFTER EURST DISC RUPTURED I N  SYSTEM ACTlVATION. OXIDIZER THROilGH bALVE AFTER 
ACTUATION. ONE V4LVE I N  EACH SYSTEM. 
- 
P/N ME204-0130-0014. OXIDIZER ON BOTH SIDES 
OF VALVE FROM TIME OF SYSTEM LOADING. ONE 
VALVE FOR BOTH SYSTWS. 
-----, --.-. 
P/N ME284-0130-0032. OXIDIZER GN INLET  OF 
1B MILLISECONDS/ SYSTEM LOADING. ONC VALVE I N  EACH SYSTEM. 
15 MILLISEfrJKOS 
----....- ---. - 
S I X  SOLENOIDS I N  EACH SYSTEM: ONE PER ENGIYE. 
OXIDIZER AGAINST VALVE ONLY AFTER SYSTEM 
SPECIFICATION ACTIVATION. 
3.47J3.75 S I X  SOLENOiDS I N  EACH SYSTEM: ONE PER ENGINE 
ACCEPTANCE/ OXIDIZER AGAINST VALVE ONLY AFTER SYSTEM 
SPECIFlCATION I ACTIVATION. 
ONE EACH MOUNTED ON INJECTORS OF ENGINES 12, 
14, AND 1 6  OF SYSTEM 1 AND ENGINES 21, 24, 
AYD 2 5  OF SYSTW 2.  
1 3041. CRES 
2 17-4PH CEES 
FIGCRE 3.3.12. PROPELLANT EXPLOSIVE VALVE. 
FIGURE 3.3.13. ' PROPELLANT LATCHING SOLENOID VALVE. 
i45 
bellows would allow the propellants t o  come i n  contact 
with s i l i con  rubber (a non-compatible material) and the 
instrumentation position switch and wiring (a possible 
igni t ion source). The bellows has been pressure tes ted 
t o  3000 ps i  before failure. This is well above the b ~ r r s t  
capabil i ty of the  propellant tanks. The bellows design 
has sa t i s fac tor i ly  passed operational t e s t s  of 4000 cycles. 
The probabil i ty of a bellows fa i lu re  under present operating 
conditions (oot more than one operating cycle or abnormal 
pressure transients)  is  extremely small. The propellant 
i sola t ion valves are considered acceptable because of the 
extremely low probability of exposing nonmetallic material t o  
the propellants. In addition t o  ce r t i f i ca t ion  tes t ing  these 
valves have shown compatibility during the propellant can- 
p a t i b i l i t y  test. EXgure 3.3-13 shows the isola t ion valve 
a n d ' l i s t s  the material of i t s  cunponents. 
e. Engine in jector  valve: 3.3-14. 
Each valve has two co i l s  a s  sham in Figure 3.3-14. These 
co i l s  are external t o  a welded t.~be which is  considered 
very rel iable.  me re  are no single fa i lures ,  other than tube 
leakage, which would expose the co i l s  or other nonmetallic 
materials t o  the propellants. The operating his tory  and 
qualif ication of the valves demonstrate t h e i r  acceptability. 
3.3.6.2 h e 1  System 
The Fuel system e l ec t r i c a l  components are the  sme as the axi- 
dizer s y s b m ,  and the same remarks apply. See (a) through fe) 
above. 
TRIM ORIFICE - 
FILTER - CRES 
3. INLET HOUSING - CRES 1 7 1 7 ~ ~  
I .  VALVE BODY (BOBBIN) - CRES 321, 430F 
5. CORE - CRES 430F 
6. SPRING - CRES 17-7PH 
7. ARMATURE - CRES 430F W/STELLITE BALL 
8. VALVE SEAT ASSEMBLY - CRES 321, 17-7PH W/FEP TEFLON S W  
9. AUTOMATIC COIL 
10, DIRECT COIL 
11. LEADUIRE HOUSING - CRES 347 
12. LEADWIRES - AWG 20, MIL-W-16678 TYPE EE 19 STRAND NICKEL COATED 
FIGURE 3.3.14. CM ROCKET ENGINE INJECTOR VALVE. 
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The S~!/RCS subsystem i s  cmposed of individual installat ions i n  four 
bays or' the SM. Figure 3.4.1 i s  a typical  schematic of one of these 
installat ions.  The SB~/RCS system i s  mounted on door panels .and are 
located around the service nodule as shown in Figure 3.4.2 and Figure 
3.4.3. 
I n  each insta l la t ion a single helium tank supplies ullage pressure 
t o  the primary and secondary oxidizer and fue l  tanks. Helium flow t o  
the pressure regulators may be shut off ( i f  required) by helium. 
isolation valves. The pressure regulators are two se t s  of parel le l  
regulators with each se t  containing two regulators i n  series with 
the primary regulator s e t  t o  operate a t  181 + 3 psia. Helium flows 
from the regulated helium manifold throwh 2-parallel se t s  of 2 
check valves i n  series t o  the oxidizer tanks and through an identi- 
ca l  check valve configuration t o  the fue l  tanks. The helium ullage 
i s  isolated fran the f l u id  propellant by a teflon bladder. A 
re l ie f  valve is insta l led i n  each fue l  and oxidizer tank helium 
in l e t  system t o  allow the systems t o  s t a r t  venting a t  225 psia. 
Hcwever, it should be noted that  the secondary fue l  tank has an 
isolation valve i n  the system between the tank and fue l  re l ief  
and check valves. 
Isolation valves are located between eazh p r ~ p e l l a n t  tank and the 
engine valves of the qusd. A pressure transducer i s  installed 
between the priiuary tanks and the isolation valves. Four engines 
form a cluster :or each RCS unit. Figures 3.4.4 and 3.4.5 show 
the location of the SM/RCS on typical  panel assemblies. 
Table 3.4.1 defines the compatibility of materials used in  the oxidizer 
system and the rationale for the i r  acceptance. Refer t o  tables 3.3.2, 
3.3.3, and 3.3.4, of the CM RCS sectior, for the conpatibility assess- 
ment of materials not normally exposed t o  oxidizer, normally expcsed 
t o  fuel, and not normally exposed t o  fuel, respectively. 
%t helium is an iner t  gas, therefore, there i s  no compatibility 
problem for internal materials. Helium pressure vessel (~~282-0051) 
internal componenets and materials are l i s t e d  i n  Table 3.4.2. The 
6 ~ 1 - 4 ~  titanium helium tank was demonstrated t o  be acceptable by. 
cer t i f ica t io3  testing.  Hydrostatic tes t ing shared the actual burst 
pressure t o  be 8000 psia giving a 1.7 safety factor and t o  be bet ter  
than the 7000 psia design burst pressure. 


FIGURE 3.4.3. SM SUBSYSTEMS IN PROXIMITY OF RCS TANKS. 
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TABLE 3 . 4 . 2 .  HELIUM PRESSURE VESSEL ( M E 2 8 2 - 0 0 5 1 )  INTERNAL COMPONENTS AND MATERIALS 
RATIONALE FOR ACCEPTABILITY 
I N E R T  GAS 
PART NAME 
U 
K SEAL 
F I T T I N G  
NUT 
P / T  SENSOR 
SHELL - T I G  WELD 
PART NUMBER 
1 2 1 0 0  PA4 
V 3 7 - 4 6 0  106-3 
MC 174-C10W 
ME449 0126-0002 
6 4 9 9 - 7  
. 
- 
MATERIAL 
1 7 - 4  PH GOLD PLATED 
3 0 4 L  
CIRES-316 CONDFF PASSIVATED 
N1-SPAN 6 
6A1-4V T I  
2.4.2.2 Fuel and Oxidizer Tanks 
A i l  p rqe l l an t  tanks ere made of 6 k l - 4 ~  titanium. Primq- and 
S ~ C O ~ ~ W J  talb of both fuel  and cxidizer system are sialla= 
except far tar& ler i ths .  The secondary tanks srt i&entical 
v i th  those used in  the c w ~ x r . C  ~ 0 6 u l c .  The internal tsnlr com- 
pocents are shown am2 l i s t e a  i n  Figae 3.4.6. The teflor, bladder 
is the only non-metallic ma%erird within these tanks anti i s  cunpatible 
v i th  the grope.Uant. !Tank stress  co r ros io~  t e s t  rcsiilted in the 
use o9 green (irhi5ited) N 0 as tlie oxidizer. Titaniuol 6 ~ 1 - 4 ~  
is ccmpatible v i th  the pro$ehtmts nar i n  use. 
The helium regulators are two regulator sections colupled i n  serzes. 
Figure 3.4.7 shows a cutaway viev and lists the materials. A d-iral 
. fa i lure  in the f u l l  open position of the series regulators is the 
only fai lure  node that  would resul t  in over-greasurizing the 
propellant tank. The flow through the f - d l  open regulators exceeds 
the rel ief  valve capability. The regulators are acceptable without 
char*-e because the subject fa i lure  involves two reguletors fai l ing 
open, siundtanecsly and 2n the same series.  No open failure has 
ever keen rep~rted  f 3r %kc? regulator duririi devslogmegt or 6uriag -ae. 
&i;biPs of the regslator fail- study sre given i n  the ApoXo CSM 
Eezctioi~ Cor;tral STS tern Series Eeg-dator Study, SD-68-&5, May 19. 
CaqatibZfitJ: 02 natcrfals c-xpoced t o  oxidizer was d€;rc-snstraixc by 
the 9 day ranpatibfiity t xs t .  For detai ls  of the t e s t  sae mpcrt 
"IJi-nety Cay Yrtqellar:t Compatibility Test CS!RCS", SD-63-459.. July 
193. 
3.4.2.4 Check Valves 
The check valves are arrenged i n  a configuretio~l t o  provide a parnllel 
path. Each leg of the paral le l  paZh contains two check valves i n  
series. The I E O S ~  corm011 fai lure  mode of a check valve is  ieakage in  
the reverse direction or a failure t c  cl3se. The series/garallel  
arranqemext requires a dual fai lwe before tk system is  affected. 
During the 9 day compata3ifity t e s t  the check valves were altered 
t o  allw leakage t o  penetrate upstream. A t  the end of the t e s t  the 
seals on the check valves had deteriorated and b e c e  gumogr. However, 
the rel ief  valves st i l l  functioned but required a slfghtly higher 
cracking pressure and leaked a l i t t l e .  For detai ls  of the test, see 
report "ninety Dey Propell a d  Co-t~biiity Test w ~ ~ ~ ,  " SD-69-459, 
July 1969. A check valve anti its list of materials is shovn in  
Figure 3.4.8. Compatability of the -sea mu-metallic nmterial 
within the check valve is  ansidered acceptable within the time con- 
s t raints  es+~blished by pmpellant compatability tes t .  
Helium Relief V a l v e  
A helium relief valve i s  located downstream of the check valv~s The 
1. Outle t  Tube (347 CMS) 
2. Bolt [Titanium) 
3. V u h a r  (347 L r S )  
4. UV Tuba 0 4 7  C I S )  
5. Diffumar Tube (6061 U )  
6. Flange (6061. A l )  
7. h t a i n a t  (6061sT6 All 
W. Dlcddar (Taflon T?B/?CP) 
d m k r t  
Dolt , 
F i t t i n g  
Nut 
Caaka t 
Guka  t 
nut 
1 
kNonlnetallic material 
(6061 Al) 17. Wuhar (6061-T6 A l )  
(Teflon T R )  18. S h a l l  ( T i t a m )  
(347 CUU) 19. Nut P l a t e  (A206 Caw 
(M4t CRIB) *o. Vent Cord (T8floa T n )  
( 3 4 7 C I S )  21. Flan8adEyalet  ( 3 0 4 m S )  
(Teflon T W )  1 2 2 ,  Pad (Tat lon T?Z/FEP) 
(Tatloa T?E) *23. Pad (Teflon T?E) 
(347 CllBS) 
FIGURE 3.4.6. PROPELLANT TANK SCHEMATIC AND MATERIAL L I S T .  


most common f a i l u r e  of a r e l i e f  valve is  lettkage. A burst  diaphragm 
is  i n  each r e l i e f  valve a h e ~ d  of the valve portion t o  prevs-lt leakage 
through the r e l i e f  -alve pr ior  t o  i i s  use. A l o w  r a t e  b l ce i  vent i s  
provided between th2 diaphragm and the valve t o  provide the correct 
d i f fe ren t ia l  pressure across the diaphragm. The system i s  operated 
i n  a lcanner t h a t  the r e l i e f  valve is not functioned without a fe i lu re  
or  an abnormal temperature r i s e  of the propellant tanks. The fa i lu re  
of the re l i e f  ~ a l v e  i n  the closed position (low probabil i ty)  would 
therefore be 'kc -econd of two f a i l u r e s  required t o  over-pressurize 
a tank. Figurr - .h. .; l  shows the hcliwl r e l i e f  valve and l ists the 
n a t e r i a l  of f . t - -  z rponents .  Teflon is  the only non-metallic material  
i n  the r e l i e f  caive and is  compatible with the oxidizer and fuel .  
3.4.2.6 F i l t e r s  
The f i l t e r s  used i n  both the helium and propellant systems contain 
only metallic na te r ia l s .  The f i l t e r s  have no potent ia l  f a i lu re  
modes t ha t  would be d i f f x e n t  from ordinary i ines .  Figure 3.4.10 
shows the f i l t e r  and l i s t s  the material  of its components. 
3.4.3 CCRJXAL COMPONENTS IN CW ON HElXM AND P l 3 r - A  
Elec t r i ca l  operating character is t ic  and interface cf propellant cam- 
ponents are l i s t e d  in Table 3.4.3. Hazard potent ia l  i s  l i s t e d  i n  
Table 3.4.4. 
3.4.3.1 Heliurr Temperature end Pressure Transducers 
The temperature and pressure transducers i n  the helium system are 
compatible with the i ne r t  helium gas. The instrumentation signal  
conditioner provides current liiniting and i n  the event of an in ternal  
f a i l u r e  the heat generated is insignificant .  
3.4.3.2 Propellant Pressure Transducers 
Propellant pressure transducers are located downstream of the primary 
axidizer and f u e l  tanks. The interface with the propeliagt is a dia- 
phragm whose burst  press is  approximately 9000 p s i  and is well over 
the tank burst  pressure of 600 psi .  
k single fa i lu re  of the diaphragm w i l l  exposp the s t a i n  gages (bridge 
network), wiring, feed through terminals and glass s ea l  t o  the propel- 
l an t .  
There are no knam fa i lu res  of the diaphragm. Figure 3.4.11 shows 
the transducer. This transducer is acce~ t ab l e  due t o  the iow proba- 
b i l i t y  cf a rupture8 diaphragm. I n  addition t o  the burst  t e s t  during 
ce r t i f i ca t ion  t es t ing  these transducers have a l so  shown compatability 
during the propellant campatability t e s t .  


TABLE 3.4.3. ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS I N  OR ON OXIDIZER AND FUEL LINES 
- 
C C  iF3NENT 
ISOLATlON 'iALVES 
ME?%-Q97d-0001- 
2 -7 -8  
PRESSURE TRANSDUCERS 
KE449-0052- 1129 
HE449-0052-1131 
OXIGILLR PRESSURE 
SIGNAL CONDITIONER 
ME901-0289- 1129  
ME901-0289- 1 1 3 1  
TEMPERATURE SENSOR 
ME449-0030-9048 
SIGNAL CONDITIONER 
ME901-029 1-9048 
ENGINE ACTUATGR 
VALVE 
HEATERS AND THERMAL 
SWITCHES 
FUNCTION 
CONTROL PROPELLANT 
FLOW FROM PRIMARY 
AND SECONDARY OXI- 
DIZER TANKS 
MEASURE PROPELLANT 
PRESSURES 
CONDIlIONS PRESSURE 
TRANSDUCER SIGNAL 
FOR TELEMETRY SYSTEM 
MEASURES QUAD PACK- 
AGE TEMPERATURE 
C3GUITIONS PACKAGE 
TEMPERATURt SENSOR 
INPUT FOR TELEMETRY 
CONTROL . ROPELLANT 
THERMAL CONTRO ?F 
ENGINE VALVES 
SUMMARY DESCRIPTION 
OF ELECTRICAL CM4PONENT TO FLUID  
INTERFACE 
SOLENOID ACTUATED LATCHING TYPE VALVES. 
I N  L I N E  CONTACT WITH FLUID  (CIECHANICAL 
VALVE PORTION). MOMENTARY APPLICATION 
OF POWER REQUIRED TO ACTUATE VALVE. 
TEFLON ONLY NONMETALLIC MATERIAL NORM- 
ALLY I N  CCNTACT WITH PROPELLANT. 
NO NONMETALLIC MATERIAL I S  USED I N  DIRECT 
CONTACT WITH THE OXIDIZER FLUID. 
MOUNTED ON CHASSIS NOT I N  CONTACT WITH 
FLUID. 
NO DIRECT CONTACT WiTH FLUID. 
NO DIRECT CONTACT WITl l  FLUID. 
DIRECT I N L I N E  CCNTROL OF PROPELLANT FLOWS 
TO ENGINE COMBUSTION CHAMBER. TEFLON I S  
ONLY NONMETALLIC MATERIAL NORMALLY I N  CON- 
TACT WITH PROPELLANT. 
NO DIRECT CONTACT WITHFLUID. 
NORMAL OPERATING 
ELECTRICAL 
CURRENT 
L I M I T I N G  
(AMPS) 
.?  -
0.25  
0 . 2 5  
0.25 
0 .25 
15 
7.5 
VOLTS 
2 8  
4 
2 8  
1 / 2  
2 8  
2 8  
2 8  
NORMAL FLUID  
PROPERTIES 
CHARACTERISTICS 
AMPERES 
1.8 TO 
OPEN 
1.3 TO 
CLOSE 
1 0  M I L L I -  
AMPERES 
100 M I L L I -  
AMPERES 
1 M I L L I -  
AMPERE 
100  M I L L I -  
AMPERES 
4 F.MPERES 
AUTOMAT!C 
1 AMPERE 
DIRECT 
1.4 
AT 
PRESSURE 
PS! 
1 8 0  
180  
N/A 
N/A 
N/A 
185  
N I A  
COMPONENT 
TEMPERATURE 
OF 
7 0  
7'7 
NIA  
N/A 
71) 
N/A 
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FIGURE 3.4.11. TRANSDUCER, PRESSURE 
3.4.3 -3 P r o p e l l a ~ t  Isolation Valve 
Propellant isolation valves are normally in  the Open condition and 
are not normally cycled during f l ight .  Therefore, fa i lures  due t o  
cycle l i f e  are insignificant. A single fa i lure  of the bellows would 
allw the propellants t o  cane in  contact with si l icon rubber (a non- 
compatible i x t e r i a l )  and the i n s t r m n t a t i o n  postion switch- and 
wiring (a  pcssible ignition source). The bellows has been pressure 
+,estea t o  3000 ps i  before failure.  This is well above the burst 
capability of the p r o p e l l a ~ t  tanks. The bellows design has sa t i s -  
factori ly passed operational t e s t s  of 400 cycles. The probabzi ty  of 
a bellows failure under present operati% conditions (not more than 
one ope r a t  i r ~  cycle or abnoraml pressure transients ) is extremely 
small. The propellant isolation velves are considered acceptable 
becawe of the extremely law probability of exposing non-metallic 
material t o  the pl p l l a n t s .  I n  addition t o  cer t i f icat ion tes t ing these 
valves ha-ie s h m  compatability during the propellant compatabaity 
tes t .  Figwe 3.4.12 shows the isolation valve and lists the material 
of i t s  c q m e n t s .  
3.k.3.4 Engine Valves 
Each engine has two actuator valves (one oxidizer and one fuel) .  
Each valve has two coils  (one auto and one manaal) . A single fa i lure  
mode does not exis t  that  would expose additional non-metallic material. 
Engine valves have been exposer?, t o  a broad range of temperatures with- 
out failures. In  the event heat i s  induced by the e lec t r ica l  power 
t o  the coils  or by the s t r i p  heaters the resulting temperatures are 
acceptable. Operating history and prapellant conpatability t e s t  
also demonstrate the acceptability of the engine valves. Figure 3-4.13 
shows the WRCS engine and lists the materizl oT i t s  coqonefits. 
3.4.3.5 Heater, T h e m  Switches and Tenperzt~lre Transducer 
The SM/F.CS heaters are mounted i n  manner t o  prevent contact with 
the propellants. Figure 3.4.14 shows the WRCS engine housing, loca- 
t ion of heaters, location of themo switches and location of package 
teuiperature neasmenent. 
The affect  of propellants upon sil icon rubber under 180 psia  presslire 
with an ignition source present i s  not ham. This i s  not considered 
a problem since t e s t  data indicates that, even though a single point 
fa i lure  mode exists that  could bring propellant in  contact wjth the 
s i l icon rubber, the safety factor of the corrponent is high. 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5 .  
6. 
7. 
'a. 
9. 
10. 
*11, 
12. 
13. 
*14. 
FIGURE 3.4.12. SM RCS ISOLATION VALVE. 
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~ 8 8 8 8 # 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 l l ~ ~ 8 f 1 I I U # 8 I l # ~ O 8 # I 8 8 8 8 ~ I 8 8 I 8 8 R ~ ~ I 8  17. Oxidizer Pre-ieniter Tub9 - Cre. A286 
m - r 11,. Fuel Pro-igniter Tube - Cres 62E6 
m .. Fue'L V d l l @  : 15. Pro-lgniter Insert  - Cres A286 
= (Same as Oxidize-; iialvt?) 16. Prc-igniter Chamber 
m q*17. T h e m 1  Inoulator - Plast ic  h i ~ t a  
I : 18. Seal - 1.605 Cobalt h a s  Alloy 
(. 
- 9 19. a p l i t  Ring - Reno 01  
m m 
m 
m 
m 
m 
I 
I 
1. t r i m  Orif ice - C n a  3(& 
2. Strainer  - Cms 316, 321; 347 
3. Valve Body - Cmm 446. 
0. Auto Coil 
5. Direct Coil 
6. Plug - Cmm ub 
7. S p r i w  - Ineonal x 
I. Anraturo - Crea U6 
4. Valve Seat Arsy - AM 355 w/TW t e i lon  s e a l  
10. h e 1  Valve Attach Rult8 - 6AGLV T i t a n i u  
11. Oxidizl. Valve Attach Bolts - Crer A286 
12. In jec tor  Housing - 6061T6 L~ILR&IIU 
*Non-metallic material 
F I G U R E  3.4.13. ROCKET ENGINE 
.
 . 
.
 
FIGURE 3.4.14. 
SM RCS ENGINE HOUSING. 
3-5-1 FUNCTIONAL DESCBIPTIO?T 
The SPS consists of a helium pressurization system, a propellant feed 
system, a propellant gauging and u t i l i za t ion  system, and a rocket engine. 
The fuel  is  aerozine -50 (A-50) and the oxidizer is inhibited nitrogen 
tetroxide (N204). The pressurizing gas i s  helium. Figure 3.5.1 is  a 
f'unctional flow diagram of the SPS. 
Eible 3.5.1 i s  a l i s t i n g  of tl!e tank and f l u id  component materials used i n  
the EPS. This l i s t i n g  include:. materials which are  wetted by the N204 and 
A-50 i n  rrormal cperation and following a single sea l  or bellows fa i lure .  
mble 3.5.2 defines the compatibility of material used i n  the oxidizer 
system and the rationale for  t h e i r  acceptance. Refer t o  table 3.3.2 of 
the CM RCS section for  the canpat ibi l i ty  of materia.1~ which may be con- 
tacted by- the oxidizer i n  the event of a single fa i lure ,  s p i l l  or leakage. 
Table 3.5.3 defines the compatibility of materials used i n  the fuel  
system and the rat ionale fo r  t h e i r  acceptance. Wble 3.5.4 defines the 
compatibility of materials which may be contacted by the fuel  i n  the event 
of a single fa i lure ,  s p i l l  or leakage. Necessary data on the following 
materials are  not available and tes t ing  has been in i t i a ted .  
a. ~ - p / ~ o v a r  reaction (295 nickel, 17% cabalt  and 54$ iron) 
b. A- ~;O/Ni-8pan-c reaction . 
d. ~ ~ 0 d ~ o l d e r  flamnability (96.5% Sn, 3.5s Ag and QQ-8-571) 
MECHANICAL COMPONENlY AND 
3.5.3.1 9 
Pressure for  the S E  fuel  and oxidizer tanks i s  provided by th2 helium 
pressurization subsystem. TarLk pressure is controlled by redundant two- 
stage regulators. Failure of a primary stage of a regulator resu l t s  i n  a 
regulated pressure increase from approximately 186 t o  191 PSI. Failure of 
a secondary stage would not increase tank pressure. milure of both stsgea 
open could resu l t  i n  tank rupture as  t'ne r e l i e f  valve capacity i s  l e ss  than 
the flow ra te  through the fa i led regulators. The fa i lu re  of both stages 
open i s  considered remote. 
FGZIEF VALVES 
The pressure r e l i e f  valves consist of a r e l i e f  valve, a burst  diaphram and 
a f i l t e r .  Diaphram rupture pressure i s  219 f 6 K I G  and the r e l i e f  valve 
relieves a t  212 R I G  minimum and 225 WIG maximum pressure. During normal 
system operation, the burst diaphram provides additional protection against 


FIGURE 3.5.1. SERVICE PROPULSION SYSTEM 
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NASA - MSC 
Table 3.5.1, a, SPS MATERIALS 
PART NAME 
Helium tank 
Sump tank . 
( h e 1  & oxidizer) 
Retention res  : 
Door assy 
Screen assy 
Storage tank 
(me1  oxidizer) 
Door assy 
O-ring 
GN;! tank 
PART NUMBER MATERIAIS 
~ 3 7 -  31~7108 ~ A L -  4v titanium 
V37- 3b2102 6ALhv titanium. 
6061 AL alloy & 
Cres honeycomb 
V37- 470204 Titanium & Cres tubing 
~ 1 7 -  470451 ~eflon-AMS-3651 . 
Cres & 6061 AL alloy 
V37- 343102 6 A L ~ V  Titanium 
~37-470203 Titanium & Cres tubing 
10059-16- 505 RAYCO S e a l  (~ef lon) '  
10054- 5- 705 
119578 (Aerojet) AM 350 s ta inless  s t e e l  
Table 3.5.1, b, SPS MATERIALS 
PART NAME PART NUMBER MATERIALS 
SPS OXIDIZER PROBE 
Flange base 389660, 389661 6061-~6 AL 
6061-~6 AL 
302, 303 Cres 
Tube tower 389653 
Terminal Assy 's ' .  384055, 386964 & 
389685 
Cornpens a t  or  386548 
Ring support 386380 
C-ring outer 386381 
C- r ing intermediate 386379 
C-ring inner 386526 
Bracket ~ & t h  38948- 1, 38947- 1 
Teflon, TFE MIL-P-2296 
Teflon, TFE ~ 1 ~ ~ 2 2 9 6  
per MIEF 14072, f in i sh  E 300 
Ground tube assy 38709 
Tube ground 389707 
Bracket 389379 
Inner Tube Assy 
3003-A- 18 WW- T- 700/2 
3003 F- 18 WW- T- 700/2 
3008-~- 18 W- T- 7 ~ / 2  
6061- ~ 6 5 1  
6061 - ~ 6 5 1  
6061 - ~ 6 5 1  
SNlOO 
Teflon-TFE Type 2, Class "E" 
Tube, lower 
Tube, inner 
Tube, Upper 
Sleeve , Upper 
Sleeve, Lower 
Sleeve, Center 
Solder 
Washer Insulator 
Bushing, s p l i t  
Spacer Grd Shld Teflon TFE Type 2 
Class G Spacer col lar  389682 
Sleeve 
Clamp hold down 
Outer tube 
Temp tube & plug 
Table 3.5.1, c ,  SPS MATERIALS 
PART PART NUMBER 
SPS OXIDIZER PROBE (continued) 
PT sensor support assy 389690 
Mount r ing  389695, 389696 
Support 389101 
Clamp assy 
Band clamp 
Buckle clamp 
Collar insulkted 
~ a l f  co l l a r  
Clamp spacer 
Spacer 
Cap scuff 
Pin Lock 
Tie bar 
Sensor r i n g  
Terminal 
Solder 
Rushing, Gpacer 
Spacer 
Stand off  
Brackett 
Screws 
Washer 
Lug terminal 
MATERIAL 
Tef lon-FEP 
AL alloy per MIL-A-21110 
~ l l o y  NO. A 356 Class 2 
A grade "C" 
305. Cres 
302 Cres 
Teflan FEP 
Teflon FEP 
301 Crea 
6061 ~ 6 5 1  
Teflon FE? 
Teflon - TF'3 
3iX2 Cres 
6061 ~6 
Table 3.5.1, d,  SPS l44!IZEUlS 
Pk. NAME PART NUMBER 
SPS OxLdizer Probe 
(contl d )  
Pin lock 
Wire lock 
Cabie clamp 
Iug solder 
Ins shoulder washer 
Ins. tubing 
Wire 
Insulator 
SPS Fuel Robe 
Flange base 
Ttibe, tower 
Bushing 
Ferrule 
Primary sensor 
glass tube 
Temp tube & 
plug 
Iug 
Clamp ring 
Clamp hold dawn 
Rod spacer 
Teflon 
Kovar 
52-460 Westinghouse 
G l a s s  gTex 
Teflon -Ti3 
60616 
2024 
Teflon-TFE GROUP A 
MIL-P-19468 
Table 3.5.1, e, SPS MAnRIAIS 
PPm NAME PART NL'MBER 
SF'S FUEL PROBE 
(continued) 
Clamp assy 
Band clamp 
Buckel clamp 
Collar insulated 
Spacer collar 
Clamp spacer 
Point sensor support 
Mount, r ing 
Plate 
Ring sensor 
Tenninal Assy 
P i n  lock 
h i n t  sensor & 
Tube Assy 
Tube conduit 389476, 38847'1 
Sn~kber 389006 
Insula5or tube 389474 
b i t i t .  sensor 389213 
comp assy 
MATERIAL 
301 Cres 
302 Cres 
Te f lon-FEP 
Teflon-FEP 
B!I~=A-2ll80 ~ 3 %  Class A grade 
Te flon-FEP 
5052 - ~36-%A-318 
tj061-~6 
Kovar & G l a s s  
Teflon '1%E 
3003 AL alloy - ~ 1 4  
Teflon TFE 
Teflon SEP 
~poxy/laminat e 
Type FL-~B-062C2/2 
MILP- 13949 
PART NAME PART NUMBER 
PRESSURE TRANSDUCER 
(wetted components ) 
-dy ME 449-0052 
Seal ME 261-0011 
Seal ME 261-0010 
PROPELLANT UTILIZATION VALVE 
(wetted components) 
Valve body & 483704 
actuator assy 
Bellows 
Gate assy 483723 
Lubrication Dixon 95-1 
SPS ENGINE ASSY 
Propellant l ine AGC ~2196-11 
Bleed l i ne  AGC ll2906 
Fil ter ,  Screen AGC 712135-5 
F i l t e r  seal A 58040 El-235 
Fi l te r  discharge ~37-470-231 
MATERIAL 
NI-SPAN 
Teflon 
Teflon coated V-ring 
AMS 5362 D CRES, 347, 304, 
440, & 304 CREs 
Am 5548 CRFS 
304, 347 & 410 CRES Teflon TFE 
Flora-Carbon LUB , 
CRES 321 
Teflon & CRES 3046, 321 or 347 
CRES 347, 321, 3046 QQ-S-763 
Teflon 
C m  3046 
Table 3.5.1, g, SPS MATEmLS 
PART NAME PART NUMBER 
- 
SPS ENGINE ASSY 
Pressure port plug 
Fi l ter  discharge 
Pressure port seal  
Propellant Line 
To S/C interface 
seals 
Propellant l ine 
To valve seals 
Orifice plate 
Fi l ter  snap ring 
RACO ses l  
RACO seals 
Bipro~ellant valve AGC 115505G8 
Spacer 1 3  54672-1 
Spring 1133793-1 
B a l l  seal  ll54272- 4 
Spacer IJ-54033- 12 
E a l l  seal cage 1154034-2 
Bearing 1132998- 11 
Seal 1132997- 3 
B a l l  shaft 1154506-6 
Valve ba l l  1153975-4 
Shaft seal(RAc0 seal) Coml  prod 1-1-694 
Was her 11551ll- 1 
Washer 
Spacer 
MATERIAL 
Teflon 
Teflon 
Teflon on spring s t ee l  
Butyl "0" ring 
Teflon on spring s tee l  
CREs 304 Cond A &&-5-763 
C ~ S  17-7pH AMS 5673 
Cres 17- 7PH MI~-S=250k3 
AL a l l  606100-A-~OO/E 
25 -11, Anodize MILA-8625 T 
I t  
Teflon on Arm alon 
Teflon AGC 46087 
CRES 17- pH AMS 5643 
Cres 17-VIl AMS 5644 
CRES 307 QQ-s 763 
Polytetra (teflon) AW 44087 
Fluoroethylene or AMS 3651 
CRES 302 &&-S-763 cond A 
Table 3.5.1, h, SPS MATERIALS 
PART NAME PART NUMBER 
SPS ENGINE ASSY 
(continued) 
Bipropellant valve 
(continued) 
Nut 
Washer tab 
Shim 
Expander 
Seal spring 
Cage m i s e a l  
Cage body 
Spring holder 
Seal 
Shim 
Cage screw 
Washer 
Safety wire 
B a l l  Cage 
Plug 
Seal retainer body 
Helical spring 
CAF screw 
Valve cord 
Coml prod AR10105-235 
CRES 17-7 AMS 5644 
CRES 304 Q ~ S - 7 6 3  
CREs 17-7 PH MILS-25043 
AL 6061-~6 anodize MILA- 8625, Type 
I, CL I optior. alodine 
MIL-C-5541, C 1  I, grade 
optional 
C R E ~  17-7pH AMS 5644 
C m  17-7PH 5673 
CRES from AS 4476-63275 
AL alloy 3 5 6 ~ 6  
Table 3.5.1, i, SPS MAlERIALS 
PART NANE PART NUMBER 
SPS ENGINE ASSY 
(continued) 
Injector's header 711525-17 
Valve t o  injector 10053- 3 
RACO seals 10054-3.931 
Injector purge plug 1121387-1 
Injector purge 
Plug seals Packing AS8040 
Lubricant 
Combustion chamber AGC 11230l.l 
l iner  
Combust ion chamber 1122981-1 
To injector gasket 
Combustion Chamber 1121358-1 
t o  injector "0" ring 
I n j  A .  alloy 5 0 8 3 4 ~ 3  
Header Al 36-76 
Teflon over spring s t ee l  
Teflon 
FS 1281 
Elastomer modified 
Phenyl- silane impregnated 
i n  s i l i c a  fabric 
Silicone Ribber 
Silicone Rubber 
TABU 3.5.2 COMPATIBILITY OF SPS OXIDIZER SYSTm MATERIALS NORMALLY EXPOSED TO NITROGEN TETROXIDE 
*G - Good, P - Poor, U - Unknown. 
**References : 
1. Compatibility of P l a s t i c s  with L i ~ u i d  Propellant,  Fuels, Oxidizers, January 1969; P l a s t i c s  Technical Evaluation Center, 
Picat  inny Arsenal, Dover, New Jersey. 
2. Compatibility of Materials with Rocket Propellants and Oxidizers, January 1965, Bat te l le  Memorial In s t i t u t e .  
REwmKs 
Acceptable fo r  t h i s  applicat ion 
s ince it is a secondary seal .  
Test required. 
Teet required. 
COMPATI- 
BILITY 
C 
G 
C 
C 
0 
C 
P 
C 
0 
U 
U 
C 
G 
C 
C 
C 
C 
. C 
G 
G 
G 
G 
C 
NONMETALS 
APPLICATIONS 
Sec. 1 
Sec. 1 
0-Ring 
Compensator Ring 
Washer 
Bushing 
Spacer 
cap 
Pin 
Pin 
Ring 
Collar 
Ineulat ion 
Seal 
SPACECRAFT 
cOMPOm 
Tanks 
Screen Assembly 
Door Assembly 
Oxidizer Probe 
I-' (D 
w 
Fressure 
Transducer 
mFEmc~/ 
PAGE NO.** 
2/28 
2i28 
2/28 
2/28 
2/28 
2/28 
l / 8  
2/28 
2/28 
2/28 
2/28 
2/28 
2/28 
2/28 
2/28 
2/28 
2/28 
2/28 
2/28 
2/28 
2/28 
COMPoNENT 
MATERIAL CONTAINED MATERIALS 
Titanium 
ss 
Teflon 
Titanium 
Crese 
Teflon 
Butyl 1 
Aluminum 
Stainless  S tee l  
Solder QQ-S-57% 
Solder 96.5SN/ 3.5AC 
Teflon TFE 
Teflon TFE 
Teflon TFE 
Teflon TFE 
Teflon TFE 
Teflon TFE 
Teflon FEP 
Teflon FEP 
Teflon FEP 
Teflon FEP 
N I  Span C 
Teflon V-Ring sea l  
TABLE 3.5.2 COMPATIBILITY OF SPS OXIDIZ-i SYSTEM MATERIALS NORMALLY EXPOSD TO NITROGEN TETROXIDE - Concluded 
Bipropellant 
Valve 
SPACECRAFT COmNENT CONTAINED MATERIALS COMPONENT I MATERIUI I 
Propellant 
Ut i l iza t ion  
Valve 
NdNMETALS 
APPLICATIONS 
Crea Stainless  
Aluminun: 
Teflon 
Teflon T 
Teflon 
Teflon TFE 
Teflon FEP 
Cres Stainless  
Teflon 
Dixon 95-1 
Flora-Carbon Lub 
Coated Spr11. j~ 
Bearing 
S e a  
Washer 
Waaher 
Gate Asaembly 
Lubricant 
F. 
.G - Good, P - Poor, U - Unknown. 
**References: 
1. Compatibility of P las t ics  with Liquid Propellant,  Fuels. Oxi 
Picatinny Arsenal, Dover, New Jersey. 
2. Compatibility of Materials with Rocket Propellants and Oxidj 
iizers,  January 1969; Plas 
, e rs ,  January 1955. Battel 
-
COMPAT1- 
BILITY 
RATING* 
REMARKS REFERENCE/ PAGE NO. ** 
Acceptable i n  t h i s  application 
s ince f a i l u r e  is required fo r  
exposure. 
i c s  Technical Evaluation Center, 
.e Memorial In s t  i t u t  e. 
TABLE 3.5.3 COMPATIBILITY OF SPS FUEL SYSTFM MATERIALS NORMALLY EXPOSED TO AEROZINE 50 
Fuel Probe 
G - Good 
P - Poor 
U - Unknown data 
REMARKS 
Acceptable fo r  t h i s  
application since it i s  
a secondary seal .  
Test rzqd. f o r  reaction 
Test reqd. f o r  reaction 
REFERENCE** 
PAGE NO. 
2/28 
2/28 
2/28 
2/28 
2/28 
2/28 
l / 8  
2/28 
2/28 
2/28 
2/28 
2/28 
2/28 
2/28 
2/28 
'OMPAT'- 
BILITY 
RATING * 
G 
G 
G 
G 
G 
G 
P 
G 
G 
G 
G 
G 
G 
G 
U 
U 
G 
NON'META..S 
APPLICATIONS 
Seal 
Seal 
0-Ring 
Conduit Tube 
Clamp, Rod 
Base Flange 
Clamps 
Primary Sensor 
C l a p  and Pin 
Insulator Collar 
Seal 
CONTAINED MATERIALS 
Stainless  S tee l  
Teflon 
Titanium 
Cress Steel  
Teflon 
h t y l  Rubber 
Aluminum 3003 
Aluminum 2024 
Titanium 6061 
Cress S tee l  
Glass, mrex  
Teflon TFE 
Teflon FEP 
Kovar 
N i  Span C 
Teflon 
V-Ring 
SPACECRAFT 
COMPONENT 
Tanks 
Screen Assembly 
Door Assembly 
Pressure 
Transducer 
MATERIAL 
Titanium 
FAL 4V 
TABLE 3.5.3 COMRATIBILITY OF SPS FUEL SYSTEM MATERIALS NORMALLY EXPOSED TO AEROZINE 50 - CONCLUDED 
I.. Compatibility of P les t icc  with Liquid Propellants, Fuels, end Oxidizers, January 1969; 
P las t ics  Technical Evaluation Center, Picatinny Arsenal, Dover, new Jersey 
2. Compstibility of Materials with Rocket PropeU.ants end Oxidizers, January 1965; Battel le  
Memorial In s t i t u t e  
COMPAT1- 
RATING ,, 
BILITY 
G 
G 
G 
G 
G 
G 
G 
G 
R r n m N C  X** 
PAGE NO. 
2/19 
2/19 
2/19 
2/20 
2/20 
2/20 
2/20 
2/20 
REMARKS SPACECW COMPONENT 
Probe 
CONTAINED MATERIALS 
Stainless  S tee l  
Titanium 
Aluminum 
Teflon TFE/FEP 
Teflon TFE 
Teflon TFE 
Teflon TFE 
Teflon TFE 
COMPolmT 
MATERIAZ, APPLICATIONS 
Eladder 
Gasket 
Vent Probe 
Pad 
Vent Line Spacer 
TABLE 3.5 -4  COMPATIBILITY OF M A T E R I A U  NOT NORMALLY EXPOSED TO AEROZINE 50 
REMARKS COMPATIBILITY I I RATINGa FAILURE 
Aluminum 
Aluminum 
REFEIIENCE/ 
PAGE NO. 
Aluminum/ Silicone 
Alminum/Epory 
Aluminized Mylar/H-Film 
P 
C 
-4 Anocized Aluminum 
Fiberglas 
H-Film (polyimide ) 
m a r  ( polwinylidene 
chloride) 
.Structure and/or Tubing 
Name Plates 
Honeycomb 
Thermal Insulation 
Structures (gold, blue, 
and brown 
Circuit Baards 
Spot Ties 
Wire Insulation 
Ill Sleeves and Heat- 
Shririk Tubing 
Indefinite 
Indefinite 
~ 2 4  hours 
~ 2 4  hours 
H-Film 
dissolves 
immediately 
Indefinite 
Decomposes 
i n  1 hour 
Indefinite 
1 hour 
30 days 
Data D i s -  
crepancy 
Probably similar t o  Mystic 
7402. 
Probably similar t o  Mystic 
7402. 
Depends on type of epoxy. 
W l a r  dissolves i n  30 days. 
H-Film dissolves immediately. 
Probably similar t o  other 
aluminum alloys. 
Electrical  properties w i l l  
degrade. 
H-Film begins t o  clissolve 
h m ~ d i a t  ely 
K$nar w i l l  crack and b l i s t e r  
a t  160° F. 
*G - Good 
P - Poor 
U - Unknown 

TABLE 3.5.4 COMPATIBILITY OF MATERIALS NOT NORMALLY EXPOSED TO mOZINE 50 - Concluded 
1. ~ ~ m ~ a t i b i l i t y  of P l a s t i c s  with Liauid Propel lants ,  Fuels,  and Oxidizers , January 1969; P l a e t i c r  Technical 
Eh-aluation Center, Picatinny Arrenal,  Dover, New Jersey 
L. C o m ~ a t i b i l i t y  of Matarials with Rocket Propellanto,  and Oxidizers - January 1965; Ba te l l e  Memorial I n s t i t u t e  
3. w e r g o l i c  Propel lant  Materials Compatibility, No. CR 64-88; Martin Company 
R W K S  
Blesches 
Bleaches 
Similar  t o  Tygun 
PAGE NO. 
DOCUMENT/ 
1/55 
1/55 
1/55 
3 
3 
2/19 
3 
RATING 
COWATIBILITY 
0 
0 
G 
U 
P 
P 
P 
u 
U 
U 
U 
U 
MATERIAL(S) 
Teflon TFE 
Teflon TFE 
Teflon TFE/FEB 
TG-15000 Fiberglas  
73-X 
Vinyl (polyvinyl 
P 
chlor ide ) 
(T, 
U) Avcoat I1 
Cork 
Unidentified 
Unidentified 
Ucidentif l ed  
- 
USAGE 
S t r a i n  Rel ief  Guard 
I D  Tags 
Heat-Shrink Tubing 
Thermil Insulat ion 
Torque S t r i p e  Paint  
Marking Ink 
Wire Insulat ion 
mFsy 
FAILURE 
Heatrhield Material  I 
Door Sealant 
Sleeves (black and 
yellow) 
Lanyard Cover (green ) 
Pot t ing  Compounds 
(blue and brown ) 
I 
helium leakage. The r e l i e f  valves are  sized t o  accommodate pressure in- 
crease from any t3ermal sources such a s  soak-back fram engine burns. 
There are  two heli-,m supply tanks i n  the SPS. These tanks have no e l ec t r i c a l  
interfaces or in ternal  sources of tank pressure increase. The fue l  c e l l s  
are  an external source of pressure and temperature increase t o  the tanks. 
This i s  insignificant  during normal operations. f i e 1  c e l l  temperatures 
are  closely controlled and an overheated fuel  c e l l  would be shut down 
before it could cause a significant  pressure increase i n  the helium tanks. 
The SPS tanks are  pa r t i a l l y  shielded by the radialbeams and would not 
respond t o  the F/C temperature increase i n  f l ight .  The probability of a 
helium tank fa i lu re  is  remote i n  the  absence of any significant  sources 
of temperature or  pressure increases. 
Two N2 tanks a re  located on the forward end of the 8PS engize. !Bey supply 
the N for  activation of the bipropellant valves. They have no e l ec t r i c a l  
intergaces of sources of pressure increare. Rvpture of these fa.&@ i s  
remote i n  view of the high factors of safety and the absence of any aourcgs 
of pressure increase. 
The SFS fue l  sump and storage -C are  located i n  sectors 5 acd 6 of the 
service module. The pressure control and r e l i e f  capabi l i t ies  a re  discussed 
i n  paragraphs 3.5.3.1 and 3.5.3.2. The only in te rca l  source of pressure 
increase i s  the gaugSrg pro3es which are  discussed i n  paragraph 3.5.4.1. 
It i s  concluded t ha t  the probes are not a sigziificant source of temperature 
or pressure increase unless ignit ion occurs. 
Ftiilures were experienced with the tanks during the program development. 
These were associated with the use of methol alcohol i n  the tanks. Exist- 
ing process con+,rol prohibits the use of msthol alcohol i n  the tanks. 
n e s e  tanks are  considered acceptable i n  t he i r  presen+, application i n  view 
of the absence of a single fa i lu re  which would significantly increase the 
tank pressure or temperature. Corrective action has been accanplished for  
a l l  defined fai lures.  
3.5.3.6 S D I Z E R  8m-P AND STORA_C;E TANKS 
The SPS oxidizers sump and storage tanks are located i n  sectors 2 and 3 of 
the service module. Tfie pressure control and r e l i e f  capabil i t ies are  
discussed i n  paragraphs 3.5.3.1 and 3.5.3.2. The gauging probe is an 
in ternal  sowce of pressure increase and i s  discussed i n  paragraph 3.5.4.1. 
It i s  concluded t ha t  the gauging probes w i l l  not cause a significant  
temperature or pressure increase.unless ignit ion occurs. 
Tank fa i lu res  exixriences d~u'ing program development were associated with 
the  use of methol alcohol and uninhibited N204. ;'recess control changes 
and the use of inhibited N204 have been ins t i tu ted  as  corrective actions. 
These tanks are considered conditionally acceptable i n  t he i r  present appli- 
cation. The only reservation i s  the possible flammability of tef lon i n  
the N204. There are  no other single point fa i lures  which would s ignif icant ly  
increase tar-k pressure or temperature. 
The following e l ec t r i c a l  components interface with the propellant feed 
system. Bible 3.5.5 i s  a summary of the e l ec t r i c a l  characterist ics of 
these components. 
3.5.4.1 J'ROPELIANT GAUGING P R m  
Each .of the SIT propellant tanks contains a probe assembly fo r  quantity 
sensing. Propellant quantity i s  measwed Qr two sewsate  sensing systems, 
p r h a r y  and auxiliary. The primary sensors a re  cylindrical  capacitance 
probes, mounted axia l ly  i n  each tank. In  the oxidizer tanks, the probes 
consist of a pai r  of concentric electrodes with the oxidizer used a s  the 
dielectr ic.  In  the fue l  tanks, a pyrex glass probe, coated with silver 
on the inside, i s  used a s  one conductor of the capacitor. Fuel on the 
outside of the  probe i s  the other conductor. The pyrex glass i t s e l f  forms 
the die lect r ic .  The auxil iary system u t i l i z e s  point sensors mounted a t  
intervals along the primary probes t o  provide & s tep  function impedance 
change when the liquid l eve l  passes t h e i r  location centerline. Hgures 
3.5.2 and 3.5.3 are exploded views of the fue l  and oxidizer probe assem- 
blies.  The sycten i s  powered only during SF'S burns. 
A hazard analysis for  shorted voltages i n  the sensors of the probes has 
been performed and i s  included as  appendix "a." A hazard fo r  fue l  probe 
leakage is a l so  included a s  apperdix "b." These analyses conclude t ha t  
th?. power available a t  a shorted sensor ca-mot cause a significant  tempera- 
ture increase t o  the thermal mass of the probe asseniblies unless igni t ion 
occurs. K ~ v a r  i s  used which could ac t  a s  a catalysis  for  decomposition 
of A-50. 'Test i s  required t o  resolve t h i s  question. 
Temperature sensors are  provided on the f i e 1  and oxidizer tanks and lines. 
They a re  bonded t o  the tank or l i ne  exterior and do not introduce addit ional  
materials t o  the f lu id  systems. The sensors operate a t  2 milliamperes a t  
0 t o  5 volts  and are not a significant  heat source t o  the system. The 
signal conditioners operate a t  30 milliamperes maximum and are  fused a t  
0.25 amperes. 
TABLE 3.5.5. SPS ELECTRICAL COMPONENT CHARACTERISTICS. 
I I I I 
COMPONENT 
NORMAL OPERATING 
ELECTRICAL 
CHARACTERISTICS 
I VOLT I AMPERE 1 WATT I 
CURRENT 
L I M I T I N G  
PROPELLENT GAUGING PROBES I I I I 
PRIMARY 
AUXILIARY 
26 MAXIMUM 
26 MAXIMUM 
12.5 MAXIMUM 
FOR SINGLE 
SH9RTED SEN- 
SOR 
0.3 AMPERE TO 115V 
POWER SUPPLY 
0 .5  AMPERE TO 115V 
POWER SUPPLY 
TEMPERATURE MEASURE I 5 MAXIMUM I 0.002 I I 0.03 AMPERE I N  SIG- NAL CONDITIONER 0 .25  AMPERE L INE FUSE I I I I 
PROPELLENT I IT IL IZATION VALVE I I I I 
TACH-GENERATOR 
MOTORS 
2 AtqlPERES 
1.0 AMPERE PRIMARY 
1.5 AMPERE AUXILIARY 
MOTORS 1 57.5 1 
PRESSURE TRANSDUCER I UI*MuN I 
L I N E  HEATERS 
BIPROPELLENT VALVE OXYGEN 
OXYGEN FEEDLINE 
OXYGEN FEEDLINE 
BIPROPELLENT VALVE FUEL 
FUEL FEEDLINE 
FUEL FEEDLINE 
BIPROPELLENT VALVE 
SOLENOIDS 
POSITION TRANSDUCER 
0.3 AMPERE PRIMARY 
0 .5  AMPERE SECONDARY 
I 0 , 0 1 5  MPERE I N  SIG- NAL CONDITIONER 0 . 2 5  AMPERE L I N E  FUSE 
1 0  AMPERES 1 0 .25  
15.0 
9 .4  
, 18.8 
0 .5  
9 . 4  
18.8 
NORMAL FLUID ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS 
PROPERTIES AT EXPOSED BY 
COMPONENT I SINGLE FAILURE 
10 AMPERES FOR SYSTEM 
1 0  AMPERES FOR SYSTEM 
1 7 8  1 +45 TO +75 I NONE 
STRAIN GAGES s 
1 7 8  
1 7 8  
+45 TO +75 
+45 TO +75 
NONE 
NONE 


3.5.4.3 J'ROPELLANT UTILIZATION VALVE 
The propellant u t i l i za t ion  valve i s  located i n  the oxidizer l i ne  and i s  
used t o  control the oxidizer t o  fue l  r a t i o  during SPS burns. The e l ec t r i c  
motors and gear t r a in  are  isolated from the N204 by redundant bellows as  
shown i n  figure 3.5.4. The bellows have a burst pressure greater  than 
120C PSI. The fa i lure  of both bellows i s  c~ns idered  remote. There have 
been no bellows fa i lures  i n  the PU valve development. The motors are  
designed for an normally operate with locked rotors. The two motors 
and the control electronics operate a t  approximately 12 watts and are  
powered only during S E  burns. This is  not a significant  heat input i n to  
the system. 
A cross-section of the pressure transducer body is shown i n  figure 3.5.5. 
The diaphram i s  in tegral ly  machined anfl has a minimum burst  pressure of 
1500 =I. Failure 3f the diaphram would expose only the s t r a i n  gauges 
t o  the propellants and i s  considered remote i n  view of the high factor 
of safety. Fbilure of the seals  would expose propellant t o  the outside 
and not t o  the e l ec t r i c a l  components. The sensor operates a t  2 milliam- 
peres and are  not a significant  heat source t o  the system. The current 
i s  limited t o  15 milliamperes by diodes i n  the signal  conditioner. The 
body of the transducer is  Ni-Span-c which could act  a s  a catalysis  f a r  
decomposition of A-50. Test i a  required t o  resolve t h i s  question. 
8 E  l ine  and engine heater ins ta l l a t ion  i s  shown i n  figure 3.5.6. A 
simplified e l ec t r i c a l  schematic is shown i n  figure 3.5.7. The heaters are  
laminated between si l icone impregnated fiberglass layers. The assemblies 
are  bonded t o  the l ines  with RTV silicone. When on, they produce a 
temperature increase of approximately one degree per how. They are  
manually controlled t o  supply heat t o  the system i f  required. Their use 
i s  not required during normal mission operations. If l e f t  unattended i n  
the powered condition, they could heat the propellants and produce some 
increase i n  t a n k  pressure. This unlikely event could be accommodated 
by the pressure r e l i e f  valves. me  fa i lure  mode is  fo r  the resistance 
element t o  fai l  open which does not consti tute a hazard t o  the system. 
Figure 3.5.8 I s  a cross-section of the bipropellant valve through the 
oxidizer and fuel  parts. Valve position indicators a re  operated by the 
gear rack and are isolated from the propellants by s i x  seals. The large 
thermal mass of the valve assembly prevents any significanf temperature 
increase from a shorted transducer. Valve operation i s  by N2 actuators 
and does not involve an e lec t r i ca l  interface with the propellants. 
305.5 SJIRY OF UNRESOLVED I S L ~  
The only unresolved issues on the SPS are  those of material compatibility 
as noted i n  3.5.2. Of part icular  concern i s  the lack of data on the 
combustibility of tef lon i n  Ng4. %flon i s  used extensively i n  the 
gauging probe and its applications should be reviewed a f t e r  flammability 
t e s t s  on the teflon i n  N204. 

STRAIN GAGES BONDED 
TO DIAPHRAGM 
I r NI - SPAN C 
FIGURE 3.5.5. PRESSURE TRANSDUCER BODY 
FIGURE 3.5.6. SPS HEATER INSTALLATION. 
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FIGURE 3.5.7. SPS HEATER SCHEMATIC. 

The CSM mechanical system includes nitrogen suppljj tanks for several 
functions and a f i re  extinguisher. !he pressure vessel characteristics 
are summized in table 2.0. Tank materiels are l isted 3x1 table 3.6.1. 
The S M  GN ta?lk is located on the X = @ SR4 shelf behind the panmanic 
camera as &om i n  Figure 3.6.1. Ihe tank supplies for the S M  
cameras. There are no internal canponents CT electrical interfaces t o  the 
tank. There are no external sources of temperature or press- increase 
for the tank. The tank i s  acceptable for its applicatim as it has an 
adequate factar of safety and there are no siepif icsnt sources of pressure 
or temperature increase. 
Docking -Probe G&, T m h  
There are four GH2 ~~ in the docking prabe. Esch tank car. provide 
for a probe retraction. Egure 3.6.2 illustrates their i n s t a ~ ~ t i o n .  
design missim requires only two remtions. There are no internal con- 
ponents a d  no electrical interfaces t o  the tanks. -re are no s-fi- 
cant external sources of temperature or pressure increase for the tmks. 
The tanks are acceptable for their applicatim as -.by have a factor of 
s d e t y  greater than 3 and there are no significant sources of tank pressure 
increase. The only failirres associated with the tanks were leakage of 
components d m  stream of the tank. The tanks sre sealed by a wel&d 
diaphram which is pierczd for a probe retraction and do not have a failure 
history as canponents. 
Side Hatch Tanks 
C 
There are two (35 tanks 5n the side hat;ch counterbalcace t o  assist  side 
hatch opening. &ure 3.6.3 illustrates their installation. These tanks 
are identical to the docking probe tenks except for an end suppcrt fit t ing. 
They are a c c e ~ ~ b l e  for tiheir application as there are no significant 
sources for temperature or pressure increaser Ihe tanks have a factor of 
safety greater than 3 and have been subjected to  handling tests which 
demomtra+~d impact resistance. Chsrwd tanks were dropped 10 feet onto 
concrete with no damage. 
A f i r e  extinguisher i s  located i n  the CM cabin. !be trPnk i s  charged with 
a water jel and "f'reon 12". A polyethelene bladder separates the charge 
fran the expulsion charge of "freca 12 and 115. " There zm? no e lec t r ica l  
k te r faces  ar spark mechanisms for the tank. 
Normally, there are no external sources of temperature or pressure increase. 
Any fixe for  which the extinguisher is required would be a source of heat. 
The extinguisher is  provided w i t h  a rupture disk which assures against 
overpressurization c ~ f  the tank. The maximm rupture disk pressure is 
375 ps i  and the tank has a burst pressure of 1860 psi. Rupture of the 
disk dumps the water j e l  into the cabin and does not harm the CM materials. 
The tank is cuisidered acceptable far its present application. 
Pressure Vessel 
SIM GN2 T d  
K Seal  
F i t t ing  
Nut 
P/T -or 
Shell 
Pressure Vessel 
GN2 Docking Probe 
Diaphram 
Pressure Vessel 
GN2 Side Hatch 
Diaphram 
Fire Extinguisher 
Pressure Vessel 
Bladder 
Qarge 
Table 3.6.1, Materials, Mechmical Syrtcm 
Material 
17-4 W Gold-Plated 
3041 
CRES 316 
NI4PAN-C 
~ A L - ~ v  Titanium 
Polyethylene 
Water ~ e l / ~ r e o n  12 
and 115 
MULT 
FIGURE 3.6.1. GENERAL ARRANGEMENT, S I M  BAY 
20 5 
PRESSURE / WZ TANK 
FIGURE 3.6.2. DOCKING PROBE ASSEMBLY. 
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An investigation was in i t ia ted  to estimate the damage which would be 
produced by the structural fa i lure  of a pressurized vessel i n  the Command 
and Service Modules. The CSM cryogenic oxygen tank is being investigated 
by Team # 1 and was omitted f r o m  th is  investigation. Because a thorough 
investigation wouJ-8 require substantial m u n t s  of time and money, the 
investigation is limited to gross assessments of expected damage. Assuming 
a tank failure, damage assessments are based on the expected fai lure  modes, 
the stored energy of the tank and the i r  ?roximity to essential  equipment, 
crew, or  other pressmized vessels. Failure ~mde data f r o m  actual planned 
or  inadvertent tes t s  are included for  comparison. 
IBch tank was assumed to contain l i m i t  pressures and be a t  a high ullage 
condition. Failure mdes were obtained by fracture mechanics which uses 
a c r i t i ca l  flaw size t o  predict whether failure would be by tank fragmen- 
tation o r  tank leakage with nq fragmentation. The fragmentation mode was 
subdivided i n b  predicted fragment sizes; a tank that muld s p l i t  into a 
small number of relatively large pieces is  referred to as a rupture failure. 
A fai lure  that  results in  many small sections i s  termed a f'ragment failure. 
The distinction between these two m.pid fai lure  cases i s  based upon the 
tank material properties. Tank failures that  resul t  i n  leakage only are  
not considered t o  cause mechanical damage and are included i n  th is  investi- 
gation for  identification purposes only. !Rmks that  rupture a re  assumed 
t o  produce limited shrapnel with the primary damage resulting f r o m  pressure 
forces. Ragmentation failures produce damage by pressure forces and 
shrapnel. It is  noted that mst tanks' w i l l  f a i l  i n  a fragmentary manner 
i f  any of the three following conditions exists: (1) pressurized to burst 
pressures, (2) penetrated by a sufficiently large particle, o r  (3) the 
tank material is weakened by thermal o r  other environmental processes. 
Very l i t t l e  data were found which could be used for  estimating space 
vehicle damage caused by a pressure vessel failure.  It is apparent that  
tanks with stored energy equivalents of several pmds of T. N. T. would 
produce catastrophic failures of a space vehicle. 
For stored energy equivalents of a fraction of a pound of T.N.T. (which 
i s  the case for  several tanks i n  the CSM and IM), estimation of damage 
becomes more difficult .  Tanks with low energy levels could conceivably 
r~lgture o r  fragment with l i t t l e  resulting damage i f  ideal conditions 
prevailed. For the estimated damage presented In th is  report, the 
assumption was made that the tank exhibiting a fragmentary mde of 
fai lure  will produce shrapnel that penetrates surmunding equipment and 
s t r k  i-e. 
Two previous tank failures were used as  a besis for  estimating damage 
produced by tanks having fractional T.N.T. equivalents. One fai lure  was 
a "hydrostatic" t e s t  of the SPS fuel and oxidizer tanks of s/M-017, 
A summary of the t e s t  condition and damage fallows. ' 
. A fuel  tank ruptured under a pressure of 
appmximtely 240 ps i  wlth an ullage of 4.3%. This pressure and ullage 
would represent approximately 0.134 pounds of T.N.T. The fai lure  ini t ia ted 
a t  a point well below the l iquid level  rupturing the lower region into 
several large pieces. When the fai lure  reached the ullage area, the dome 
of the tank fxagaented. Shrapnel and blast  forces frorathis tank failu.re 
ini t ia ted a fai lure  of an adjacent oxidizer tank. The oxidizer tank also 
had s potential of .13k pounds of T.N.T., thus the combined potential was 
.264 pounds of T.N.T. Damage to the service module was extensive and 
cnder mission conditians wu ld  have resulted in to t a l  destruction of 
the SM and possibly the CM. 
One additioilal tank fai lure  which had a fractional T.N.T. energy equiva- 
lent  was used i n  damage estimation. This was a tank fai lure  which occurred 
i n  the Structures and Eiechanics Labratory i n  1965 (reference 7). A thin- 
walled 301 stainless s t ee l  tank fai led under a pressure of 1337 ps i  and 
an ullage condition of 1.74 representing a T.N.T. energy equivalent of 
apprpximtely .019 pounds of T.N.T. The tank that  fa i led was submerged 
i n  a water bath i n  a second tank for  the purpose of obtaining volumetric 
chawes. The tank containing the bath had a flanged cover from which a 
graduated glass standpipe extended upward. When the inner tank ruptured, 
the bath tank ruptured, sending the flanged top approximately 25 feet  
upward to the building roof structure, bending a s tee l  "I" beam (6'' WF 
15.1 wgt) and column buckling tm s t ee l  T sections. The T sections were 
formed by bolting together two angle sections, 2" X 2", 3/16" thick. 
Also, a sand bag protection barrier around the tank was toppled. 
The structural damage caused by these t m  tank failures with energy 
equivalents of a fraction of a pound of T. N. T., together with analysis 
performed i n  the references 1 through 4, were used to estimate the damage 
capability of rupturing tanks. 
Estimated damage is  discussed i n  each of the following sections on the 
Service Module and the Cammand Wdde.  Included i n  the discussian of 
each section are  tables l i s t ing  the tanks i n  a descending order of 
potential damage capability. 
In  addition to  the above failures, data from reference 3 conclude the 
following. Reference 3 documents the results of a study by Southwest 
Research Inst i tute  on the damage potential associated with an SR3 helium 
tank explosion in  the NUA MSC Vibration and Acoustic Test Facility. The 
conclusions of t h i s  report s ta te  that there i s  a high probability of 
extensive damage and likeliness tLat the exterior walls of the bcilding 
would be blown off and that  the CM would separate from the SM. 
In order to calibrate the reader on potential damage associated with 
explosions, data are presented in  Table 4-1 to show representative 
explosive devices T. N. T. equivalents. 
TABU 4-1 TYPICAL EDIDSIVE EQUIVALENTS 
EXPLOSIVE DEVICE 
Rif le  FYimer (o r  Firecracker) 
.22 Iong Riile Cartridge 
.45 Pistol Cartiridge 
No. 8 Elect r ic  3las:ing Cap 
.3O M2 Ball Rifle Cartridge 
.50 M 2  Ball MG Cartridge 
20 MM HE Project i le  
MKII Fragmentation Hand Grenade 
On2 Stick (one lb) 100s Gel. Qmamite 
Antitank Mine 
IB, EQUIV. 
0. oooog2 
0.000232 
0.000563 
0.00127 
0.00480 
0.0226 
0.025 
T.N.T. equivalent values are calculated by the following equation: 
Tank stored energy 
6 Use 1.4 X 10 ~ t - ~ b / ~ b  T,N.T as heat explosion of T.N.T. 
Then T.N. T, equivalent of pressurized tank is  
- mt 
= dh% - (Y-L)(1.4 X 106) Lb T. N. T. equivalent 
8 = rat io  o f  specific heats (gas only) 
4.2  ISC CUSS ION 
The Service Module t a r h  included i n  th is  examfrlation are  tabulated i n  
descending order of potential damage capabnity i n  Table k-2. Included 
i n  th is  table are tank identification, quantity of tanks, fa i lure  niode 
(based on limit pressure and fracture mechanics) l i m i t  pressure, and 
T. N. T. energy equivalent. The T. N. T. values for  the tanks, were computed 
using l i m i t  pressure data and a 100$ ullage condition. 
Of all the SM tankage, the centrally bca ted  helium pressure tanks for  
the S?S have the maximum potential damage capability. Failure of either 
of the SPS helium tanks w i l l  result  i n  an i n i t i a l  explosion, equivalent 
tc, apgroximately 11 pounds of T.N.T., which i s  expected to propagate 
failures i n  the adjacent helium tank and four SBS propellant tanks. The 
resulting t o t a l  explosive force, approximately equal t o  43 pounds of T.N.T.; 
+ irould destroy the service module and could be catastrophic in  that the 
CM could be destroyed by the explosion o r  by shrapnel penetration of the 
pressure cabin. EScaminakion of data taken from the t e s t  fa i lure  of 
S / C - O ~ ~  SM indicates that a low T. N.T. energy level can cause extensive 
structural damage. The calculated con3ined energy equivalence P s r  the 
two low ullage (4.3% ullege) tanks was ,264 pound of T. N. T. I n  the event 
that tbe CM survives the explosion, damage to the a f t  heatshield and 
separation controller could be catastrophic to CM reentry. 
SPS Propellant Tanks 
The four SPS pmpellant tanks have approximately equal potential damage 
capability. Failure of any one of the SPS propellant tanks could plopagate 
- . - . -. - . . . . . . . . . . . . . .- . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . - . . . . . . - . . - . - - - - - 
*Rnpirical data on effects of internal explosions i n  a i rc raf t  show that 
1 l b  of T.N.T. detonated within the fuselage of any known a i rc raf t  w i l l  
completely demlish the fi~selage. (reference 3). 
TABLr 4.2. - SM TANKS I.ISTED I N  DESCEND1 CG ORDER OF POTENTIAL DAMAGE CAPABILITY 
Fa i lu re  mode estimates are based on l i m i t  pressure condi t ions and 
f rac tu re  mechanics as prescr ibed i n  "Apol l o  Command and Service Module 
Pressure Vessel Operating C r i t e r i a  Specif ications," SEV-0028, G. M. 
Ecord and S. V. Gloricso. 
** Experimental camera f o r  J mission. 
Pressure vessel 
Pressure tank 
He1 i urn 
SCISPS 
Propel l a n t  'lank 
Oxidizer Storage 
SM/SPS 
Propel 1 ant  Tank 
Fuel Storage 
SMISPS 
T r o j S T T Z E  Tank 
Oxidizer Sump 
sn/sps 
PrSopellant Tank 
Fuel Sump 
SMISPS 
Pressure Tank 
He1 i urn 
SMIRCS 
Tressure Tank 
GI4 
SM/SPS 
Pressure Tank Pam** 
Camera GN2/SM 
,C_ - Propel lant  Tar,: 
Primary Oxidizer 
SMIRCS 
Propel 1 ant  Tank 
P r i m r y  Fuel 
SMIRCS 
Cryogenic Tank 
LOX 
SM/EPS 
Cryogenic Tank 
LH2 
,SM/EPS 
' Pressure Tank 
FlC GN2 
Propel 1 ant  Tank 
Secondary Oxidizer 
'SMIRCS 
Propel lant  Tank 
Secondary Fuel 
SM/PCa 
UANTITY 
~E~IJIRED 
2 
1 
1 
1 
- 
1 
4 
3 
- 
1 
4 
i 
2 
2 
3 
4 
4 
TNT 
Equivalent  
LBS I 
10.960 
4.41 4 
. 
4.414 
4.4!4 
4.41 4 
0.362 
-- 
0.051 
0.593 
0.062 
0.049 
1.215 
I 
0.499 
0.259 
0.039 
0.032 
Fai  1 ure* 
Mode 
Frag . 
Frag . 
Frag . 
Frag . 
L i n ~ i  t 
Pressure 
PSI 
3685 
225 
225 
225 
i. 
' 
Frag . 
Frag . 
Frag . 
Frag . 
Rupture 
Rupture 
Leak 
Leak 
Leak 
Leak 
Leak 
225 
4500 
2900 
4500 
248 
248 
1020 
285 
1500 
248 
248 
failurec i n  the remaining SPS p m w t  tanks and possibly the SPS helium 
tanks, causing Rn explosbn appmxipletely equal to 43 pounds of T.N.T. 
Th-. damage t o  *k CSM w i l l  be equ1valer;t to  the h m g e  description wn- 
t ab&  i n  the discussion of the 3 s  helium tanks. 
RCS He.' , i i i  Pressure Tanks 
- 
Failure af aq,- one of the four RCS helium pressure tanks could p~opagate 
a failure ;I the adjacent SPS propellant tank. 
4.2.1.4 Pressuv Tank GN, SPS 
Failure of either of the two GI$ pressure tanks could propagate a failure 
in the SAS propellant tanks. . 
4.2.1.5 Pressure Tank Pa3 Camere GN 
Failure of the G% pressure tank for th, - Fan Camera carried in  the scientific 
bay during mission J ( ~ p o l h  16) coul* propagate a failure in the SPS pro- 
pellant tanks. 
4.2.1.6 RCS Primary Pmpdlant Tank 
Bilure of one of t'h four RCS primary oxidizer p p e l l a n t  tanks or  of one 
of the four RCS primary fcel pmpzllmt t u k s  can in  the worst case f a i l  
the adjacent SFS propellant tar&. A '  ruptuq-ng tank, as we have ir? this  
instance, w i l l  possibly iragment i n t o  several large pieces. The probability 
of imphcting the SPS tanks, although not defined, would certainly be smaller 
than in the case of a fragmentary failure. A mitriraum dama~e estimate, 
assuming the SEE tanks are m t  failed, would i m l v e  possible lass of 
adjacent tubing, electrical wiring, E(CS qued and any equipment in the 
path of the w e n t  trajectories . 
4.2.1.7 R-ining Tanks 
The remaining tanks, II)X cryogenic tank, + cryogenic tank, F/C presswe 
tank, RC:5 secondary oxidizer, and RCS secondary fuel pmgellant tanks, f a i l  
i n  a leak mde a t  lbit pressws,  which i s  m t  considered as a blast or  
shrapnel damsge hazard, but as a Fss ibie  material compatibility problem. 
mere are sppmximately 20 pressure vessels contained within tile Apol lo  
Command M u l e .  The fire extinguisher, hatch pressure assist, and the 
bcking prcbe pressure -ottles were excluded fmm this  discussion due 
ta smal l  T.N.T. equi7ralent d u e s  and large d?sign margins. 
The remaining tanks are l isted iri Table 4-3 i n  a descending order of 
potential damage capabiiity. The table presents the pmbable failure 
mde, l i m i t  pressure and T.B.T. energy equivalent. This order was estab- 
lished on the locakion of the tank within the CM and the factors presented 
in the tablc. 
The guide used to  ccmpare the severity of m g e d  caused by a tank failure 
were as foIlous: 
1) The most severe damage be direct -bcdy injury to the 
crew caused by shrapnel or by rapid decompression. 
2) A second order of severity would be penetration of the crew 
compartment causing a less rapid loss of pressure. 
3) The least severe damage to the CM muld Ite a failure causing 
the loss of a system or  systems. 
4.2.2.1 Helium Pressure Tanks - RCS 
The twr, helium tanks are installed in the aft eqciparent bay within inches 
af the pressure -.bin sideuall. This sideuall is of aluminum sandwich 
mnstruction about one inch thick and muld provide li-:tie p t e c t i o n  
against shrapnel penetration. 
The helium tanks are Fragmen-my type vessels end have a stored energy 
equivalent to approximately 9-14 p o d  of T. KT. Should' either of these 
tmks fail, rela+,ivelylarge boles would be made in the pressure =bin 
resulting in m i d  decompression. However, because of shielding of the 
crew meders by equipment 'mys, the shrapnel hazarO is estimated to be 
slight (references 4 and 5). 
I n  addition, i t  is expected that a failure of helium tank 2 would rupture 
the tw adjacent RCS fuel tanks vith -e t o  the RCS fuel and oxidizer 
tu3ing and wiring muted t h u g 3  the frames behind this tank. The fire 
caused by RCS fuel and oxidizer mixing muld be catastrophic. 
4.2.2.2 Oxygen Surge Tank - ECS 
The ECS oxygen surge tank woulfi be hazardous to the creu sbould it fai l .  
This vessel i s  located within the pressurized crew compartment and is 
irstalled in the left-hand eqaiyment bay approximately 18 inches f h m  
the nearest ast-nact. Analysis shows that this tank w i l l  mil  in  a 
rapture mode, separating into large fnqpents. The close out panel would 
afford l i t t l e  protection for the crew against shrapnel. The panel i t se l f  
could become a missile due to blast pressure. 
In addition to the hazard of possible direct injliry to the crew, it is 
probable that the crew eompar+hient will te rapidly vented due to shrapnel 
being blam thmugh the cabh sidewall o r  by rupture due to blast loading. 
TABLE 4.3.- CM TANKS LISTED I N  DESCENDING ORDER OF POTENTIAL DAMAGE CAPtdILITY 
Failure mode estimates are based on l i m i t  pressure conditions and 
fracture mechanics as prescribed i n  "Apollo Convland and Service 
Module Pressure Vessel Operating Cr i te r ia  Specification ," SEV-0028, 
G. !4. Ecord and S. V. Glorioso. 
Pressure vessel 
Pressure Tank 
He1 ium 
CH/RCS 
Oxygen Surge 
Tank 
CM/ECS 
Oxidizer 
Tank 
CH/RCS 
Propel 1 ant 
Tali k 
CH/RCS 
Cab1 n Repress, 
O x y ~ ~ n  
WECS 
Glycol Reservoir 
CH/ECS 
Potable Uater 
CM/ ECS 
Waste Wzter 
,CH/ECS 
L i f e  Raft 
Pressure 
Cycl I c Accun . 
v 
Quantity 
7 
1 
2 
2 
3 
1 
1 
2 
2 
1 
I-a1 lure* 
M e  
Fragment 
Rupture 
Rapture 
Rupture 
Leak 
Leak 
Leak 
Leak 
Leak 
Leak 
L imi t  - 
Pressure 
P S I  
50CIr 
1020 
360 
360 
1210 
60 
50 
60 
4500 
140 
TF:i J 
Equivalent 
LBS 
I 
0.157 
0.192 
0.056 
0.047 
0.062 
0.002 
- - -  
0 . OO:? 
0.015 
I 
0.027 
0.0002 
' e  2.2.3 Propellant and Oxidizer Tanks - CM/RCS 
All of the pmpellant and oxidizer t a d  of the CM/RCS are located in the 
a f t  equipment bay and have approximately the same stored energy (.05 pound 
of T.N. T. ). The dmage caused by the failure of any one of these tanks 
will be characteristic of each tank. 
All of these tanks are a s s m d  to f a i l  in  a rupture mode under the con- 
ditions specified in the introduction of this  section. 
Like the RCS helium tanks, all of this tankage is ? s s U e d  vithin iaches 
of the crew compartm~nt sidewall, vith a damage potential of fragments 
met ra t ing  the crew compartmnt sidevall resulting in rapid deoomipression. 
However, i f  catastrophic failme 3f tine crew compartment does not occur 
there will be considerable damage to the tubiag and wiring bundles installed 
in  the a f t  equifaent bay. Failure of these tanks could result in damage 
to both FK!S fuel and oxidizer tubing for systems A and B. A minimum damage 
e s t l a t e  would be the loss of one (24 RCS a d  a maximum danage estimate would 
be a catastrophic f i r e  caused by mixing the fuel and oxidizer. Shrapnel 
hazeds to the crew are estimated to be minimal. 
Failure of system 2 oxidizer tanks couid result in  damage t o  the tubing 
and wiring which connect the SM to  the M. This could result in complete 
loss af the SM's systems resulting in  the inability to separate prior to 
entry. 
The proximity of the p~opellant anks to each other and to one of the 
helium pressure tanks provides the qme type of hazard as discussed i n  
the failure of the helium tank. These tanks are within 12 inches of each 
othsr and the failure of either tank wuld probably result i n  the failure 
of all three. 
It i s  predicted that the three cabin repressurization bottles, tbe vater 
glycol reservoir, the potable and waste water tanks, and t h ~  t w o  l i f e  raft  
pressurization bo';tles w i l l .  only leak when subjected to limited pressure; 
therefore, they do not present a significant hazard of danage to other 
structures or systems other thhn by contamination. 
Estimates of structural dainage t o  the SM and CM produced by pressure veesel 
failures were made by cmpering the energy levels of these tanks with 
selected low-energy tank failure data. The majority of the 8M and LM 
tanks have the energy capacity t o  cause aassive e t r u ~ t u r a l  damage. !The 
ovgen surge tank, considered t o  be the most hazardous ZM tank, presents 
a significant shrapnel hazard t o  the crew. The cover panel of the surge 
tank compartment w i l l  l ikely add t o  the tank s'mapnel hazard. This panel 
cculd be dislodged by the tank's rupture and could become a missile witfiin 
the crev compartment. The failure of aw- of the high energy CM tanks 
could resul t  i n  rapid decompression of the crew campartnent and damage t o  
tubing and wiring. Both fue l  and oxtdiker tub iw and wiring are installed 
i n  the a f t  equipment bay with these tanks. 
Recause 09 the large damage capability of the CSM tankage, it is recom- 
mended that  a l l  tank acceptance cr i ter ia ,  t e s t  and checkout procedures and 
operational procedures be reviewed and improved t o  insure e l l  +ankage is 
satisfactory a t  acceptance and i s  not degraded during usage p r i o ~  t o  f l ight .  
O f  particular interest  is  the 02 surge tank which has been accepted (by MR 
action) with porosity as  large as .014", i f  i n  the weld. This c r i t e r i a  
should 'oe reviewed t o  insure i ts  acceptability. 
5.0 CONCLUSIONS 
The foliawing conclusions are  bast9 on the resul ts  of the data review 
accomplished during the Peael 6 ac t iv i t i es  and c'iscmsed previouely in th i s  
=PO"? . ,411 subsystem and coarponents reviewed are  considered ecceptable as 
is, vnth the exceptions noted below: 
ENV.'IliONbENTAL CONTROL SYSTEM (ECS~ 
The quantity gaging system (including the e lec t ronks)  i n  the pohb le  
water and waste water tanks is exposed t o  oxygen a t  pressures of 25 psia 
during f l i gh t  and 35 psia during countdown. The electronics is supplied by 
28 Vdc through two 5 amp c i rcu i t  breakers. The acneptability of this design 
w i l l  require additioaal ignit ion tests which have already been ini t ia ted.  
The following tasks were not canpleted during the ECS review due t o  lack 
of detailed component infomation: 
(1) Review of cyclic accmulator O2 control valve 
(2) Review of 0 flow transducer 2 
(3) Review of 0 pressure transducer, 100 psi systlm 2 
(4) E C  review of noometallics, which are  used on ECS O2 l ine  compo- 
nents, tha t  NR has accepted by similarity. 
(5) Verify that  no e lec t r ica l  sciurce could cane in contact with the 
100 o r  9 psi aluminim l ines in  the O2 ccmtml panel and the ECU. 
m e  required information is  being assembled by the contractor and the 
review w i l l  be completed. 
b. EIiECTRICAL POWER SYSTEW (EPS) 
It was not possible t o  establish the acceptability or  unecceptability 
of the cryogenic hydrogen tank design. Sufficient informatlm could not be 
found i n  the l i terat -  t o  conclusively s t a t e  tha t  shorting of the internal 
e lec t r ica l  components of the tank would not i n i t i a t e  a sustained reaction of 
some kind which could eventual& ei ther  f a i l  the tank or destrcrj a l l  internal 
Rrnctionsl capability. The necessary t e s t s  t o  resolve these issues have 
been ini t ia ted.  
Even i f  such sustained reactions are  shown not t o  exis t ,  it is  not possi- 
ble  t o  determine whether shorting of a single internal component w i l l  or  w i l l  
not damage through propagation to  enough of the other Sntemal f'unctions of 
the H tank t o  cause a mission abort. The necessary tests t o  deternine the 
exten$ of propagation have been init iated.  
Compatibility t e s t s  a re  required t o  establish the acceptability of 
solder and brass i n  I-$ and have been ini t ia ted.  
216 
The direct contact between high pressure gaseom oxygen (935 ps i )  and 
Teflon covered wiring such as in  the fuel  ce l l  oxygen sint off solenoid is  
considered an unacceptable design. 
The 0 purge valves and reactant pressure regulator have nonmetsllic 2 
materials i n  high mechanical s t ress  applications whose acceptability could 
not be unconditionally established. The necessary impact tests  have been 
initiated. The pressure switch and the pressure transducer I n  the O2 
system valve module and the pressure transducer i n  the fuel c e l l  are condi- 
tionally acceptable pending receipt of f'urtber detailed informetion, 
Pyro a.ad entry battery tes t  data are not sufficicint t o  establish pres- 
sure capabi-lity and acceptance procedures ana not adequate to insure sstis- 
factory q u l i t y  control during manufacturing. The necessary t e s t  w i l l  be 
perform4 t o  provide th i s  assurmce. The batteries are believed t o  have the 
required pressure capability. 
c. SERVICE PROPULSION SYSTEM ( s P S ~  
It was not possible t o  establish the acceptability or unacceptability of 
the direct contact of electr ical  components and Teflon w i t h  oxidizer and 
fuel  which ejtists i n  the SPS quantity gaging sensors. Analysis indicates 
there shculd be no problem. Test have been ini t ia ted t o  confirm th is  anal- 
ysis . 
Compatibility (reactive decomposition gf A-50 w i t h  Kovar or ~i-span-C) 
tes ts  are required and have been ini t ia ted tc establish the acceptability of: 
(1) Kovar in Aerozine 50 
(2) Ni-Span-C in Aerozine 50 
(3) Solder i n  Ii2O4 (flammability) 
a. Perform analyses of the L'CS water quantity gaging system t o  determine 
the integrity of the transducer cover and the noa-pimpagation of flame to  
the bladder for  a worst case short i n  the transducer. If the results 
indicate a marginal factor of safety, perform a t e s t  using actual hard- 
ware for both f l ight  and gro: d conditions. A t  the same time,. the requi: e- 
ment for  a water quaiztity gaging system should be re-examined t o  detem:, le 
i f  it is  mandatory fo r  fl ight.  
b. Complete the ECS review for  the following: 
(1) Cyclic accmulator O2 control valve 
(2) O2 flow transducer 
(3) O2 pressure transducer, 100 ps i  system 
c. Complete the review of a l l  nonmetallics on ECS 0 l i ne  conqonents 
that NR has accepted by similarity. If any m n m e d i e s  are found not 
acceptable for  O , then review the components which contain these non- 
meta l l ic~ ,  with h e  guidelines f o r  thls study. 
d. Test plans already ini t ia ted should be completed to determine whether: 
(1) Sustained reactions can be ini t ia ted by means of electr ical  
shorts i n  the CS-4 cryogenic hydmgen tank wiring. If 
reactions can be init iated, a re  they sufficiently energetic 
to rupture the hydrogen tank o r  l ines? 
(2) If no sustained reactions can be identified, can a single 
electr ical  short within the tank o r  conduit resul t  i n  fai lure  
of enough tank functions (healxrs, fans, quantity, temperature) 
to result  in a mission abort. 
e. Reevaluate the desirabili ty of adding AVT t e s t s  on tanks with internal 
e lectr ical  components. 
f. Complete the redesign of the fuel c e l l  oxygen shutoff valve (or system) 
already initiated. 
g. Complete the t e s t  ...rig already ini t ia ted to determiae vhethsr sustained 
reactions can be ini t ia ted i n  the SPS quantity gaging sensors within the 
energy limits of each application. 
-1. Complete the testing already ini t ia ted to resolve the compatibility 
issues of the conclusions. 
i. t'mceed w i t ?  the MSC te s t s  of impact of wn-metallic materials i n  
high pressure oxygen tc, resalve the issues associated with the oxygen 
purge valve and reactant pressure regulators. 
j. Rkview expected information on oxygen system valve lmdule pressure 
switch and pressure transducer and fue l  c e l l  pressure transducer t o  
determine validity of conclusions reached to  date and take necessary 
action if proven invalid. 
k. ComlAete the test ing already init iated t o  determine the burst capa- 
b i l i t y  of the entry and pyro bettery cases and modify the acceptance 
t e s t  procedure t o  include a proof pressure t e s t  consistent with the 
results of the bnst test .  
1. Review all pressure vessel acceptance cr i ter ia ,  t e s t  and checkout 
procedues and ogerational pmcedures . 
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This hazard analysis was conducPed to determine the effects of I 
various sensor failure modes with emphasis on add:tional power I I 
dissipation re~ulting from sensor malfunctions. I 
I 
I 
I 
A L L Y S I  S I 
Follotqing are the voltages present at the fuel and oxidizer sensors. 
These voltages are generated in the control unit and are derived I 
from 115 V, 400 Hz primary and auxiliary line from NR. i 
TABLE I 
FUEL ----.,I 
PRIFWRY PiUXILi,hk,Cr, - -. - i 
C D -7 
. ---.-, -f 
1 
-20 VACp 
V A M  . , 8 V, 6KC 
- 6 VDC 
. 
OXIDIZER 
LINE 
1- 
2 - 
3- 
4- 
5 - 
L 
PRIl4ARY 
COLLTlN A 
+26 VACp 
AUXILIARY 
B 
-26 VACA 
27 V,6KC 
2.7 V,6KC 
+10 VDC 
- 6 VDC 
Voltages which a r e  of i n t e r e s t  i n  t h i s  t ask  a r e  the  ones l i s t e d  on 
Line 1 of  Table 1. Voltages on Lines 2 through 5 o f '  Calumn D were 
analyzed and discussed a s  p a r t  of ~ n a i n e e r i n ~  Report E-803 of 
June, 1969. S u m r y  of t h a t  r epo r t  r e l a t e d  t o  +lo V x ,  -6 vx, and i 
6 KC vol tages  of the  a u x i l i a r y  syatem follows: I i 
A l l  t h r e e  power s u p p l i e ~  shor ted a t  t h e  sensor ,  which i s  worst  case, ,  
would cause an increase  in, cu r r en t  through the  0 , s  amp a u x i l i a r y  
system fuse on t h e  115 VAC l i n e  of less than 0.06 amp. This would j 
r equ i r e  only an add i t i ona l  7 wat t s  from the  115 VAC, 400 Hz power 1 
l i n e .  60% of the  add i t i ona l  power would be d i ss ipa ted  i n  t h e  .control 
u n i t  regu la t ing  c i r c u i t  and the remainder d i s s ipa t ed  a t  t h e  r o i n t s  ! 
shor t ing  i n  the  fue l 'p robes .  
OX1 DIZER SXISOR AUXILIARY VOLTAGES 
Voltages l i s t e d  on Lines 2 through 5 of  Column B have b a s i c a l l y  r!-e 
same c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  a s  t he  ones of Column D discussed i n  E-803. 
Analysia of '+lO VDC, -6 VDC, and 6 KC a u x i l i a r y  ox id izer  volteges 
w i l i  no t  be performed due t o  s i m i l a r i t y  t o  a u x i l i a r y  f u e l  voltages ' 
ana lys i s ;  conclusions drawn from a u x i l i a r y  f u e l  could r e a d i l y  be ' 
appl ied t o  a u x i l i a r y  ox id izer ,  
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I Figure 1 shows the routing o f  the voltages listed tn Table I ,  ] line 1. The voltases are generated in the primary and auxiliary 
I power supply and delivered t o  the sensors temperature sens i t ive  I res is tors .  
I Fuses used in the  power supplies have the follouinq charac ter i s t ics : ,  
Fuses Type: 
Character- 
is tics : 
! 
Tests  w e r e  conducted on a Block 11 control  u n i t  t o  ac tua l ly  measure i 
i 
the ombunt o f  power t h a t  could be d is t r ibuted  by the control  u n i t  - 
I 
W i l l  ca r ry  100% load 
and open i n  10  ueconds 
a t  2002. Opening 
t i m e  increaser as T~ 
under sensors shorted o r  maximma p w e r  t r ans fe r  condition. i 
1 
Maximum power t ransfer  is achieved when load (It,) is equal t o  the  j 
: impedance of  the s-urce (2 ) Haxitam power t ransfer  is the  Eg 
point where an increase in current  w i l l  not  r e s u l t  in increased 
pouer. Max- load power is delivered whem the  slope of  PL and j 
ZL is zero a s  shown by diagram, 
w i l l  car ry  1002 load 
and opea i n  10 seconds 
a t  150%. Openin? 
time increases as T* 
- 
- Figure 2 and F i w r e  3 i l l u s t r a t e  the t e s t  setup used t o  determine 
i 
I 
1 effec t ive  res is tance  of  sensor power source. This is accomplished i 
; by loadlng voltage source t o  112 its unloaded value. A t  t h a t  point,: 
: ef fec t ive  res is tance  of the  power source is the  same a s  the load I i 
I 
resistance. I i 
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FIGURE 2 
Power dissipation and load for  each circuit  a t  maximum 
power transfcr is as foUows: 
A = 8 . 5  watts 
B = 8 . 5  watts 
C = 2 . 3  watts 
D = 10.7 watts 
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RETURN 
( A l l l )  AUXILIARY POYER SUPPLY 
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SIGNAL 
GROUND 
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FIGURE 3 
Maximum power transfer and load for each circuit is 
as follows: 
E = 7.8  watts 
F = 8 .2  wattr 
G = 9.6 watts 
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Table 2 i. a t abula t ion  of power d i s s ipa t ion  as a r e s u l t  of the  I 
f a i l u r e  of one o r  more sensors.  
Table 2 
I , I 
SENSORS 
FAILLRE MODE 
1. Pri Ox. 26 VACp Shorted 
2. Aux. Ox. 2E VACA Shorted 
3. Pri. Fuel 2.0 VACp Shorted 
4. Aux. Fuel 2C VXp Shorted 
5. P r i  Ox. 6 Aux. Ox. 26 VAC 
Shorted 
6 .  Pri. Fuel & Aux. Flrel  
20 and' 26 VAC Shorted 
7. Pri. Ox, 6 Pri. Fuel 
20 and 26 VAC Shorted 
- - 
8. Aux. Ox. & t h .  Fuel 
26 VAC Shorted 
9 .  Pri .  & Aux. Fuel & Ox. 
26 VAC (20 VAC Pri. Fuel) 
Shorted 
POUER DISSI ?ATION 
A t  Control Unit I A t  Sensors 
8.7 wa t t s  6.7 watts 
8.4 wa t t s  6.4 wat t s  
6rl wat t s  I . 4.1 wat ts  
12.6 wa t t s  
10.0 w a t t s  1 8.0 wat t s  
9.9 wat t s  7.9 w a t t s  
9.3 watts 7.3 wa t t s  
14.5 w a t t s  12.5 wat t s  
REPORT NO E-''l 
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CONCLUSIONS 
As a r e s u l t  o f  l a b  testin:, it was found t h a t  t he  maximum amount 
o f  power t h a t  could possibly be generated a t  t he  sensors due t o  
any poss ib le  f a i l u r e  mode is in t h e  neighborhood of  12.5 wat ts .  i Power d i s s ipa t ion  occurr ing due t o  the  sho r t ing  condi t ion of one : 
o r  a l l  sensors  would no t  r e s u l t  i n  a s i g n i f i c a n t  temperature change 
due t o  the large bulk o f  heat  d i s s ipa to r  surrounding any shor t ing  . 
poin ts  withh  the sensors  themselves. I 
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1.0 INTRODUCTION 
The following Hazard Analysis was conducted t o  deternine the  
ramif icat ions  of Fuel (A-50) Leakage i n t o  the  Auxiliary System 
cav i ty  on; A) The Auxiliary System B) The Primary System and 
C) The Spacecraft.  
2.0 ANALYSIS 
2.1 AUXILIARY SYSTE4 
.The  f u e l  (A-50) being o f  conductive and cor ros ive  na ture  
a t t acks  the  insu la t ing  mater ia l  i n  the  e l e c t r o n i c  modules 
(point  sensor modules) located i n  t he  Auxiliary cavi ty .  
Improper point  sensor ind ica t ion  may occur along.with the  
loading down of  t he  t h r ee  aux i l i a ry  power supply vol tages  
(- 6 VDC, +10 VDC, +8 VAC @ 6 KHz). The power suppl ies  are 
located i n  t he  cont ro l  u n i t  and are common t o  t he  e n t i r e  point  
sensor system., Fa i lu r e  of these  vol tages  reduces t h e  Auxiliary 
System t o  a nominal flow in tegra tor .  
The above t h r e e  power suppl ies  a r e  contained i n  two modules i n  
t h e  cont ro l  un i t .  
These t h r ee  power suppl ies  a r e  a l l  t r a n s i s t o r  regulated s igna l  
type suppl ies  wi th  cu r r en t  l imi ted  outputs .  A l l  t h r e e  suppl ies  
a r e  derived from the  115 VAC 400 Hz power l i n e .  A t o t a l  sho r t  
on a l l  t h r ee  suppl ies  w i l l  not  draw enough e x t r a  cur ren t  t o  
blow the  0.5 amp a u x i l i a r y  system fuse  on t h e  115 VAC l i n e .  
The regula t ing  nature  a f  both d.c. suppl ies  i s  as follows: 
PROBES CONTROLUNITI yo 
I 
I 
Q I 10 
I 
I LOAD z I 1 
I 
FIGURE 1 
! 
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2.1  continued 
An unregulated d.c. voltage appears a s  V 1  a f t e r  being r e c t i -  
f i e d  from the  400 Hz transformer T1 by t h e  diode bridge D4. 
Capacitor C f i l t e r s  ou t  a.c. noise  caused by the  400 Hz l i ne .  
The d.c. vol tage Vo is  l imited t o  a maximum vol tage by Q and 
zener diode 2. I. i s  l imited t o  a maximum value by Q and R. 
The cur ren t  through R i s  used t o  d r ive  Q. Thus, the  maximum 
output cur ren t  I, is  the  cur ren t  through R times the  cur ren t  
gain  of  Q. Both the  -6V and t h e  +10V power suppl ies  are' capable 
of supplying approximately 100 ma without reducing the  output  
vol tage and both suppl ies  a re  l imi ted  by t r a n s i s t o r  gain a s  
described above t o  approximately 300 ma i n t o  a sho r t  c i r c u i t  
load. 
The 6 KHz o s c i l l a t o r  uses bas i ca l l y  t he  same p r i n c i p l e  f o r  
regula t ion  on an a.c. basis as  follows: 
CONTROL UNIT I PROBES 
I 
I 
I 
I 
1 vo 
I I0 
I 
1 LOAD 
I 
- 
- 
C 
' I  
FIGURE 2 
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Again the  d r i v e  t o  the output  t r a n s i s t o r  Q i s  l i d t e d  by the  
r e s i s t o r  R. Output t r a n s i s t o r  Q d r i v e s  t h e  primary o f  t r a n s -  
former T. The secondary of  t ransformer T supp l ies  t h e  6 KHz 
s i g n a l s  t o  a l l  four  probes. 
I, is  a maximum i n t o  a s h o r t  c i r c u i t  load and is  l imi ted  t o  a 
maximum value  of  approximately 100 m a  by t h e  c u r r e n t  through R 
and t h e  c u r r e n t  ga in  o f  t r a n s i s t o r  Q. 
With a l l  t h r e e  power s u p p l i e s  shor ted ,  t h e  i n c r e a s e  i n  c u r r e n t  
through t h e  0.5 asap a u x i l i a r y  system f u s e  on t h e  115 VAC l i n e  
w i l l  be less than 0.06 amps. 
1 2.2 PRIMARY SYSTEM 
The primary system w i l l  be completely unaf fec ted  by t h i s  o r  
any o t h e r  auxi1,iary system f a i l u r e .  A l l  power s u p p l i e s  are 
p h y s i c a l l y  separa ted  as w e l l  as s e p a r a t e l y  fused. Auxi l i a ry  
and Primary probe c a v i t i e s  are s e p a r a t e l y  h e r m e t i c a l l y  s e a l e d  
and separa ted  by 0.1" aluminum w a l l . t h i c k n e s s .  Incoming power 
l i n e s  t o  both syscems a r e  separa ted  as w e l l  as probe c a b l e s  
and connectors,  1 2.3 EFFECT ON SPACECRAFT 
A s  s t a t e d  i n  (A), an a d d i t i o n a l  0.06 amp max. may be requ i red  
(7 w a t t s )  from t h e  115 VAC 400 Hz power l i n e .  Approximately 
4.5 watts w i l l  be d i s s i p a t e d . i n  t h e . c o n t r o 1  u n i t  r e g u l a t i n g  
c i r c u i t r y ,  and approximately 2.5 w a t t s  w i l l  be d i s s i p a t e d  t o t a l  
a t  t h e  p o i n t s  o f  s h o r t i n g  i n  the f u e l  probe. Nei ther  o f  t h e s e  
power d i s s i p a t i o n s  i s  seen a s  a s i g n i f i c a n t  temperature r ise 
due t o  t h e  low wattage and l a r g e  bulk of  hea t  s i n k i n g  around 
t h e  u n i t s .  1 3.0 CONCLUSIONS 
I n  t h e  event  t h a t  a f u e l  l e a k  occurs  i n  t h e  PUGS Fue l  Probe 
Auxi l iary  c a v i t y ,  t h e  r e s u l t i n g  e f f e c t s  would a t  no time en- 
danger t h e  i n t e g r i t y  of  t h e  Spacecra f t ,  nor  t h e  a b i l i t y  t o  
s u c c e s s f u l l y  c a r r y  o u t  t h e  mission o b j e c t i v e .  
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3.0 continued I 
Considering the Auxiliary System point  sensor operat ion 
(Reference A),  the  two condit ions which could t h e o r e t i c a l l y  
occur are :  incor rec t  Auxiliary Power supply voltages and n 
sho r t  c i r c u i t .  
Concerning the  incor rec t  voltages,  i f  these vol tages  a r e  
reduced o r  t o t a l l y  eliminated due t o  loading, then t he  point  
sensor  operat ion would be disrupted causing an inaccurate  
Auxiliary System. However, the  Auxiliary System would s t i l l  
function,  but, l imi ted  i n  operat ion t o  a nominal flow integrator '  I' 
I n  a worst case shorted condit ion,  it has been ca lcu la ted  t h a t  
a t  no time would s u f f i c i e n t  add i t iona l  cur ren t  be drawn from 
t h e  115 VAC,Hz power source t o  cause the  0.5 amp fuse  t o  blow. 
This i s  a r e s u l t  of t he  system design incorporating cur ren t  
l im i t i ng  c a p a b i l i t i e s  i n t o  the  power supply outputs.  
Power d i s s ipa t i on  occurring due t o  tl-e shor t ing  condit ion i s  
not seen a s  a s i g n i f i c a n t  temperature r i s e  considering the 
low wattage value and extensive heat  s ink  absorbers surrounding 
the  a f fec ted  components. Reference C f o r  spec i f i c s  r e l a t i n g  
t o  Spacecraft  e f f e c t .  
The r e l a t i onsh ip  of t he  Primary System during an Auxiliary 
System anomaly is  one of canplete  i s o l a t i o n  from both a 
physical  and e l e c t r i c a l  standpoint .  Thus, its operat ion i s  
completely anaffected.  
1 
'. 10-019 NASA - MSC 
B-5 
